The choice: social representation and the  formation of the Hellenic Armed Forces by Domazos, Efthymios
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-12
The choice: social representation and
the  formation of the Hellenic Armed Forces
Domazos, Efthymios










MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT 
 
 
The Choice: Social Representation and  




By: Efthymios Domazos 
December 2008 
 
Advisors: Mark J. Eitelberg, 











Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Choice: Social Representation and the 
Formation of the Hellenic Armed Forces 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Efthymios Domazos 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
As societies of the developed part of the world evolved, new trends of military staffing have been 
coming up. The basic trend that used to exist globally till the end of WW-II was the conscription system, 
through which all citizens were obliged to serve. During the 20th century, when globalization became the 
new world concept, when terrorist attacks devaluated armies, when people became wealthier and more 
independent; military staffing, as an issue closely related to the society, was also affected. The new trend 
nowadays is towards the All Volunteer Force. 
The present military conscription system of Greece is constituted by two types of soldiers: the draft 
soldiers and the volunteers. The recent trend in the same country is towards the All Volunteer Force. 
Nevertheless, that trend has raised many arguments about the effect of lack of Social Representation, 
which is directly connected to Military Efficiency. 
Our purpose is to cover an aspect of that dilemma: The Social Representation factor in the 
structure of the Hellenic Military. As our compass we will use USA and other countries’ examples, along 
with the Military Representation Model created by Mark J. Eitelberg. Our destination is the military 
effectiveness of the Hellenic Armed Forces. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
275 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  All Volunteer Force (AVF), Draft, Conscript, Soldiers, Hellas, Greece, 
Armed Forces, Social Representation, Socioeconomic, Military Sociology, Novel. 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE CHOICE: SOCIAL REPRESENTATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE 
HELLENIC ARMED FORCES 
 
 




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 















Approved by:  _____________________________________ 




   _____________________________________ 
   Bryan Hudgens, Support Advisor 
 
     
   _____________________________________   
   Terry Rea, CAPTAIN USN, Acting Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
THE CHOICE: SOCIAL REPRESENTATION AND THE 






As societies of the developed part of the world evolved, new trends of 
military staffing have been coming up. The basic trend that used to exist globally 
till the end of WW-II was the conscription system, through which all citizens were 
obliged to serve. During the 20th century, when globalization became the new 
world concept, when terrorist attacks devaluated armies, when people became 
wealthier and more independent; military staffing, as an issue closely related to 
the society, was also affected. The new trend nowadays is towards the All 
Volunteer Force. 
The present military conscription system of Greece is constituted by two 
types of soldiers: the draft soldiers and the volunteers. The recent trend in the 
same country is towards the All Volunteer Force. Nevertheless, that trend has 
raised many arguments about the effect of lack of Social Representation, which 
is directly connected to Military Efficiency. 
Our purpose is to cover an aspect of that dilemma: The Social 
Representation factor in the structure of the Hellenic Military. As our compass we 
will use USA and other countries’ examples, along with the Military 
Representation Model created by Mark J. Eitelberg. Our destination is the military 
effectiveness of the Hellenic Armed Forces. 
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Military Effectiveness is a goal that has been sought by nations for ages. 
Various factors affect Military Effectiveness, such as economic resources 
sufficiency, training, procedures, manning issues, and others. Obviously, social 
representation is not a common factor to think of when considering the military 
establishment. This factor became important to many, some years after the 
Second World War, when some countries reduced their armies while, at the 
same time, hiring volunteers. As years went by, more and more European 
countries, along with the U.S., based their Armed Forces (A.F.) on volunteer 
soldiers.1 
This at first caused military operational capabilities to rise, as volunteers 
were trained for longer periods and were fully embedded into the military culture. 
The U.S. followed this military structure trend after the Vietnam War in 1973. 
Analysts who focused only on the operational effectiveness of the military were 
very optimistic about the new volunteer-type forces. 
After years of implementing this type of military structure, some 
deficiencies were evident. One of the first to identify the disadvantages of 
volunteer forces was Charles Moskos, a Greek-American professor who lived 
and taught in Illinois and California. Professor Moskos identified a gap being 
created in the U.S. between the society - and specifically the elites - and the 
military force.2 This gap was not only in ideologies and perceptions, but tended to 
be a idealistic gap, too.3 
                                            
1 For a situation as progressed in European armies regarding the volunteers’ participation, 
see Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the Sociology of 
the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003). 
2 See Charles C. Moskos, The Military: More than Just a Job? (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-
Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988); Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and 
David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
3 This is evident in: Roth-Douquet, Kathy, and Frank Schaeffer. AWOL: The Unexcused 
Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country. 1st ed. (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2006), 30; where “we” is the society and ‘they” is the military or vice-versa.  
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Moskos indicated that this gap was being created because the military 
was unrepresentative of the society that it served. This was the beginning of 
numerous discussions, articles and books - especially in the U.S. - about social 
representation in the military. Many felt that this factor not only affected society 
by discriminating among people, but also resulted in operational deficiencies in 
the military.  
Mark J. Eitelberg, influenced by Moskos and other military sociologists at 
the time, continued these studies on military issues related to sociology and 
psychology.4 Eitelberg created a conceptual model for evaluating social 
representation in the U.S. military according to three “measures:” political 
legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity5. This model evaluated the 
degree of social representation in the U.S. military, and determined a method od 
identifying whether it is within acceptable limits. Of course, as a conceptual 
model, it does not give specific values and limits for the proper representation. 
Nevertheless, it provides a compass to follow toward better social and military 
outcomes, according to the factor of social representation. For shortness, we will 
abbreviate this model as MRM Military Representation Model. 
The current discussion has concerned the social representation of the 
U.S., a country which has had an All Volunteer Force (AVF) for more than thirty-
five years; more than a generation long. Greece, on the other hand, took its first 
steps toward volunteerism in the A.F. only as late as 1989. The interesting part 
with the Greek case is that it now finds itself in transition, where volunteers 
coexist with conscripts6, in a ratio of 30 to 70, respectively.7 
                                            
4 For a complete bio of Professor M. Eitelberg go to Mark J. Eitelberg, 
https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb (accessed May 21, 2008). 
5 For more on that model, see Appendix E. 
6 The terms conscript, draftees, and draft force are used in this thesis when referring to 
soldiers in compulsory military service. On the other hand, volunteers are the soldiers who are 
picked by the all-volunteer military. and get paid as military employees.  
7 See John Androulakis, “Volunteers,” Scopia.gr (2008), http://www.ellinikos-
stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as (accessed October 24, 2008). 
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All Hellenic political parties have been discussing new potential military 
structures for at least five years now, primarily increase military effectiveness 
along with social satisfaction. 
This project aims to find a solution for the future of the Hellenic military 
structure, taking into account the factor of social representation. Of course, the 
approach is not as simplistic as it appears. We not only examine if all social 
groups are represented in the military, but also focus on all related military 
aspects such as training, financial budget, operational demands, and others. 
As a compass, we use the U.S. experience, and specifically, the MRM 
model. At first, we examine if the MRM model works in the Greek system, and if it 
is successful, we will apply that model and find out the best solution for the future 
Hellenic military structure. 
Right now, the U.S. happens to be a major military force with many 
ongoing operations. The U.S. military passed from the draft system to an AVF. 
As this appears to be the trend in Europe and in Greece, the U.S. experience 
should provide a very good chance to see some potential outcomes for the future 
in Greece’s military. As an analogy to that comparison, we can imagine a sailing 
boat ahead of us, which experiences some weather situations that we, too, will 
face when passing that same spot; we might choose not to follow that route, as it 
might be too dangerous for us. 
This describes generally the aim of this project and the direction it follows. 
Next, we provide a more detailed “road map” of the project. 
At first, due to the nature of social representation, we not only focus on the 
military, but also look at the inputs and the outputs of it. In other words, we look 
upon the youngsters of Greece entering the military “family”, and those exiting 
into society after completing their service. Figure 1.1indicates the three phases 




Figure 1.1. The Three phases Under Examination in the Present Project, 
Referring Mainly to the Greek Army. 
In the first phase, we identify young people who are willing to be 
volunteers and those who are not. We examine their differences and the reasons 
for their choices. Then we examine their socioeconomic status, which is crucial 
for the whole project. The socioeconomic status of these individuals in Greece is 
further defined. Through this distinction, we identify those who would prefer to 
volunteer based on specific socioeconomic criteria, which give an idea of the 
socioeconomic structure of the volunteer force specifically. 
We continue by examining potential obligatory service for woman, which 
yields some very interesting results for Greek society, based research results.8 At 
present, women in Greece are not obligated to serve as soldiers. Nevertheless, 
they have served for more than twenty years as professional volunteers for 
example petty officers in the navy, and a decade ago, they were allowed to enter 
military academies to become officers. The contemporary dilemma in Greece is 
whether women should be conscripted to raise the declining numbers of soldiers 
eligible for conscription. On that issue, we provide clear answers based on 
analysis and ample survey data. 
 
                                            
8 Throughout the project, we use reliable sources for acquiring survey data such as the 
“Eurostat” and the “Hellenic Statistical Agency.”  














Next, we make some generic observations about the Hellenic Military 
officer academies, so that the reader can better understand this extra option for 
youngsters, and also get a more general idea of the whole military structure of 
Greece, apart from the lower soldiers’ base. 
In the second phase, we examine the military by itself, as a closed 
system. We start with the analysis of the two distinct lower bodies of the military: 
draftees and volunteers. we search out the pluses and minuses of their service 
according to specific factors: economical, operational, training, and, finally, 
mobilization. That issue is explored in a more detailed manner when the MRM 
model is discussed.  
In a volunteer-conscript comparison, we also add a sociological flavor by 
trying to estimate how society views each group. This again will be useful in the 
last phase of the project, where the focus is on the society itself. Apart from the 
perception of society, we analyze what types of soldier military leaders prefer. 
This aspect of senior officers’ perceptions provided a wider view of how 
volunteers and draftees are seen by all of the groups related to them. 
After that, we touch on the critical concept of representation. We try to 
answer the question of what representation is and why it is needed. What are the 
specifics in the Hellenic Military that support the feature of representation? In 
analyzing these questions, we arrive at with a new concept the “Modern AVF 
armies that act as a global police force.” This concept creates a perception in 
society that the military is equivalent in some way to the police force, so, only 
those hired for this purpose should do the job and the society in general has 
nothing to do with them. We ultimately reject this new perception, drawing upon 
plenty of military and sociological-related arguments.  
After completing the examination of all the above inquiries, we came to the 
conclusion that social representation is a critical factor in the Hellenic A.F. To 
determine just how critical it is, we utilized Eitelberg MRM model. First, we had to 
test if its characteristics are applicable to the Greek situation. This proved to be 
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quite an interesting quest; apart from validating it for a European country, we also 
identified some generic limitations on the type of countries for which the MRM 
model should be used. The MRM model focuses on three basic balances along 
with attitudes and ideologies concerning social representation in the U.S. military: 
racial/ethnic, gender, and socioeconomic. Especially for the Greek case, we 
tested and used only one aspect of the MRM model: the socioeconomic 
representation of the society groups in the military force. We excluded 
racial/ethnic issues because Greece does not face any of those issues in its 
military force. Additionally, we did not examine any gender representation issues. 
For this aspect of social representation, we proposed a different way of 
evaluating the unit measurement of male-female representation. Considering that 
no country in the world has 50-50 representation in its military, there should be a 
deficiency in the way we measure representation. Our views were that we do not 
have to count for this male-female division individually, but rather by viewing 
families.  Traditionally, families elected to have their men represent them in the 
army and their women to stay behind. Therefore, if the proposed unit 
measurement is the family, there is no gender distinction to be observed. 
Therefore, the only representation issue that we considered critical was 
the socioeconomic representation of draftees and volunteers in the military. To 
our understanding, this socioeconomic representation factor is the most critical 
one in Europe, and especially in Greece. 
The application of the MRM model had many surprises; although we 
believed that it would be only a qualitative approach with no specific proposals, it 
turned out that this model, along with the mathematical logic tool of “Proof by 
Contradiction,” provided a specific solution for the future Hellenic soldier-base 
structure. Of course, we do not provide specific number ratios for the level of 
draftees or volunteers. However, we do provide a specific structure proposal for 
the whole army.9 
                                            
9 In that project, we use several words interchangeably to refer to the military, including 
Armed Forces (A.F), Army, and services. 
 7
With that proposal, we conclude the second phase of the project. The final 
phase focuses on how society interacts with the military in Greece. This is a very 
interesting analysis, as we observe the draftees who complete their service, 
return to society, and interact with the rest of the civilians. The outcome of proper 
social representation shows its results first in society, and later in the military. 
The lack of social representation caused problems in society by creating a 
mental and ideological gap between civilians and military personnel. The final 
outcome of this gap becomes evident in the A.F as a lack of military 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
In that phase, we introduce the concept of “Horizontal Control” of the 
military by society, a concept that was also analyzed by Born, Caparin and 
Holtmer.10 We suggest adding this “Horizontal Control” factor to the MRM model 
as a fourth factor for evaluating social representation, or perhaps making it a sub-
factor under political legitimacy. 
In Chapter V, we present a new model created for this project: The 
“Interconnection Military Society” model (IMS). Through this model, we examine 
the value and the outcome of social representation in the Hellenic Military by 
considering the factor of the “Horizontal Control” of the military by the society. 
Apart from interconnecting social groups among them, this type of control helps 
to continuously keep the military in the focus of society and politicians, and 
consequently sustains its effectiveness and improves its efficiency. 
We conclude the first section of this project with Chapter VI, which 
provides a brief presentation of the proposals that came out from this project.  
The project does not end there. There is a second section that will be 
considered an innovation for theses and projects, especially for NPS. The 
advisors for this project, Professor M. Eitelberg and Professor B. Hudgens, along 
with the author, developed the idea of creating a novel-type part for this project. 
                                            
10 Hans Born, M. Caparini, and K. Haltiner, “Models of Democratic Control of Armed Forces,” 
ERGOMAS Research Project (2000): 1-7. 
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Inspired mainly by the best-selling book, The Goal,11 we thought that this feature 
would provide several beneficial features to this project. So, apart from being 
innovative, this short novel will also help in the following ways. 
• Provide a story based on general facts from the survey that could 
make teaching more amusing for the students and easier for the 
teacher 
• The story will be remembered by the students, and they would try 
to find analogies to themselves and their social environment 
• It will ignite lively discussions, arguments, and opposing views, 
which supports in teaching a subject 
• It will provide a foundation for building on other stories in the future, 
so as to create a relevant trend in teaching 
• Finally, the novel has the unique characteristic of expressing the 
feelings of its characters. The lack of such feelings is a deficiency 
of an official research paper, especially when the focus is on a 
sociological issue. For example, in an official paper, we cannot 
express the sorrow of the hero when losing his/her loving mate 
when enlisting, or, the feelings of an elite child about 
socioeconomic status when he is ordered about by petty officers 
who are seen as being socially beneath him. 
In summary, this project seeks to analyze the factor of social 
representation in the Hellenic Military, and how it influences military 
effectiveness. The advantage of this research is that, being qualitative; it 
provides many arguments and perspectives on the issue. Even if some might 
consider the models we used to be questionable, the analysis stays in place, and 
can also be used separately for decision-making. In general, we tried to follow 
logical ways to prove our arguments and exploit sound evidence to answer 
potential readers’ questions.  
                                            
11 Eliyahu M. Goldratt and Jeff Cox, The Goal, 20th ed. (Massachusetts: The North River 
Press, 1984). Another case of a novel-type book is Kathy Roth-Douquet, and Frank Schaeffer, 
AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts 
the Country, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006). 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Military effectiveness is a goal that mankind has sought from the first 
civilized societies. The first discussions about the construction of a powerful army 
took place in China.12 Later on, in 500-400 BCE, great arguments among 
philosophers of that era13 developed over manning14 the armies of ancient Greek 
cities. Plato, in his “ideal Republic,” initially attempts a partition of society. He 
says that the genesis of a society has as its initial cause the specialized needs of 
the individual that one cannot fulfill on his own.15  
Plato recognizes, however, that the needs of the society will eventually 
grow larger, and the resources of the Republic will eventually not be sufficient, so 
the need for war will arise. For that purpose, Plato assigns a new caste: the 
“Guardians.” This group of citizens should be specially educated to defend the 
city effectively. Therefore, Guardians would be the military men who could 




                                            
12 For more on China’s ancient civilization, see Maurizio Scarpari, Ancient China, 1st ed. 
(Athens, Greece: Karakotsoglou, 2000). 
13 Great were the intellectual fights between Aristotle and Plato about manning the Athenian 
Army.  
14 In fact, even the word “manning” starts to be excluded from the military vocabulary, as 
nowadays an increasing number of countries use women to staff their forces. Moskos, Eitelberg, 
and Shields have analyzed some aspects of this new emerging reality, as we see later in this 
paper. 
15 Thus, four or five men constitute the first society that Plato names the Republic: a farmer, 
a shoemaker, a builder, who has as their aim to serve the human needs. Gradually, these needs 
are multiplied as the population increases, and new kinds of professionals deal with these new 
needs. Each one of the members of this Republic shall be specialized only in his field.  
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Apart from that, the ancient philosopher does not agree with the 
representation of the society in that organization, as he believed that only those 
who had high physical and mental abilities should be part of the Guardians.16 
Plato had in mind a purely qualification-based system of conscription in the army. 
In the philosopher’s “Republic,” women are considered as totally equal to 
men, enjoying the same education and the benefit of participating in the 
commons.17 The selection of women for the Republic’s army was the same as 
men’s selection, with the only provision being that they would first give birth to 
their children and then enlist. In fact, this project later presents the same need in 
contemporary society: filling positions in the army with women, while at the same 
time dealing with the problem of a low birth-rate.18 
As Eitelberg notes:19  
One could say that Plato argues against the notion of population 
representation, since he assumes that a selected few are capable 
of performing the task of defending the Republic. At the same time, 
it would argue against massive conscription, since the arm of a 
military draft would pull in many people who might best serve the 
Republic in some other capacity. Further, if we take a closer look at 
Republic, we should find that women are expected to take their 
rightful place as Guardians, alongside their male counterparts, even 
in combat. This is interesting from several perspectives regarding 
gender representation – and not the least of which is Plato’s place 
(ancient Greece) and the fact that he seems so far ahead of his 




                                            
16 Plato’s “Guardians” should combine natural and acquired qualifications. They need to have 
good sight, speed, and agility, and also resistance in rough conditions. Furthermore, they are 
supposed to have also mental talents, be brave and have powerful wills and proper education. 
17 While men are compelled to provide military service from 20 years until 60 years of age, 
women have the same obligation, but it begins only when they give birth to their children and it is 
continues up to 50 years of age. Their military education is reasoned by the wise excuse that 
cities which have women enlisted would have the double number of soldiers than a men-only 
army of another similarly-sized city. 
18 For more, see Neoklis Sarris, Ancient World (Athens: Kaktos, 1997), 293-349. 
19 Mark Eitelberg, personal communication, October 6, 2008. 
 11
militaries, particularly those that have abandoned conscription, is to 
allow women greater access to previously-restricted military jobs 
(for example, combat-related positions).20  
The later Roman Empire utilized an early volunteer system for the military, 
where the higher ranks of the army were a stage for all politicians to go through 
in order to retain their social status in the aristocracy.21 
In Europe, knights, who were mainly upper-class soldiers devoted to local 
aristocrats, prevailed until the 16th century. During this period, whoever could pay 
more would have the best army. Apart from that, the weapons used had some 
technical aspects (cannons, building barriers, etc.), making specialization a 
critical factor. During the 18th century, the form of armies was somewhat common 
all through Europe: officers came from the aristocracy, and soldiers from the low 
socioeconomic ranks.22  
In Germany of 1860, Prime Minister Bismarck made two state institutions 
obligatory: school and the military. That was the main trend during the two major 
World Wars. Later on, the Cold War era, the downfall of the former USSR and 
the tactics of terrorists’ started to change our perspectives on building armies. 
As societies of the developed part of the world evolve, new trends of 
staffing the military have arisen. The basic trend that used to exist globally until 
the end of WW II was conscription, through which all citizens were obligated to 
enlist in the military of their country. A view of the U.S. conscription system can 
be found in G. Flynn’s23 book about the draft in the U.S., while a view of the 
Greek system can be found in the official website of the Recruitment Department 
                                            
20 For example, we’ve seen this occur in the U.S., Australia, Canada, and the UK, as well as 
in a number of other European nations. Proponents of allowing women to serve in the military 
without restriction have often cited Plato’s position. 
21 For more on that era and earlier on see George Steinchouer, War in Ancient Greece 
(Athens: Epimetron, 1996). 
22 N. Toskas, Gen. Ret. “Conscription: Can it be Upgraded?” Strategy 18 (2008). 
23 George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973. 1st ed. (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 
1993). 
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of Greece.24 During the 20th century, when globalization became the new world 
concept, when terrorist attacks devaluated armies, and when people became 
wealthier and more independent, military staffing, as an issue closely related to 
society, was also affected. 
The new trend started to be toward the Volunteer Force (VF) and, in some 
cases, toward the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Conscription, or the draft system, is 
being slowly devaluated as a VF takes its place.25 A general view of the U.S. VF 
is given in the book The All- Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service.26 
The new social “contract” between countries and their societies, that 
people want to have the ability to decide whether or not to participate in the 
military, was first made possible because the countries that accepted the V.F. 
forecast that they would be able to pay for the volunteers, and that a mass-war - 
where a great number of draftees would be needed - was highly improbable. 
Under that prism, our main focus is on military efficiency and how it is 
affected by social representation. Charles Moskos27 and Mark Eitelberg have 
contributed the most to that area. In fact, Eitelberg has created a model called 
the “Convergence/Divergence Model of Military Representation,”28 or the Military 
Representation Model (MRM). This model serves as a tool for examining the 
reality in a country other than the U.S. with distinct social and economical 
differences. That country will be Greece.29 
                                            
24 Hellenic Recruit Office, http://www.stratologia.gr/ (accessed October 12, 2008). 
25 For more about international trends in the ‘90s see Volker Gelhausen, “The Effects of 
Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the Successful implementation of an All-
Volunteer Armed Force,” Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis (1998). 
26 Barbara A. Bickler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Wagner, The All Volunteer Force: Thirty 
Years of Service, 1st ed. (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2004). 
27 Professor Moskos passed on in May 2008. 
28 For the sake of economy, we will refer to that model throughout this thesis by the name 
Military Representation Model (MRM). 
29 Greece is a European Country, participating in all world institutions and has a very distinct 
culture; thus, it is a great case for examining if it is valid for that country also. 
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Prior to 1997, Greece’s military corps was totally based on draftees.30 
Dimitrios Smokovitis31 gives us a picture of the Greek military during the ‘80s. In 
1997, Greece inaugurated the use of volunteers to substitute the demand for 
draftees.32 This came up as a need of the modernized army as well as the 
modernized society. As of this writing, the mandatory service for a draftee is 
twelve months, while a volunteer must serve at least four years.33 Greece is now 
on the crossroads of deciding whether it will cease the draftee force in favor of 
the AVF. 
This study covers one aspect of that dilemma, the social representation 
factor, for each of the two available conscription systems: draftees and the VF. 
Our goal is military efficiency and our guide is the example of the U.S. and other 
countries, along with the MRM tool. 
B.  MAIN PART 
1.  Military Efficiency – The Conscription System 
As the dual system of conscription in Greece is relatively new,34 few 
bibliographical resources or other tools are available, that examine this social - 
military area.  
After the Vietnam War, the U.S. transitioned to an AVF system,35 and now 
there are several discussions as to whether another system is needed. The 
                                            
30 The Greek military is divided mainly into three parts: officers, petty officers and draftees. 
The last is the biggest part, and will be the core of our study. 
31 Dimitris Smokovitis, “Greece,” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. Charles C. 
Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 249. 
32 See Hellenic Law: Ν. 1763/88 «Recruitment of Greeks» (FΕΚ 57 Α') as replaced by the 
articles: 5, 7 and 12 of Ν. 2510/97 (FΕΚ 136 Α'). 
33 See Hellenic Law: N 2936/2001, “Professional Volunteers and Other Articles,” FEK 
166/25, July 2001. 
34 It was fully implemented in 2000 and is still evolving to an unknown destination. 
35 George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, 1st ed. (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 
1993). 
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fundamental research on that aspect was done by Moskos.36 In framing his core 
question, “Military Institution or Occupation?” he defines the Institution as the 
draft system, where military service is considered as an obligation to the country. 
His Occupation mostly refers to the AVF system, where the soldier considers his 
military duty as a job, mainly measured by monetary and other relevant 
benefits.37 
The debate over Institution vs. Occupation (I/O) is considered by Moskos 
similar to the debate over Economics vs. Sociology in the military. In Exhibit 1, 
we present a part of Moskos’ study that lists the I/O Factors.38 
Analyzing these two military systems, Cotton39 explicitly supports the 
Institutional structure for the following reasons: 
• The military should not be isolated from democratic society, as a 
potentially different military culture/ideology might be a threat for 
the democratic political structure of a country. 
• A military model based on market rules is isolated from civilians 
and, furthermore, lacks cohesion among its soldiers. 
Moskos40 adds that the Institutional model evaluates its personnel by 
“whole person” criteria, which means that a draftee is considered as a paradigm 
of a good general attitude toward the military and society. 
On the other hand, the Occupational model focuses on how one practices 
a job only while on duty: this kind of private company–like evaluation takes away 
the ethical element that unifies in peace and at war. In general, motivation is 
                                            
36 Charles Moskos, “Institution or Occupation” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. 
Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988).  
37 For that phrase and for the whole study, we are using he/his as an indication of a person 
in general. We do not intend by that to underestimate female personnel. In fact, female personnel 
are part of this study and typicalities in the use of language are more of a burden for the reader 
than recognition of female equity. We will try to enhance and support that equity through the 
actual content of the present study. 
38 Charles Moskos, “Institution or Occupation” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. 
Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 16.  
39 Ibid., 7. 
40 Ibid., 19. 
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based on individualism and materialism for the Occupational model, while for the 
Institutional model, motivation is synonymous with altruism and moral 
concerns.41 T. Parsons has examined that shift from collective to individualistic 
pattern variables,42 which is evidence that the military follows the general trends 
of society. In fact, this is an advantage for the military, as we show later by using 
the MRM. 
The draft system in Greece was much appraised, as is evident from 
Smokovitis’ research43 in 1996. Nevertheless, the validity of the results of that 
research might be questioned, as the research was conducted only among 
young military cadets and not through a more representative sample of Greek 
society of that time. Nevertheless, the answers given at that time by a part of the 
Greek youth are very interesting. The youth who were interviewed believed 
mainly that the draft system is a link between democracies and conscription.44  
Finally, Eitelberg recognizes the Institutional aspect of conscription, and at 
the same time criticizes the lack of that aspect in the AVF.45 The author presents 
eight common views that implicitly support the Institutional model over the 
occupational. 
• Unrepresentativeness of society in AVF 
• Low number of individuals who are willing to enlist 
• Higher cost per recruit 
                                            
41 Charles Moskos, “Institution or Occupation” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. 
Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 25. 
42 Ibid., 17. 
43 Dimitris Smokovitis, in Military Sociology, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat 
Publications, 1999), 321-322. 
44 It is interesting to read the author’s reasoning about the values of the Draft: “The above 
findings express a traditional value and the public opinion that the military transmits and 
preserves the social ideals and values of Greek society. Also, that the military is a “school” for the 
socialization of young people to a “Greek” way of life, to ideals and attitudes prevailing in Greek 
society and to ethnic values, very important for the preservation of Greek society. On the other 
hand, conscription is considered as a democratic institution which brings together young men 
from different social strata, who acquire same socialization, same experiences and same feelings 
of comradeship and a common lot.” Ibid., 322. 
45 Mark J. Eitelberg, https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb (accessed May 21, 
2008). Similar findings can also be found in other books by the same author (see Bibliography). 
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• Lower quality of recruit 
• Missing recruiting goals 
• High attrition rates 
• Increased personnel costs 
• Inappropriate manning46 
The first reason listed above is, according to the author, the most crucial 
one and will be further analyzed later on. 
In addition, Moskos47 analyzes the results of Occupationalism driven by the AVF 
in three categories. 
• Mission Performance: Moskos suggests that performance is not 
getting higher through individual interests and economic means 
• Member Motivation: Moskos argues that Occupationalism replaces 
intrinsic motivation with extrinsic rewards48 
• Professional Responsibility: Moskos’ main argument is that the 
Occupation model is based on decisions made under the sole rule 
of cost-benefit analysis. This way of professional decision-making 
undermines ethics and military benefits, other than profits. 
Despite the fact that Moskos elucidates that clear division, he also admits 
that both types of the model exist in any country’s Armed Forces.49 Cotton 
agrees in general with Moskos on the I/O model and its values. Nevertheless, he 
presents α fault of Moskos’ model, by arguing that he observes the group and 
system perceptions, not the values of the individuals.50 In his words, “Moskos 
                                            
46 Keeping soldiers for an extended service-duty or extensive use of retired personnel. 
47 Charles Moskos, “Institution or Occupation” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. 
Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 4-6. 
48 For motivation through monetary and other rewards, see: Kenneth A. Merchant, and Wim 
A. Van der Stede. Management Control Systems, 2 ed. (Essex, England: Pearson Ltd, 2003). 
49 J. Faris has the same opinion as Moskos. He believes that I/O models are not mutually 
exclusive. See J. Faris, “Social Psychology of Military Service,” in The Military, More than Just a 
Job? ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 
58. 
50 C. Cotton, “Institutional Organization Model and Military,” in The Military, More than Just a 
Job? ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 
42. 
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does not focus on the issue of individual values but on group and system 
perceptions, inside and outside the Military. This writer has measured individual 
values and role orientations, but did so primarily to document the character of the 
Military as a social system.” 
Later,51 Cotton discusses military participation and focuses on youth 
participation in the Armed Forces. His main point is that middle and upper 
classes do not participate proportionally, and the quality of recruits is 
problematic. He suggests an expansion of the recruitment base by working 
toward a more national social representation. Despite his wish, he also admits 
that it is a social fact of life in liberal democracies to find youth who avoid a 
military carreer. For that reason, he proposes a two-tier system with both 
volunteers and draftees.52 
As we can see, we were led through the discussion of military efficiency 
and the evaluation of the existing alternatives of draftee force and VF to the 
general idea of I/O model. This model implicitly uses social representation as a 
measure of efficiency53. 
We perceive social representation as a critical factor in general. Moreover, 
when we talk specifically about a choice between draftees and VF, it is the one 
affected the most, along with perhaps the country’s economical resources factor. 
                                            
51 C. Cotton, “Institutional Organization Model and Military,” in The Military, More than Just a 
Job? ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 
50-52. 
52 His proposal is linked to a National Service for all youth with other than monetary 
incentives for draftees (e.g., training/education). This approach was developed at that time (late 
‘80s) in Canada and was advocated by Moskos in the United States. 
53 Of course, there are many other factors of military efficiency, such as economical 
resources used for the Armed Forces, political support of the military, political “use” of the military, 
training and many others. Still, we consider social representation as one of the most critical 
factors for achieving military efficiency.  
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a. How Social Representation Affects Military Efficiency 
This is the first intellectual “Gordian Knot.”54 That knot is made 
even more complex through multiple other knots, expressed by the following 
questions: 
• Why do we want representation? 
• Does social representation affect military efficiency, and how? 
• How do we measure military efficiency? 
• Do we want an accurate representation of civilian society in the 
Armed Forces? 
• If not, what are the acceptable limits of representation? 
The sword, or the tool, for untying those knots might be found in the 
MRM.55 
Eitelberg focuses on military efficiency through social 
representation, and his basic thoughts are the following. 
• Perfect representation is often described as “microcosmic” 
representation, a miniature reflection or copy of the larger 
population 
• The idealized state of perfect representation cannot be achieved 
under normal conditions- and may not even be desirable. For that 
reason, it is necessary to establish some boundary of “approximate 
representation.”56 
• The application of (MRM) involves complex value judgments and 
reality judgments associated with representation57 
                                            
54 The Gordian knot is said to be the practical problem of untying a knot, that Great 
Alexander of ancient Greece (Macedonia) was called to handle in the 3rd Century BCE). Nobody 
until then had succeeded in untying that knot. Great Alexander put out his sword and cut the knot 
in two, solving the puzzle through the power of the sword and the mind.  
55 The MRM model is presented in Appendix 5. 
56 The perfect and approximate representation is depicted in Eitelberg’s model, presented in 
Appendix 5. The boundaries of E. M are defined by three factors, which also serve as national 
goals: 1. Military Effectiveness, 2. Social Equity, 3. Political Legitimacy. 
57 This model might be criticized for using the problem to resolve the problem. Yet in the 
case of representation, most arguments- most judgments about proportionality – have been of an 
abstract nature. 
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• Those who are no longer responsible for serving their country may 
never gain a full appreciation of civic duty, possibly resulting in 
widespread public apathy and acquiescence concerning the military 
affairs of the nation58 
• Military representation is linked, through the quality of individuals, 
who join, to military effectiveness. When the modern draft ended, 
there was no yardstick for assessing the quality of new enlistees.  
After the above analysis, some people might worry about the 
degree of unit cohesion and morale in an unrepresentative force.  
The response could be given by Guy Siebold,59 who draws a 
connection between military effectiveness and cohesion of troops. Presenting the 
ancient Spartans as an example of cohesion, the article concludes that cohesion 
is a military efficiency multiplier.60 
So far, we have connected low cohesion with low military efficiency. 
The only line left to be connected that between social representation and 
cohesion/unity of the military. But how do we define social representation? Which 
are the distinct social groups that form the society? 
As we see, we have again fallen into another case of a Greek myth: 
That of “Lernea Hydra.”61 That is probably the problem of digging into military 
efficiency; after answering one question, two new ones appear. 
We use the sword tool of MRM for first defining what forms the 
individual social groups that should be represented. Eitelberg refers to four 
evaluative categories in his model. 
 
                                            
58 Actually this might be the case today in the U.S.-society and military gap. 
59 Guy L. Siebold, “The Evolution of the Measurement of Cohesion,” Military Psychology 11, 
no. 1 (1999): 7-10. 
60 There are several other interesting sources presented in that book that enhance our 
understanding about cohesion: to list a few: “Durkheim and the 4 Cohesion Types,” Siebold G. L 
“How Small Unit Cohesion Affects Performance,” and others.  
61 In that myth, Hercules tried to cut off the many heads of a monster called Lernea Hydra: 
for each one head cut off, two new emerged. (For more on Greek myths go to 
www.erevos.com/mythology.) 
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• Minorities (Racial, Ethnic) 
• Women 
• Military Political Views or Political Representation62  
• Recruitment 
These four categories apply to the U.S. situation; this is the first 
point where we should depart from the U.S. and focus more on Greece. 
b.  The Greek Case – Recent Trends 
What has been stated prior to this point fits the Greek situation, too: 
the dilemma of draftees vs. AVF, the target for military efficiency, the goal of 
cohesion. Nevertheless, in Greece, differences in social groups are minor. The 
National Sociological Studies Research Institute of Greece63 gives us some 
fundamental information for the Greek population. 
• There are no significant religious minorities. More than 90 percent64 
of the population is Greek Orthodox Christian.65 
• The total population of Greece is close to eleven million people, 
with less than one million immigrants; the National Statistical 
Service of Greece lists immigrants as making up 7.3 percent of the 
population in 2007.66 Immigrants come mostly from the Balkans.67 
                                            
62 This social category is the most crucial for our study and includes the gap between 
civilians and military in a number of issues, along with the gap of the socioeconomic 
representation in the military. In fact, we consider the socioeconomic representation in the 
Hellenic Armed Forces as the generator of the political representation in them and the core of 
society’s perceptions of the military. 
63 EKE, http://www.ekke.gr/ (accessed October 12, 2008). 
64 Less than ten percent, mostly immigrants, belong to another religious dogma. In that 
single-digit number, there is no prevailing religious minority. Apart from that, for the needs of the 
present study, in the Hellenic Armed Forces religious issues are not a determining factor, as only 
the Greek Orthodox religion is accepted for soldiers. 
65 Orthodox Christians are not divided according to religious beliefs into Greek, Russian, 
Bulgarian, etc.; it is only an administrative division, and the religious dogma is the same. 
66 National Statistical Office of Greece, Hellas in Numbers (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 
2007).This ratio will not affect our study, as these people are not allowed to enter the military. The 
reason has to do with ethnicity and is explained in the passage that follows. 
67 The geographic area east of Italy and west of Russia and Turkey. Countries like Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Romania are considered the poorest in Europe. Some of them were recently 
accepted into NATO and have begun official negotiations with the EU for entrance into the 
European organization. 
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• The numbers of women and men in Greece are fairly balanced, 
with women having a small lead. 
• The birth rate in Greece is very low: 1.3 births per couple;68 this 
means that, while the military needs stay at approximately the 
same level, the number of youth available to cover those needs is 
declining. 
• The socioeconomic structure is based on Eurostat’s69 very reliable 
Office of EU; many political measures proposed by the EU are 
driven by Eurostat’s statistical findings criteria.70  
The subjective decision we have to make for this project is whether 
we should consider the children of immigrants as a minority in the military, or 
include them in the general-population socioeconomic categories. For this project 
we chose the latter option, immigrants’ children as a homogenous group in the 
overall socioeconomic categorization and not as a minority. The reason is that 
soldiers, in order to be admitted as draftees or volunteers, have to be Greek in 
origin and citizenship.71 To gain citizenship is fairly easy: one has to stay legally 
and work in Greece for more than five years. To gain origin is more difficult; a 
person has to be born in Greece, to parents who have at least Greek citizenship. 
As a result, the child of immigrants who chose to join the Armed 
Forces, would have to have been educated totally in Greek schools, and his 
family must have lived in Greece for at least 24 years.72 
 
 
                                            
68 A sustainable population is said to have at least a 2.1 birth rate. 
69 European Statistic Office. http://epeurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal (accessed October 12, 
2008). 
70 Poor is defined as a person earning less than 1000 € per month. 
71 Hellenic Law Directory, www.teialm.gr/nomothesia/syntagma (accessed October 12, 
2008). 
72 Five years for the parents to get citizenship and then nineteen years for the child to go to 
the military. 
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“He who receives Greek education becomes a Greek citizen.” This 
was an empirical “rule” set by the ancient Greek philosopher Isokratis.73 History 
has taught us that this rule is true for all the historical eras of Greece.74  
Based on the above thoughts, we use Eitelberg’s MRM for only two75 of 
the sub-categories of Social Representation.76 
• Political/socioeconomic groups 
• Women 
c.  Political/Socioeconomic Representation 
Regarding Political/Socioeconomic representation, Eitelberg argues 
that77 “...the U.S. Military is less representative of American Society. Military 
service is not shared equally across all segments of society. This disparity is one 
of class, not race, as most people mistakenly believes,” He also strengthens his 
opinion through reports from the Department of Defense that come to the same 
conclusion using other research.78 
                                            
73 Isokratis made that speech, from which the above abstract comes from, in front of the 
Parliament of ancient Athens in the 5th century BCE He initially intended to integrate the 
“immigrants” of other ancient city-states to the leading city-state of ancient Athens. For more on 
ancient sayings, see www.greekquotations.googlepages.com (accessed 12 October 2008). 
74 For integration of Greek ethnic groups through history, see Konstantinos Paparigopoulos, 
History of the Hellenic Natio (Athens, Greece: Kaktos, 1975). The greatest example of all is the 
nearly 400 years of Ottoman occupation of Greece (1453-1821) when the religious and 
educational system of Greeks did not change, despite the fact that the foreign population element 
was not only significant but had also the power to rule the Greek population and the society in 
general.  
75 Eitelberg has also considered the war and peace as very critical factors for determining 
military efficiency according to social representation .See Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military 
Representation: Reflections and Random Observations,” paper presented at the Biennial 
Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD 
(October 1989). 
76 These two sub-categories will lead us to examine the embedded factors of education and 
ability of the youngsters that choose to become soldiers. 
77 Mark J. Eitelberg, https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb (accessed May 21, 
2008), 3. 
78 Mark Magee and Steven J. Nidler, “Citizen Soldiers and the War on Terror,” Progressive 
Policy Institute Policy Report (December 2002): 4 (DoD Report) and 6. 
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Cotton79 seems to agree with Eitelberg by proposing the use of 
indicators of internal and external military integration. He also creates a simple 
model based on the principle that “the greater the external adaptation, the bigger 
the internal integration.” Cotton defines external integration as: “the Social and 
normative links between the Military and society,” and internal integration as: “the 
social and normative links between the Military.” Cotton wishes for high 
integration in both aspects. 
E. Schein80offers Cotton his definition of the term culture: 
The pattern of basic assumptions which a given group has invented 
discovered or developed in learning to cope with its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration, which have worked 
well enough to be considered valid, and therefore to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems.81 
Military culture is a wide area that is directly related to the leaders 
of the military and the quality of their followers, the soldiers. We do not focus on 
that area, as it is beyond the scope of this project. However through many 
readings,82 it is evident that culture is affected by social representation in the 
military, and these two together affect Armed Forces efficiency. 
In Greece, there are no recent studies about social representation 
in the Military. During the ‘80s, D. Smokovitis83 presented the historic trends of 
the social status of military personnel. Officers in the Greek military during that 
                                            
79 C. Cotton, “Institutional Organization Model and Military,” in The Military, More than Just a 
Job? ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 
45-50. 
80 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco, California: 
Jossey-Brass, 1985). 
81 C. Cotton, “Institutional Organization Model and Military,” in The Military, More than Just a 
Job? ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 
45. 
82 See Williamson Murray, “Does Military Culture Matter?” Article presented at the Foreign 
Research Institute Conference, Philadelphia, July 1998; also Allan R. Millet and Williamson 
Murray, Military Effectiveness (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). 
83 See Dimitris Smokovitis, “Greece,” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. Charles C. 
Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 250. 
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period were considered to be upper class and, in some instances, higher than 
the politicians, while soldiers – mostly draftees at that time - were considered 
prestigious and were honored by Greek society, mainly because of the patriotic 
institutional model of the Armed Forces that used to exist. Nevertheless, Greece 
had a black page in its history; the dictatorship of 1967-1974, led by a group of 
medium-rank Army officers.84 That incident changed social perceptions regarding 
the military structure needed in the future. First, society demanded military 
officers to be chosen according to their abilities, and not according to family or 
social relations. Second, society also required a more professional conscription: 
draftees to be placed in positions according to their skills, and the Greek Military 
Model to be changed to a more occupational trend, hiring volunteers for technical 
jobs. 
The trend towards occupationalism was aimed to force the military 
to look after its own business and not other civil matters. Both Smokovitis and 
Radbruch85 agree with this opinion. The latter expressed an opinion toward 
occupationalism in Italy during the ‘80s, as he believed that it would reduce the 
praetorian tendencies of The Armed Forces. 
A more recent look at the matter of social representation comes 
from an NPS thesis by Volker Gelhausen (1998).86 In that thesis, social 
representation is examined for several countries in Europe and elsewhere. There 
are a lot of interesting data-tables and theories regarding the type of military 




                                            
84 Their rank at that time was equivalent to Captain in the Navy, 0-6 for U.S. Army. 
85 Hans E. Radbruch, “Institutional Versus Occupational Model in Italian Military,” Military 
Sociology 1, no. 1 (1985): 3-35. 
86 Volker Gelhausen, The Effects of Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the 
Successful Implementation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1998). 
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evolves. Gelhausen also uses some very helpful elements of Nadler’s 
Organizational Behavior Theory,87 which are also practical for understanding 
Moskos’ I/O theory. 
2.  The Factor of Women’s Representation 
This is the second subcategory of social representation that we examine 
in our study. Eitelberg88 looks upon that issue, first historically. In 1980, women 
made up 11 percent, of the U.S. military while the proportion of women during the 
Vietnam-era draft was fewer than two percent. 
Despite that increasing trend, women’s proportion in the U.S. Armed 
Forces is far below their proportion in society (which is close to fifty percent). He 
then looks at the general argument that was made at that time – and it is still 
made today – for restricting women’s participation in the military. 
• Lower individual ability (compared to men)  
• Lower unit cohesion 
• Lower effectiveness (compared to all male units)89 
In another work of the same author,90 he adds one more concern: combat 
competence. This is another issue that was raised by opponents of women in the 
military. The author, by presenting opinion polls from various media, supports the 
ability of women being capable of undertaking the same combat burden as men. 
But, even if women are indeed capable, will it be a good evolution to have an 
exact representation of women (fifty percent) in the military? Will it be good for 
society? Will it be good for the core of society? For the families? 
                                            
87 David A. Nadler and Michael Tusman, “A Congruence Model for Diagnosing 
Organizational Behavior,” The Organizational Behavior Reader, 1991. 
88 Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations.” Paper 
presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and 
Society, Baltimore, MD, October 1989. 
89 These arguments were similar to the one made for restricting blacks’ participation during 
the late 40s. 
90 Mark J. Eitelberg, “Your Mother wears Combat Boots. But Should She Pack a Gun?” 
Presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Boston, MA, 
August 1990, 12, 14. 
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If we consider M Segal,91 who presented family and military as 
contradicting greedy institutions, which both have great demands with respect to 
loyalty, time and energy, then we could easily pose the question: Could the 
traditional core of family, the mother, who takes care of her children, change to a 
father who takes care of his children? In the same article,92 Rose and Lewis 
Coser present a similar argument and question the ability of society to take the 
burden of a wife that is devoted to the military instead of her family. 
In addition, P. Shields93 examines the perspectives of women in the U.S. 
Military under Moskos’ (I/O) Model. She believes that an unplanned 
consequence of the draft’s system would be an increased reliance of the U.S. 
military on women. She also foresees the trend increasing rather than 
decreasing, as official DoD reports suggest.94 The interesting part of her study is 
the suggestion that women “vaccinate” the Armed Forces with several beneficial 
characteristics, besides the fact that no efficiency–related issue has been raised 
for them since their proportion in the military became bigger. Referring to the 
U.S. Occupational Model, the author suggests that, in spite of their volunteer job, 
women perceive the military in a more institutional way, keeping discipline and 
adventure as high priorities. 
Nevertheless, the aspect of “family as greedy institution” implicitly 
becomes an argument of Shields, as she believes that a woman in the military 
has her “Institutional Identity” eroded by family responsibilities, since the military 
does not really accommodate women. For the Institutional Model of the military, 
the author believes that the typical female enlistee is probably more 
institutionally-oriented than her male counterpart. In general, she believes that 
                                            
91 Mady Wechsler Segal, “The Military and The Family as Greedy Institutions,” Armed Forces 
and Society 13, no. 1 (Fall 1986): 9-38. 
92 Ibid., 13. 
93 Patricia Shields, “Sex Roles in the Military,” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. 
Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 111. 
94 DoD, Manpower Installations and Logistics, Military Women in the Department of Defense, 
II (Washington, D.C., April 1984), 3. 
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women today are integrated in the U.S. Armed Forces, and furthermore, they are 
institutionally-oriented with relevant embedded values. At the same time, she 
recognizes the hindrance that the military poses to a woman on family creation 
and motherhood. 
In Greece thirty years ago, the picture was the exact opposite of what is in 
the U.S. today. During the ‘70s, Greece had a pure draft system; there were no 
women in the military, and the social value of family was in its highest level. 
Furthermore, not many women worked in jobs outside the house and the 
proportion of educated women was far below that of men95.  
 The evolution of Greek society along with the military for the past thirty 
years is really amazing. In 1982, the prime Minister of Greece, Andreas 
Papandreou, signed a law that established legal equity between men and 
women. The military followed society and, in the late ‘80s, the first women as five 
year volunteers, became reality96. 
As Greece was integrating with the European Union, many European 
laws, practices, and jurisdictions applied to Greek society, moving the country 
forward in a more developed and civilized state. 
Still, many disagree with the positive social impact of the EU in Greece, as 
they believe that over-capitalism and globalization destroyed the core of Greek 
Society, the family. This was mainly because wives departed from their typical 
role of child raisers and housekeepers and entered into the job market. As a 
consequence of having a job, women gained more social/economic power and 
self-esteem, a fact that broke the traditionally-defined family of the past century. 
As an indication that supports the above argument, divorces continuously rose  
 
 
                                            
95 For relative research topics, see National Social Research Office of Greece: 
http://www.ekke.gr/  (accessed October 12, 2008). 
96 Dimitris Smokovitis, “Greece,” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. Charles C. 
Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 252. 
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over the past 30 years, and today, they occurring approximately 25 percent of 
marriages.97 This concern is very difficult to answer if we further consider the low 
birthrate of Greece.  
As the military is a “greedy institution” for Greek women, it might also be 
an “unsuitable” one that goes against the Greek social norms and traditional 
family values. Despite the “traditional” social and military values in Greece, 
women in the Armed Forces are continuously increasing in numbers. 
In general terms, the participation of women in the Greek Armed Forces is 
broken down to the following categories.98 
• Officers: Women entered in the Military Academies with the same 
perspectives/career opportunities as men in late ‘90s. 
• Petty Officers : Women entered the Military Petty Officers’ body in 
1999. 
• Volunteers:99 Women were accepted in the volunteer force with 
equal obligations to men in 1989.100 
• Draftees: Women have not been drafted. Nevertheless, during the 
past five years, there have been some discussions regarding a 
possible draft for women.  
As we can understand, the issue in Greece with women’s representation 
is dual:  
• Should they contribute proportionally to the military? 
• Should they also be called as draftees? 
 
 
                                            
97 All relevant data can be found in National Social Research Office of Greece: 
http://www.ekke.gr/hellasinnumbers  (accessed October 12, 2008). 
98 Data found by the Greek recruitment Office http://www.stratologia.gr/ (accessed October 
12, 2008). 
99 Volunteers have at least five year obligation. 
100 There were special admissions to the military for women prior to that. The first women 
entered the Armed Forces in 1979. 
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The National Greek Bureau of Statistics,101 in its 2006 report,102 gives us 
analytical data that conclude the following. 
• Men and women are in approximately equal numbers in Greece 
• Marriages declined, while divorces increased 
• Fertility has declined radically103 
The above facts, along with other research projects conducted by the 
Eurostat, help us define the role and the significance of women in Greek society 
and military. 
3.  Conclusion 
With the help of Moskos’ division of Institutional and Organizational aspect 
of Military, which mostly reflects the draft and volunteer forces, we look upon the 
organizational effectiveness of the military. In more detail, we focus on social 
representation in the military and we are led by the analysis of Eitelberg based 
on the Military Representation Model (MRM), which is focusing on three 
goals/directions:104 political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity. 
These are the goals of a proper social representation; our aim is to try to define 
the “proper” social representation, while implementing it in the Greek military. 
The reasons for our attempt are basically two: first, to check the validity of 
MRM in a foreign environment, and second, to find solutions or new perspectives 
for the Greek military based on that model. 
Social representation in Eitelberg’s Model has various subcategories; 
nevertheless, we analyzed the reasons why we will examine only those two that 
apply in Greek society. 
 
                                            
101 The official department of statistics regarding Greece and its population: 
http://www.statistics.gr/ (accessed October 12, 2008). 
102 National Statistical Office of Greece, Hellas In Numbers (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007). 
103 From 2.09 births per couple in 1981, it declined to 1.31 births per couple in 2003. 
104 See Appendix E. 
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• Political or socioeconomic representation 
• Women’s representation in military 
Greece’s case presents an extra interest for the following reasons. 
• Greece has a great and long history, where many real 
social/military incidents can be evaluated 
• The country is also under a transition period, both in society and 
military terms 
• At present, the military is based on a dual system of draftees and 
volunteers 
• Women are participating in the Greek Volunteer Force, but not in 
the conscription. At present, there are many discussions about 
conscripting women, even for social job conscription.105 
The main advantage of this research is that, until this point, there has 
been no other research in Greece that has officially dealt with social 
representation and the military efficiency of draft and volunteer systems. In 
addition, we are in an era when every suggestion on that has an extra value, due 
to the transition phase of the political views regarding this issue.106 
As for the quantitative part, we borrow some critical statistical data from 
the National Statistical Agency of Greece, the National Centre of Social 
Research of Greece and the European Statistics Office of the European Union. 
This should help us enhance our arguments and find a quantitative steady base 
for our qualitative pillars.  
At this final part, we left a last book to be commented upon: The Goal107. 
This book has no direct relevance to our subject, as its content is about the  
 
 
                                            
105 Social job conscription might be translated as serving the needs of the country in non – 
military positions according to each one’s abilities/ education (e.g., teach in a remote village, 
technician in a university, help in a hospital etc.). 
106 Several articles have been written in Greek newspapers regarding the best military 
system to be followed. 
107 Eliyahu M. Goldratt and Jeff Cox, The Goal. 20th ed. (Massachusetts: The North River 
Press, 1984). 
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inventory management of a factory. The reason we refer to it is that it offers an 
innovative way of presenting inventory management theory and principles 
through a very engaging novel. 
Being inspired by this book, we will try to create a separate part of the 
project uses some characters as “sociological torches,” first in Greek society, and 
then in the Greek military. This last part of the project offers an interesting way of 
teaching through discussion and more interaction with the students. Of course, 
all of its points will be based on the scientific part of the study presented earlier. 
Through this method, we hope to understand the wills and the 
perceptions/emotions of the individuals, answering at the same time the criticism 
of Cotton to Moskos for not including individual values but only collective values 
in his model.108 Some basic autobiographical data are presented in the note 
below.109 
                                            
108 See present chapter, 8. 
109 As the basic author of this paper, I feel it is important to present my strengths, 
weaknesses and a short biographical profile, as the project contains many sociological and 
psychological aspects. First and foremost, I have no predetermined opinion about draft or VF. I 
have been an officer of the Navy for almost 19 years and I have lived and experienced both 
systems on a ship and in an office. Except for being educated in the Naval Academy, I got an 
undergraduate diploma in Social Studies at Athens University. I am married to Catherine, who 
has also served in the Navy as a Petty officer for 19 years now. Both my parents were working, 
and my father (Dimitrios) had served in the Coast Guard as a Petty Officer at first, and then as an 
officer. My mother, Maria, is retired and used to be an accountant in private companies. My 
economic status used to be and is right now between middle and upper middle (according to 
Eurostat’s Criteria). My political beliefs are not at the far end of the political spectrum and I 
consider myself politically balanced. I have not faced any incident in my personal life or in my 
working environment that stigmatized me in any way. 
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III. PRIOR TO THE ARMY 
A.  FACTORS AFFECTING YOUNG MEN’S DECISIONS TO VOLUNTEER 
OR TO SERVE AS CONSCRIPTS IN THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES 
In this chapter, we examine the “who” and the “why” of the manpower part 
of military.110 That means: 
• Who is willing to volunteer?  
• Why is he willing to do so? 
One might ask whether a pro-military examination of military manpower is 
needed. Our reason for examining the choice of youngsters is a direct effect of 
the issue of manning the armed forces, as, in any procedure, the incoming “raw 
material” generally determines the “final product.” In our case, the final product is 
the military efficiency of the Hellenic A.F. 
Aside from who looking at incoming military personnel, we later benefit by 
examining those who volunteer. That benefit is the easier implementation of the 
MRM model, which is based on the socioeconomic factors of those participating 
in the Army force. As a result, we then have an idea of the socioeconomic status 
of volunteer groups.  
Additionally, in this chapter we refine the meaning of socioeconomic 
status. Although we might not offer a detailed refinement, we show which the 
most critical element of socioeconomic status is at least for Greek Society. Again, 
this fact is extremely useful later when implementing the MRM model in the 
Greek military and society. 
Armed Forces’ efficiency is dependent on two key factors. 
• Quality of manpower and administration 
• Quality of technological means/weapons 
                                            
110 As we are examining the present situation of the Hellenic Military, we take as granted that 
every man has to serve anyway as a conscript, so the freedom of choice lies only on whether he 
should be a volunteer. 
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By examining who is entering the military pool, we can determine the first 
factor, quality. 
This examination of the quality factor of manpower will be very useful 
when we focus on the interrelation between those entering the Armed Forces 
and the society in general. 
To understand the factors affecting the choice of a youngster to enlist, we 
should first see what the military has to offer, as well as the conditions that might 
make the military’s benefits most appealing.  
1.  Why These Factors are Crucial 
Instead of examining this subject theoretically, we chose to examine it 
using more qualitative factors and more realistic theories. So we use the 
microeconomic principles along with the tools of supply and demand curves. In 
that way, our analysis is more solid and easier to capture, as most of the 
conclusions in this part came through the supply-demand graphs. 
As is evident, we fully embed the occupationalism theory of Moskos for 
the volunteer force, and we consider the military profession as a labor part of the 
general labor market. So, we use the “Free Market” principle as the one that 
mostly formulates the decision toward military volunteerism. It is also our belief 
that, especially during peacetime, these decisions depend mainly on realistic and 
not ideological criteria. 
The way we construct the “Supply Demand”/ Economic Market Model is to 
correlate the “Military Offerings” to the “Supply” line, and what youngsters ask to 
the “Demand line,” Of course, what people ask for is a semi-free choice that they 
make, as it is closely related to what it is feasible to get. For example, everybody 
would ask for a big salary, but they would also be happy if they could achieve a 
little higher salary than the average of their same-level colleagues. That is why 
we will use as the measure of demand the generally accepted current average of 
each monetary or other value earned as a salary or benefit from each job. 
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a. What Does the Military Offer to the Volunteers? 
• First, a salary of about 1000 €,111 while the average salary of a low-
level employee (one that has only finished school with no other 
education) is approximately 650 €112. 
• Second, military service offers a steady job. This is a very valuable 
benefit, as the present trend in Greece, and in Europe generally, is 
toward privatization and part-time jobs. 
• Third, the military offers full-coverage on health insurance. In 
Greece, health insurance is a kind of public good and everybody is 
eligible to enjoy free health benefits. Nevertheless, there are many 
cases where private insurance is required. In addition, the part-time 
occupation erodes these public-health benefits.113  
• Finally, military service is valued by Greek society, so the volunteer 
would be esteemed by the society in general. Surveys of 
Eurobarometer114 show that the majority of the society (87 percent) 
sees the military job as a highly esteemed.115 
The above are the basic elements of what the military offers to a 
person who chooses to enlist. There are several others, such as health coverage 
of the parents, traveling to other places in and out the country, etc., that we 
chose not to focus on in the present study. 
b.  What the Military Demands from Volunteers 
Of course, there is also another side the military: what it asks from 
volunteers. Thus, the military often means the following. 
• In general, a demanding job, requiring continuous training and long 
hours of work 
                                            
111 John Androulakis, “Volunteers,” Scopia.gr (2008), http://www.ellinikos-
stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as (accessed October 24, 2008). 
112 National Law, “Minimum Wages for 2006-2007,” April 13, 2006, 
http://hta.org.gr/pdf%20files/egsse _2006_2007.pdf (accessed October 26, 2008). 
113 For more information see Hellenic Ministry of Public Health, 
http://www.mohaw.gr/gr/ygeia/index_html (accessed October 24, 2008); National Statistical Office 
of Greece, Hellas in Numbers (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007), 9. 
114 Eurobarometer Survey, 48 and 54.1; completed 1997 and 2000, respectively. 
115 For more analysis on that subject, see Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed 
Forces,” in New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: 
Kluwer Publishers, 2003). 
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• A strict hierarchical job, where one loses some parts of personal 
freedom 
• A job that obligates the member and his family, in most of cases, to 
move often from one’s home. 
• A job that generally affects one’s personal and family life, 
regardless of the time of the day, while on duty or not 
• A potentially dangerous, life-threatening job116 
c.  The Supply and Demand Economic Theory 
The offerings of the military mentioned previously help to formulate 
the Demand (for military jobs) line of the Microeconomic Supply/Demand graph 
for labor. This line will not be anchored to some specific points. For example, we 
do not have, and it is very difficult to collect, data relating to the specific number 
of persons attracted to the Army, when the salary is 2,000€. So, the positioning 
of the line will be in comparison to the relevant line of the general labor demand 
of the market. Of course, we always compare jobs with relevant prerequisite 
educational levels. Figure 3.1 shows the military labor “demand” line standing by 
itself in the supply/demand graph: 
                                            
116 This feature of the military depends on the country’s overall strategy. For example the 
level of danger is different when you enlist for the U.S. Army and the Hellenic Army. The strategic 
dogma of Greece is defensive deterrent as it is depicted in the relevant documents:”White Bible 
of the Hellenic Armed Forces,”,and the site: Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, 
http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage356 (accessed October 24, 2008). In addition, the 
history of the past 30 years-after the dictatorship- also showed that, except for accidents, there 
were not any battle-losses for the Greek A.F.. As a consequence, this factor is slightly considered 
by the potential volunteers. 
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Figure 3.1. Supply – Demand Curve for Military Jobs 
Now we have to incorporate in Figure 3.1 the private labor sector 
and the job demand attached to it. As we see, the demand is defined by the 
respective offering of benefits. So, for the current social situation - as analyzed 
earlier - the theoretical line of “military job” benefits (Bm) will be placed above the 
theoretical line of “private–job” benefits (Bpr.).This means that for the same pool 
of high school graduates, the military offers more benefits than a private sector 
job.  
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Figure 3.2. Supply – Demand Curve for general and military jobs. 
To give a better understanding of what Figure 3.2 shows, we 
explain it briefly. For a specific educational or technical-level job, there is a 
general job supply depicted in the “general labor supply line,” This line denotes 
that, whenever higher benefits are given by employers, a larger number of 
employees is attracted to that job, or a stronger demand is created.117 So, 
moving in the right direction on the job-supply line, we increase the benefits and 
we attract more employees. This is the case for the military as depicted in Figure 
3.2. The military gives higher benefits (Bm) than the private sector (Bpr.) and it  
 
 
                                            
117 Of course, this must fall within the limits of employee’s pool of the society. Specifically, in 
Greece and in most European countries, due to the unemployment rate (roughly 10%), there is a 
continuous demand for jobs, so the employee pool it is not supposed to be eliminated. 
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attracts more employees (Qm) than the private sector (Qpr.). This means that all 
prospective employees are first filling the vacant jobs in the military sector and 
then they are looking for a job in the private sector.118 
At this point, and before examining the other part of the graph – the 
Demand, - we should consider that we base our “Supply and Demand” analysis 
on the institutional/ occupational model of Moskos119 and especially on the side 
of occupationalism of the Military Volunteer-job, which means that a position in 
the military is seen and valued as an ordinary job with its advantages and its 
weak points.  
But, why are we picking the occupational explanation of the Model 
for the case of Greece? Why, for instance, did we not add an important intrinsic 
benefit to military occupation: that is, having the satisfaction of serving one’s 
country? The reason for doing so is given by the responses of the specific focus 
group (the Greek youth in our case), through surveys conducted by Hellenic and 
European official institutions. These responses mainly form the military labor 
Supply and Demand120. There are two main factors that affect both the Supply of 
military jobs and the demand for them. 
• The military operational needs of the Country, in the historic period 
under examination and 
• The personal needs of individuals, during the same period 
 
                                            
118 This will be evident in the next chapter, as we will present real data of the applicants for a 
military volunteer position. The number of applicants in 2003 was more than triple the positions 
requested to fill. 
119 Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, The Military, More than Just a Job? 
(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988). 
120 We should not forget that the “demand” for a job and especially a military one is related to 
the socioeconomic status quo of the country and the focus group in particular (the high school 
graduates in our case). For example, the benefits of a third world country’s military are much less 
compared to the benefits of a developed country’s military. Nevertheless, the youngsters of an 
undeveloped country still enlist as they find it attractive, compared to the benefits of other jobs in 
their country. 
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For the first one, if the country is at war or in a state of tension with 
another country, there are multiple ways that individuals might react; they might 
believe in the country’s superior need and enlist; they might be mostly affected 
by the individualism trend of capitalistic societies and avoid the service. There is 
no clear answer on the issue, and we will not attempt to give one without having 
relevant data. Nevertheless, the above described uncertainty serves as an 
argument for a draft, since a draft, allow a country to easily mobilize civilians 
when they are needed. These civilians, as ex-conscripts, would have a short 
period of military experience, and be able to offer their services to the armed 
forces immediately when needed.121 
As for the second factor, personal needs change according to the 
economic status of the whole country and of our focus group (the youngsters 
between 18 and 26 years of age).122 
Observing the official statistical findings of the Hellenic Statistical 
Agency,123 we can see that the unemployment rate is relatively steady at roughly 
10 percent of the labor force in Greece. 
A more detailed survey on the employment and financial position of 
Europeans, and specifically Greeks, can be found in the “Eurobarometer” 
findings of 2007.124 As seen in Figure 3.3, Europeans are unable to find a job 
mainly due to the lack of opportunities and not to the lack of education.125 
 
                                            
121 This is a very critical factor, especially for Greece, as its population of about 10 million 
people does not provide the luxury of a huge soldier pool to pick when manpower needs are 
increasing. 
122 This is the acceptable age in order to be enlisted. See the relevant announcement of the 
Ministry of Defense: Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages56 
(accessed October 24, 2008).  
123 National Statistical Office of Greece, Hellas in Numbers (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007), 
6. 
124 The Gallup Organization, “Youth Survey,” Flash Eurobarometer Series 202, 2007. 
125 Greeks replied that they cannot find a job due to a lack of job opportunities at a ratio of 




















Most Important Reason for
Greeks  not Finding a Job
 
Figure 3.3. What is to blame for unemployment?126 
In the same survey,127 the new generation replies that, when 
unemployed, they would accept any satisfactory, stable job.128A summary of 

















What to do if unemployed .
most probable possibility 
 
Figure 3.4. What Greeks would do if unemployed. Most probable possibility 
(in percent)129 
                                            
126 The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," Flash Eurobarometer Series 202 (2007): 56. 
127 Ibid., 68. 
128 Greeks would take any stable job at a ratio of 42% while only 2% would keep on looking 
for a job considered as appropriate for them. 
129 The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," Flash Eurobarometer Series 202 (2007): 68. 
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This denotes that a military job is a potential solution, not only when 
someone is facing unemployment, but also as a general plan for the future. 
In the same study,130 there is one more interesting finding: the 
reason that young generations do not move from their parents’ house is because 
they cannot afford to do so. This is critical, as the military’s disadvantage of 
having to move out of one’s home town proves to be not so important, since the 
youngsters’ reason for not moving is usually their bad financial situation.131 
Apart from those factors, the “demand” of the young generation 
toward the military occupation is mainly affected by their future expectations or 
beliefs. These are clearly described in another Eurobarometer survey.132 
Based on that very recent (2008) survey, it is evident that:  
• Youngsters in general are pessimistic for what is coming in the 
future.133 
• What they believe is the worst part is the potential for future 
unemployment and the extension of their working lives,134 along 
with less income.135 
• Greece has the highest rate among countries whose citizens 
believe that, in twenty years time, they will not be able to afford 
proper medical treatment (84 percent).136  
The reason for mentioning all the above fears of the young 
generation is that the same factors represent the advantages of a military 
occupation, where members are given stability, good pay, and medical insurance 
for themselves and their family. 
                                            
130 The Gallup Organization, "Youth Survey," Flash Eurobarometer Series 202 (2007): 71. 
131 Again, Greeks have one of the highest ratios (61 percent) in that survey, in replying that 
they cannot afford to move from their parental house. 
132 The Gallup Organization, “Expectations of Europeans in 20 Years Time,” Flash 
Eurobarometer Series 227, 2008. 
133 Ibid., 6. 
134 Ibid., 8. 
135 Ibid., 12. 
136 Ibid., 15. 
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Finally, the demand of a youngster to volunteer in the Military is 
affected by another qualitative factor: the social appreciation of the job. For 
example, there are other jobs that make money and might have stability, but they 
are not considered as potential future employment by young people.137 In this 
matter, we have a solid base to believe that, during the past thirty years (after the 
dictatorship), Greeks appear to hold the profession of the military,138in high 
regard. 
The above analysis has sustained the results that came out of 
Figure 3.2, where an open market model is used for attracting volunteers. But 
what happens in the case where a war is probable or it actually occurs? How will 
this model react? The complete “supply-demand” graph for that case is depicted 
in Figure 3.5. 
                                            
137 For example, in the survey The Gallup Organization, “Youth Survey,” Flash 
Eurobarometer Series 202, 2007, when youngsters were asked if they would work in the black 
economy they answered negatively by a percent of 92%. 
138 During the past 30 years, several surveys indicated that the Greek society expresses its 
confidence to the Military (For more see: Dimitris Smokovitis, in Military Sociology, ed. Leena 
Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999) (survey done in the 1980s); Eurobarometer 
48 (1997); Eurobarometer 54.1 (2000). Another clear indication of that is that every year since the 
1980s the required high school grade to enter to Military academies is increasing (See the 
relevant site of Ministry of Public Education: Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, 
http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm) (accessed October 12, 2008). 
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Figure 3.5:. Supply – Demand Curve for general and military labor139 during 
war. 
As seen in Figure 3.5 the benefits and the quantities of employees 
between the military and the private sector jobs are reversed on the occasion of 
a war. The benefits of the military, in the instance of a war, are reduced, due to 
the great danger the Volunteer might face. In that occasion, the private sector 
offers a better job proposal for the youngster. As a result, the quantities of 
volunteers would lessen while the actual demand for them would increase. Thus, 
a volunteer deficit might be created ((Equilibrium Qm) – (Needed Q΄m)), forcing 
the Armed Forces to receive the last-resort employees who will neither be the 
best choice for the A.F., nor representative of the society they would defend.  
                                            
139 We are always focusing on the sample of youngsters who have a high school diploma. 
There is no indication that volunteers exceed the minimum requirements. Later on, we elaborate 
on the issue of the formulation of the volunteer force. Apart from that, from a wide experience of 
the author in the navy, it is very rare to find a volunteer having a university or high - technical 
diploma. In addition, those who plan to enter the military as a university graduate are most likely 
to attend a military academy.  
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The above analysis leads to the following two conclusions 
regarding the Greek situation. 
• The criteria for choosing the military profession - especially in 
peacetime - are totally “open-market” criteria without any 
“institutional” thoughts 
• At present, and for the lower educational level youth,140 a military 
job is an appealing and more promising choice than a relevant job 
in the private sector 
These young people must now be categorized according to their 
socioeconomic status to make MRM implementation in Greece easier. Of course, 
the socioeconomic factor is an abstract measure that differs among different 
societies and different eras. In the following section, we try to refine the 
socioeconomic factor that is relevant to today’s Greek society.141 
2.  How is Socioeconomic Status Defined in Greek Society? 
First, we have to define the meaning of “socioeconomic,” Then we can 
estimate it in Greek society and especially among those willing to volunteer.  
a.  What is the Socioeconomic Factor? 
Among many definitions that can be found in publications from 
sociology and economics, we picked the most important points in the writings of 
Teachman, Call, Segal and the U.S. Congress142. We extracted the following 




                                            
140 High school graduates. 
141 Later on we will sustain that assumption with research data. 
142 For more see Jay Teachman, Vaughn Call, and Mady W. Segal. “The Selectivity of 
Military Enlistment.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 21, (Winter 1993): 287-309; 
Congress of the United States, Social Representation in the U.S. Military (Washington: 
Congressional Budget Office, 1989). 
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• Financial level of the parents 
• Educational level of the youngster 
• Education of the parents. 
• Social position of the parents. 
• Race/ Ethnicity  
 
b.  Analysis of the Elements of the Socioeconomic Status 
in the Greek Society 
(1) The Financial Status of the Family. This directly 
affects and defines the financial situation of their children, especially those who 
have recently graduated from high school and do not have a job of their own. 
(2) The Educational Level of the Youngster. This is the 
second element of socioeconomic status. The educational level of a young 
person is mainly driven by three forces: the personal will to be educated, the 
parents’ will to educate their child, and, finally the means required to do so. 
Greece is considered a country that promotes public and free education without 
creating the need for individuals to spend money, even through the completion of 
the Public University.143 Nevertheless, reality seems to be quite different. As 
multiple studies have shown, educating a youngster requires great expense, to 
the point that a middle-class family does not have the means to do so. Research 
by a well-respected educational institution in Greece shows the following:144 
• At least for the years 2004 to 2006, the cost of educating a child 
rose much more than the average increase in wages 
• Private tuition is a big general educational expense, which most of 
the parents pay, irrespective of whether their children are studying 
in a public school or not 
                                            
143 Books and tuition for anyone that chooses to attend public schools are free. This is also 
the case for those who pass the general exams for entering the public universities. There, too, 
books and tuition are free. 
144 “The Cost of Education for the Hellenic Household,” ISTAME (Institute of Independent 
Studies), 2006. 
 47
• A great expense that most of families consider when their child 
thinks of studying at a university away from the family is rent and 
other living expenses. These expenses are estimated at 600 €145 
So, a great consideration of the parents - especially those in 
difficult financial situations - is the economic need of their child while studying for 
at least four years in a university.  
The situation becomes more difficult when the child’s 
university is in a city far from the home city of the family. As a previous study146 
shows, the economy plays a major role in a child’s decision not to leave the 
parents’ home, even if that child is employed. So, if an employed young 
individual cannot sustain himself, one can imagine how difficult it would be for a 
family to sustain its child while studying and living in another city.147 
To add one more bit of evidence to our findings regarding 
the close relationship between education of the youngsters, socioeconomic 
position, and economic status, we cite a recent survey that was conducted in 
Greece by a respectable educational institution. The survey examined the cost of 
education for each family from elementary school to the university,148and found 
the following: 
• On average, between the years 2005-2006, the increase in the 
education cost for all grades was close to 20 percent, while 
increases in salaries were approximately three percent 
• The cost of studying in a university away from the family house 
incurs an increased cost of 50 percent compared with five years 
ago (an approximately increase of about ten percent per year) 
• The monthly cost of rent and utilities for a university student 
studying in another city on his own, would be close to 600€, which 
is the lowest salary that one can receive in Greece in 2008 
                                            
145 To compare, the lowest country’s legal wage is at the same level as that amount.  
146 The Gallup Organization, “Youth Survey,” Flash Eurobarometer Series 202, 2007. 
147 This relation, between the educational level of the young ones and the financial situation 
of their families, is a really wide one. In this part, we tried to sustain our position as briefly as 
possible, as we will discuss aspects of that relation in several points in this study. 
148 “The Cost of Education for the Hellenic Household,” ISTAME, 2006. 
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Despite the great weight of the family financial factor on the 
child’s educational level, there is another factor that might lead the child to higher 
education, even though in a difficult financial status. This is the prior education of 
his parents. 
(3) The Education of the Parents. This might strengthen 
the will of the child to be more educated. In addition, the parents themselves 
would do their best to educate their child as they have been educated. A survey 
of the European Commission conducted in 2007 is very revealing:149 
How can better access to opportunities help reduce 
inequalities? 
The analysis presented in the Report suggests that promoting 
equal opportunities in the European Union could make a major 
contribution to both greater social cohesion and economic growth. 
For example, children of parents with a high level of education are 
four times as likely to attain a higher level of education themselves 
as children from a low education background. Higher education 
levels are of course associated with higher incomes and a much 
reduced risk of unemployment.150 
Furthermore, another study shows that the parents of 
students who leave school are of low education and have low-income jobs.151 
Still, is this factor the same as the “Social status of the parents”? 
(4) The social Status of People in Europe and in Greece. 
This used to be differentiated from their economic status a century ago.152 
Currently, it is evident that the only distinction in society is between the rich and 
                                            
149 “Eurostat – Unit F.3 -Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,” European Commission, 
April 2008; European Commission, “Eurostat – Unit F.3 -Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,” 
April 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/reports_social_situation_en.htm 
(accessed October 24, 2008), 3.  
150 Emphasis added. 
151 Nikos Fakiolas, “Why Kids Leave School,” Hellenic Centre of Social Studies - Research 
Paper (2000). 
152 A professor in a university used to belong in the upper-class of Europe and Greece in late 
1800’s and early 1900’s without this meaning that he was rich. Nowadays, social castes are 
eliminated and in their position, economical castes have risen.  
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the poor, as it is evident from two surveys of the European Union. In a 2008 
survey153 by Eurobarometer, Greeks – as well as Europeans - responded that, in 
the future, the social problem would be the gap between the rich and the poor 
(and not the gap among social classes). In the same survey, Greeks indicated 
that they believe that personal efforts are a more important influence on their 
overall chances in life (66 percent) than is their family social background (32 
percent). 
In the same survey, Europeans indicate that they want to 
see the gap between rich and poor reduced in the future.154 As an abstract from 
that survey states: 
EU citizens were then presented with statements about 
expectations regarding social conditions, or social reality, in 20 
years’ time and asked whether they agreed or disagreed with them. 
Respondents were the most likely to agree with the statements 
saying that, in 20 years’ time: 
• The gap between the rich and the poor in one’s country 
would be wider (Percentage of those who agree: 82 percent) 
and, 
• People’s working lives would be extended (Percentage of 
those who agree: 80 percent). 
Finally, if, there is no social distinction, is there any race or 
ethnicity distinction in Greek society? 
(5) The Race or Ethnicity Distinction. This is a relatively 
new issue for Greeks.155 Race issues have not been addressed before now. On 
the other hand, some issues have emerged, especially with regard to 
                                            
153 The Gallup Organization, “Expectations of Europeans in 20 years time.” Flash 
Eurobarometer Series 227 (2008).  
154 Ibid., 26. 
155 It started in the early 1990’s after some political decisions that allowed immigrants from 
the Balkans and specifically from Albania to enter Greece. 
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Albanians.156 According to a survey conducted in 2007 by the Panteion 
University of Athens157 on behalf of the European Union in 2007 the following 
was found. 
• 7.3 percent of the whole country’s population are immigrants 
(approximately 800,000 people)158  
• Half of the immigrants (3.5 percent) come from Albania 
(approximately 440,000 people) 
Apart from the relatively low immigrant levels, another fact 
keeps ethnic issues from affecting military volunteerism: Greece maintains a very 
strict policy determining Greek ethnicity status.159 Greek ethnicity status is an 
absolute criterion for being accepted in the Greek military; so, until recently, 
immigrants have not been able to enter the Hellenic A.F. 
Finalizing the analysis of the elements that form the 
socioeconomic status, we conclude that the most essential element is that of the 
financial situation of the family. This conclusion will help to treat socioeconomic 
status as the simpler family economic status, and to use it later in the MRM160. 
3.  What are the Future Job-Alternatives for Each Socioeconomic 
Category of Youngsters? 
Assuming a connection between economic and social status, one might 
ask: If a richer child does better in school, so as to gain a potentially higher 
                                            
156 Albanians are the largest immigrant group and most of the people focus on their 
attitudes. In addition, they usually live in groups in close areas, resulting in minor incidents with 
the native social web. 
157 Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Immigrant Integration in Greece,” UEHR- Panteion University 
(2005). 
158 Ibid., 2. 
159 National Statistical Office of Greece, Hellas in Numbers (Athens, Greece: ESYE, 2007), 
41. 
160 This equation concerns only the Greek society and is a little bit rough. Although, it depicts 
a quite true picture of the Greek reality. We do not have the ability to extent our analysis further 
on that. Nevertheless, the conclusion that we came up with, which is a direct positive relation 
between children’s educational level and parents financial status, is also sustained by several 
research projects, such as the official report by: European Commission, “Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities,” Eurostat (April 2008): 4-60.  
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educational status, wouldn’t this result in higher social status? And following this 
line if reasoning wouldn’t a person’s high economic situation these become a 
hindrance to volunteering for the military?  
At first sight, we might answer no. However, we need to look for relevant 
data, derived from reliable sources. To achieve that, we examine the 
alternatives161 of each socioeconomic (or, as we have shown, economic) 
category.162 Let us start with the higher economical status of families/ 
children.163 
The upper-economic status families would want their children to make as 
much money as they make, or at least to have an easy life. These criteria 
counter the military choice. Apart from that, they have plenty of alternatives. 
Some of them would be able to enroll in a university in another European country 
and earn a degree as valuable as the ones given in Greek universities.164 
 
                                            
161 Referring to alternatives, we focus on what the youngsters could do in case they don’t 
succeed in the general high school exams that lead into universities. We will overcome the 
obstacle of answering the question of who is succeeding in the general exams, the rich or the 
poor, and we will focus on their understanding of the options they have in life in the case of failing 
to pass these exams. 
162 We will use the categorization found in official EU chambers such as European 
Commission, “Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,” Eurostat (April 2008): 4. In this report, we 
read: “In 2004, around 100 million Europeans (22% of the total population) had less than 60% of 
the EU median income of around € 8000 per year for a single person or € 22 a day.” So roughly 
the high income could be 20,000 €, the average 14,000 € and the low 8,000 € per year per 
person”. 
163 Regarding the ratio of youngsters living in their parents’ house till late after graduating 
from university or high school; for some western societies and primarily for USA, the connection 
of family economic status to the status of their children might not be understandable. It is very 
usual in Mediterranean countries, for children to be financially helped by their parents until late in 
their lives (see previous cited survey: The Gallup Organization, “Youth Survey,” Flash 
Eurobarometer Series 202 (2007): 71.)  
164 Most of the universities in Greece are public and you do not have to pay. On the occasion 
that a student fails in the University introductory exams, he has two options: Studying in domestic 
institutions that are not validated, or enlisting in a university abroad For validating foreign 
universities diplomas in Greece, one has to go over rigorous exams given by a public institution 
called DIKATSA, but sooner or later the students who go this route pass the exams and their 
foreign diplomas are considered equal to the Greek ones, which means that they can apply for 
work in the public or private sector. 
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Another option for rich families/children is to have a kind of a personal job 
funded by their parents. Many enterprise options also exist for these youngsters, 
one of which is to continue in the profitable job of their parents if the latter are self 
employed. 
For the middle socioeconomic class, educational/occupational alternatives 
are reduced; nevertheless, they exist. Middle socioeconomic class youngsters 
could try for a not high-budget university of Europe, or even get a loan and start a 
business for their own children. The critical factor that affects the middle class, 
though, is future economic uncertainty, as described in a previously cited survey. 
As discussed below, this middle class, which tends to be the larger class, is a 
crucial determining factor of military personnel quality, due to the fact that the 
portion of this class entering the military affects the social representation factor, 
as described in Eitelberg’s MRM. So the factors that most affect this social group 
are the future economic and quality of living forecasts. Due to the lack of funds, 
this group feels quite sure about the present, but is worried about its future 
prospects. 
The lower financial social group is mostly concerned about the present 
and how to cope with economic and other difficulties. As a result, high school 
graduates in this category do not plan to go abroad for studies or to get a loan for 
a new business. They are mainly directed toward the prospect of stability and 
moderate income.165 Finally, the only alternative for the lower financial social 
group is to learn a technical skill and be a technician or a farmer or a labor 
worker. All these labor-intensive jobs might be prosperous, but they do not 
guarantee the future economic stability of the Greek youth. 
                                            
165 See related survey answers in previous cited surveys: The Gallup Organization, 
“Expectations of Europeans in 20 Years Time,” Flash Eurobarometer Series 227 (2008); The 
Gallup Organization, “Youth Survey,” Flash Eurobarometer Series 202 (2007).  
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4.  How Would a Differentiation in the Future’s Economic and 
Social Wellbeing Alter the Choices of the Youngster? 
This is a great concern when estimating the social representation in the 
military, as the occupationalism of the military service is quite evident today. As 
we stated in the previous part, the middle socioeconomic class is mostly affected 
by expectations regarding the economy and society. For example, surveys 
shows that, today, the greatest number of young people in Greece are afraid 
about their future employment and other issues related to their economic and 
social life. We could say that we are living in a pessimistic period, where the 
employment benefits of the military seem better than benefits in the private 
sector. This may help to explain why the Armed Forces are not current facing a 
problem in enlisting volunteers.166 
Still, what would be the case when an optimistic future job perspective 
occurs? The middle class would most probably move away from the military. If 
we could consider that case as one where the private sector offers more benefits 
in general as compared with the Armed Forces, we would have the opposite of 
the initial (peacetime) supply-demand graph, where fewer employees would have 
a demand for a military job (Qm) and the larger part of the labor force would 
prefer a private-sector job (Qpr). This relationship between private sector and 
military jobs resembles the relationship between them seen in the case of war, 
which was presented in paragraph Figure 3.5. This happens as these two 
prospective employers compete to offer relatively greater benefits. That situation 
is represented in the Figure 3.6: 
                                            
166 See the supply and demand graph in present chapter paragraph A1 and the relevant 
sources: Jay Teachman, Vaughn Call, and Mady W. Segal, “The Selectivity of Military 
Enlistment,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 21, Winter (1993): 287-309;, John 
Androulakis, “Volunteers Scopia.gr (2008), http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as 
(accessed October 24, 2008).  
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Figure 3.6. Supply – Demand Curve for general and military labor when 
future perspectives are positive. 
As seen in Figure 3.6, in the case, the military’s pool of potential 
volunteers shrinks, and the advantage goes to private sector. A labor surplus is 
even created for private sector jobs. This means that a youngster would have 
enlistment as his third priority; his first priority would be the private sector; and his 
second would be to wait to go in the private sector in the future or even take a 
private job with fewer benefits than the army, with the expectation that things 
might get better in the future. In fact, it is the reverse situation of the one Greece 
is experiencing in 2008. 
In addition to this difficult case for military recruitment, we should add the 
inherent weakness of the Armed Forces in adjusting to an open-market 
environment by increasing the benefits given to the volunteers. The Armed 
Forces cannot move the way a company does, according to future estimates of 
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the economy and profits, but rather, must move according to a relatively steady 
budget. As a result, the military has the disadvantage of moving slowly toward 
the equilibrium of demand and supply by increasing the benefits supplied slowly 
and without the ability to make large or sudden changes in its budget. 
An additional factor applies to Greek society regarding the choice of 
volunteering or not: that is the future stability of the area and the international 
relations among Greece and its neighbors. Young people will weigh the forecast 
of a peaceful or a turbulent future to make their choice. For example, given the 
same benefits from the Army, when a peaceful situation exists and when a war is 
imminent or probable, the choice of joining the Army would be harder in the 
second case. 
If we compare the demand and supply graph from Figure 3.2., this time we 
would have a transition of demand for military jobs to a lower level, resulting in 
fewer people volunteering for the Armed Forces.  
As we can understand, the volunteer pool grows continuously smaller 
when moving from peace conditions to tension and, finally, war. 
Here we face a Gordian Knot regarding recruiting for an All-Volunteer-
Force in a tension or war situation. How will this type of Armed Forces cope with 
that issue? How will the military attract volunteers in such a harsh period? How 
could the Armed Forces, in addition to attracting volunteers, recruit in a small 
span of time and train those new recruits while that tension is progressing and 
numerous operational needs emerge? The above situations tend to be 
disadvantages for the All Volunteer Force in general and, more specifically, for 
Greece. 
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This issue has another face - the operational one - but we will now 
examine the issue from the perspective of problematic recruitment.167In general, 
when economic perspectives get better, or tension between the home and 
another country emerges, the volunteer pool becomes smaller, pushing the 
military job demand downward. This situation forces the state to raise the 
benefits to attract more volunteers. 
In the latter situation of tension or wars, there is an additional problem: 
Armed Forces normally need more volunteers to cover new operational needs. 
That means that the supply for military labor is increased; however, while supply 
increases and demand decreases, a big military volunteerism deficit is created. 
This deficit is, in most cases, created quickly and without warning, as tension 
between countries or even war is not predetermined, and usually happens 
overnight. 
In the same situation - tension or war- one might also recruit civilians. In a 
country that has a draft force, these civilians would be more experienced and 
trained than those of another country that uses AVF. This is mainly an efficiency 
issue for the Army and it is discussed further in the following chapter.168 
Concluding the first part of the chapter devoted to the period “Prior to the 
Army,” we analyzed the following subjects. 
• Who is choosing to volunteer? 
• Why is he deciding to do so? 
• What would be his alternatives in another economic or security 
environment? 
                                            
167 Since the U.S.A is currently involved into at least two war zones (Iraq, Afghanistan) 
finding volunteers tends to be a rigorous task .More specifically, in the book by Roth-Douquet and 
Frank Schaeffer, another useful argument is presented: who is going to enlist when not only a 
war is in progress, but an unfavorable outcome is forecasted? In AWOL: The Unexcused 
Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How It Hearts the Country. 1st ed. 
Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 167.) 
168 This study also includes an interview with an experienced retired officer, in recruiting 
service, Mr. Gus Moutos. (See Chapter IV) 
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To include the whole population of youngsters in the prior-to-the-Army age 
group, we should also look at the perspectives of the female group in Greek 
Society. 
B.  WHAT IS THE CASE FOR WOMEN IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY 
FORCE ? 
1. History of Women in the Hellenic Military Force  
Up until now, we have examined mainly the option that young men have 
between being drafted or volunteering for at least five years in the Hellenic 
Military force. In Greece, there is no such option for women; they are not 
conscripted, and only during recent years have they been accepted as 
volunteers.169 Numerous discussions have taken place recently regarding this 
issue, and, more specifically, what military and society have to gain or loose from 
that decision.  
a.  Women and Draft 
Hellenic history up to now shows that women and the military are 
not two separate concepts. Women fought along with men in the front of several 
wars very effectively. That was the case in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the 
First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1941-1945), and other 
smaller-scale conflicts.170 From a first view, therefore, there is no evidence that 
women are not efficient in the Greek Army, or that the culture of the Army does 
not accept them. But what is their opinion about the Military? Do they want to be 
drafted? There is no specific survey to answer that question; nevertheless, a 
recent announcement that came out from the Hellenic Women Union, stated that 
                                            
169 For a short history on Greek women in the military, see Appendix B. 
170 See Appendix B for more. 
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their position is clear and unanimous, and it is a rejection of drafting women.171 
The same opinion came from all of the political parties of Greece except the 
current ruling party.172 
Women’s main argument against being drafted is mainly the low 
birthrate that Greece faces in general, and the special role that a woman plays in 
the sustainment of a family. These arguments are examined below.  
b.  Women and Military Volunteerism 
In this part, we examine women’s status in Greece on the issue of 
participating in the volunteer force. Although we do not have specific general 
surveys on that matter, we have even more valuable real data: those of the 
women applicants for volunteer positions.173 These data show that the number of 
applicants is between three to five times more than the number of volunteer 
positions available. In this case, the same socioeconomic factors analyzed 
before apply both to men and women, making the demand for a steady job the 
strongest determinant.174 
The equality of sexes is a second determining factor that raised the 
participation of women in the volunteer force. Two surveys by the European 
                                            
171 This response came as a reply on various scenarios that were publicized by the Hellenic 
Ministry of Defense regarding the potential drafting of women along with other changes in the 
Hellenic Armed Forces. (See: Loukas Dimakas, “Hellenic women union is Opposing the volunteer 
conscription,” Newspaper “Ta Nea,” April 4, 2006.)  
172 New Democracy is the governing party and is supposed to lie on the “right”. The other 
two big parties that lie on the “middle” and “left” political wing, distributed announcements that 
opposed or at least did not support the idea of drafting women. 
173 For specific data see: John Androulakis, “VolunteersScopia.gr (2008), 
http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as (accessed October 24, 2008); Hellenic Ministry 
of National Defense, http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp (accessed October 
24, 2008). 
174 In order to get a live taste of what real persons (women) responded as to why they 
choose to volunteer, see Ilias Kapetanakis, “Conscripting Women: An evil or a necessity?(2006), 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=el&u=http://library.techlink.gr/ptisi/article-main.asp 
(accessed October 26, 2008). 
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Commission (EU)175 show some interesting results. Specifically for Greece, the 
surveys show a transition in a common belief of the society regarding the equality 
of genders. The first-cited survey, (done in 1996)176 has various elements that 
reveal a more conservative society.177 
In addition,178 as seen in Figure 3.7 the survey reports that Greeks 
have the highest percentage of respondents who support the role of women as 
children-raisers rather than job hunters. 
 
Figure 3.7. Percentages of those that agree, in each country, to the 
statement: “A mother should give priority to her young child rather 
than to her work”179 
                                            
175 European Commission, “Study on Intergrading Women in EU,” Directorate-General For 
Employment and Social Affairs (2002); European Commission, Eurobarometer, “Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men,” Directorate-General for Employment 44.3 (1996). 
176 European Commission, Eurobarometer, “Equal Opportunities for Women and Men,” 
Directorate-General for Employment 44.3 (1996). 
177 For example, on the debate of women staying in house or going to work opinions are 
divided in half (50% for and 50% against). Ibid, p. 24.  
178 European Commission, Eurobarometer, “Equal Opportunities for Women and Men,” 
Directorate-General for Employment 44.3 (1996): 36. 
179 Eurobarometer , Report on Equality of Sexes -44.3 (1996). The abbreviations represent 
the European countries. Greece (GR) is far right with the highest percentage. 
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As the years have passed, a more liberal aspect of Greek society 
has become evident. As a result, in the EU’s survey of 2002,180 Greece is 
positioned in a group of countries that believes in and supports, not only 
individually but also officially, the equality of sexes, especially in the employment 
area.181 
The equality of sexes in Greek society brings us to the conclusion 
that the case of female volunteerism in Greece obeys the same open-market 
“laws” that were analyzed previously through Supply and Demand graphs. So, 
the only part of women’s participation in the military that differs from that of men’s 
is the draft, which will not be a free choice of women, but an obligatory service for 
them, as is the case for men in Greece today. The next part analyzes that issue 
based on the potential personal and social benefits and weaknesses of drafting 
women.  
2.  What Would Be the Consequences of a Women’s Military Draft, 
for Women Themselves and in Greek Society Generally? 
If Greece conscripted women, what would be the outcome? Of course, it is 
a hypothetical question, but we try to answer it by listing the positive and 
negative results of that potential move, both in personal and social aspects. 
a. The Beneficial Factors of Obligatory Women Service 
First, let us start with the beneficial factors of enlisting women for 
obligatory Military Service. The most critical advantage of such an innovation for 




                                            
180 European Commission, “Study on Intergrading Women in EU,” Directorate-General for 
Employment and Social Affairs (2002).  
181 More specifically, that survey showed that equality laws and procedures are in place in 
the public and private employment sector of Greece. 
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increasing need for soldiers to cover its military needs. Every year, the draftees’ 












Birth rate per couple
 
Figure 3.8. Birth rates per couple in Greece183 
This is an argument that is supported by many officials, one of them 
being the Minister of the Hellenic Department (or ministry) of Defense. The 
Minister of Defense stated in an interview in 2007 that women are as capable as 
men and very useful in today’s situation, where a lack of soldiers is evident in 
Greece.184 Figure 3.9 shows the projected decline in the young population, and 
thus in the number of potential draft soldiers, in Greece.185 
                                            
182 Some interesting data for that issue are included in National Statistical Office of Greece, 
“Demographic Analysis,” National Surveys (2006): 4 where it is reported that birth rate fell from 
2.09 in 1989 to 1.34 in 2004. 
183 National Statistical Office of Greece, "Demographic Analysis," National Surveys (2006): 
4. 
184 Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231 (accessed 
October 27, 2008).  
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Figure 3.9. Percentages  of population by age group186 
The morale in the draft force as will improve, as the presence of 
more women reduces the loneliness of a male-only environment. Of course, 
many might pose some concerns about that issue, such as whether female 
soldier participation will dissolve the hierarchy and the obedience of the Armed 
Forces. This fear has been answered already in practice by the implementation 
of equal participation of women in the Greek Military academies and volunteer 
force. No general incidents have occurred to “loosen” military laws or customs. In 
fact, in many cases, women appeared more efficient than men. 
Women’s efficiency in the military has been examined in various 
countries to lessen the fear that women might be inefficient in the Armed Forces. 
To our knowledge, no definitive study suggests that women cannot act efficiently 
in the military when observing the same rules and rituals as their male cohorts. 
On the contrary, there are many surveys and articles in Greece and the U.S. that 
support the opposite. For example Marina Nuciari187 used data from an empirical 
study conducted in 1985, where the efficiency and cohesion of a male military 
                                            
186 National Statistical Office of Greece, "Demographic Analysis," National Surveys (2006): 
4. 
187 Marina Nuciari, Women in the Military, in Giuseppe Caforio, Handbook of the Sociology 
of the Military, 1st ed. (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 290. 
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group was possibly improved by the entrance of females into that group.188 After 
arguing for the positive points of enlisting women in compulsory service, we will 
consider the “gray” parts of that resolution. 
b. The Negative Factors of Obligatory Women Service 
The disadvantages of compulsory women’s service may not be 
many, but they surely have an increased gravity. First of all, we will refer to the 
great contemporary problem in Greece: the low birthrate.189There are two sub-
arguments embedded in that low birthrate factor. First, the hindrance placed on 
women who want to get married or get pregnant during the period that they serve 
in the military.190 
The second sub-argument is that, by knowing about this difficult 
situation, women will not think of marriage or a serious relationship before ending 
their service in the Military. Support for the position comes again from Moskos 
and Nuciari.191 Figure 3.10 below shows the percentage married personnel by 
rank and gender in the U.S. military in 1997.192 
 
                                            
188 Later studies presented more ambiguous results. Nevertheless, they did not conclude 
any opposing argument about women’s efficiency in Armed Forces. For more information, see the 
above listed source.  
189 That was the main argument presented earlier, by the Hellenic Women Association, 
against the plans of the Hellenic ministry of Defense for recruiting women. See, Loukas Dimakas, 
“Hellenic Women Union is Opposing the Volunteer Conscription,” Newspaper “Ta Nea,” April 4, 
2006.  
190 We should not only count for the time actually serving in the military, which most probably 
would be one year or less, but we should consider all the changes on a woman’s life that will also 
occur. These changes, such as leaving her family’s home, ceasing her studies, breaking possible 
personal relations, losing valuable time for looking for a job and an overall decrease in her 
financial status, is evidence that a valuable period of her life, much greater than the enlistment 
period, is lost. 
191 Marina Nuciari, Women in the Military, in Giuseppe Caforio, Handbook of the Sociology 
of the Military, 1st ed. (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 290.  
192 There are no relevant data for Greece; still, we have no reason to believe that it would 

































Figure 3.10. Percentages of Married military personnel by gender and by 
rank.193 
It is evident that women are at a disadvantage when looking to be 
married while in the military. We will show that this problem is a serious one for 
the country’s future. In reality, the advantage of women participating in the army, 
and covering the male population deficit, proves to be an action that solves a 
problem in the short run by using rare resources, which worsen the same 
problem in the long run. These resources are the women, who at present tend to 
avoid giving birth to many children for various reasons. Will military service by 
more women help or not in that aspect? The answer is the latter, as women’s 
financial condition will worsen so mean to due to current pay policies and by 
asking them to postpone their career or educational plans.194  
                                            
193 Marina Nuciari,, Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, 1 ed. Women in the Military 
Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 287. The Petty officer ranks are E-1 to E-
6 , while the officers’ are O-1 to O-6. The survey sample was derived from the whole U.S. military 
personnel. 
194 Some interesting facts on that argument can be found in European Commission, 
Eurobarometer, “Equal Opportunities for Women and Men,” Directorate-General for Employment 
44.3 (1996): 11.  
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Another issue closely related to the previous one is the problem of 
how married women with children will take care of their children while in the 
military. A counter-argument to this might be that husbands could take care of 
their children during that period. If we consider that solution, we find some other 
potential problems such as the following. 
• Men usually have more stable jobs than women have, so this could 
result in a serious financial cutback  if a husband lost his job195 
• Women in that age (18-22) are best able to nourish small babies, 
something that poses difficulty when men try to undertake this task. 
Apart from that, mothers have the natural instinct for taking care of 
their children, especially young ones.196 
After the previous analysis, we have to weigh the positive and 
negative consequences of drafting women for the Hellenic Military Force. Which 
weighs more? 
c. Weighs the Positive and Negative 
Using the tools of logic, we could easily come to the conclusion that 
one cannot solve a problem by using the same resources that initiated the 
problem. The number of draftees is steadily declining due to low birthrate.197 The 
reason for this is the trend among new couples to have fewer children, influenced 
by increasing unemployment and economic difficulties. These factors would be 
adversely affected by drafting women. 
 
                                            
195 Some interesting facts on that argument can be found in European Commission, 
Eurobarometer, “Equal Opportunities for Women and Men,” Directorate-General for Employment 
44.3 (1996): 23. 
196 This applies only when we have to make a choice between the two parents, as the best 
education/nourishing come from both parents. Evidence on this issue could be the court 
resolutions which decide who is to keep the children after a divorce; most of the times, mother is 
appointed to keep them. 
197 See National Statistical Office of Greece, “Demographic Analysis,” National Surveys 
(2006); Ilias Kapetanakis, “Conscripting Women: An Evil or a Necessity? (2006), 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=el&u=http://library.techlink.gr/ptisi/article-main.asp 
(accessed October 26, 2008). 
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Thus, by drafting women in Greece, we could make the problem of 
a lack of soldiers even worse for the future, when feasible solutions will be even 
fewer. But, is there any other type of women’s draft that could help the state and 
the army? 
3.  Which is a Potential Women’s Draft Case that Would Be 
Beneficial to the Hellenic Military and Society? 
This subject could be a case for a separate analysis. Nevertheless, we 
can present some ideas that might have a positive outcome. But, before doing 
so, we should clearly list the aspects of the problem and the demanded outcome. 
a.  What are the Problems to Be Alleviated by Proposing a 
Women’s Draft? 
• Declining number of draftees in the Hellenic military 
• Equity issues in society; equal weight put to all citizens, regardless 
of their gender 
b.  What are the Disadvantages of Recruiting Women that 
We Should Overcome? 
• Not limit their ability to have and raise children, including indent  
• To not degrade women financially 
• To not eliminate their free time198 
c.  What We Should Provide for Drafting Women? 
At first sight, a rough estimation for satisfying the givens and the 
outcomes of that problem would be: a volunteer based type of draft for women, 
with some benefits attached to it. This solution is surely a generic one, but has 
the potential to alleviate the problem of low draftee numbers while not affecting 
the core problem of low birth rates. 
                                            
198 By qualitative, we mean the free time that has the potential to be used as leisure/ relaxing 
or in a relevant manner. For example, you have a lot of free time when you are unemployed, but 
you do not have money to benefit from it. So, this kind of free time is not considered to have any 
quality elements. 
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Let us analyze the two pillars of the above generic solution. 
(1)  Volunteer-Based Drafting for Women with a Flexible 
Service-Period Obligation. While it is true that many women have financial or 
other problems that hinder them from considering maternity, there is still a 
significant number of women that are in good financial condition and can devote 
a short period of their lives to serving their country. In addition, an increasing 
number of women might  delay pregnancy for various reasons.199 
In any case, since a volunteer-based system is established, 
every woman could weigh her decision to enlist according to her situation. An 
additional feature for women could be the ability to serve for less than a full year, 
as is now the case with men, but for two semesters during a defined period of 
time. This feature could make a women’s choice to enlist easier. 
Before presenting the next element of our proposal, we 
should question whether a semester military position might be feasible and 
beneficial to the Hellenic A.F. Considering the Greek reality, we can easily 
answer this question. First, Greece has remote military bases on islands and 
near its boarders that are very difficult to staff, as most of the soldiers try to avoid 
being stationed there. On the other hand, a woman who was born and lives in 
these remote areas would have the motivation to help the defense of her own 
region, along with the sustainment of the military base in her area.200  
Second, we could easily come to the conclusion that there 
will not be a disadvantage for the Greek military, since men’s service today is a 




                                            
199 Usually these reasons are profession-based, as many women nowadays are focusing 
first on their occupation and later on to create a family. Another case would be women that 
cannot have children due to health issues. 
200 A base does not only offer security but also economic resources for the whole area. 
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woman’s service for a semester turns to be the same for the efficiency of any 
specific military unit.201 So, the period that a woman would serve in a remote 
area would be the same as a man’s. 
Apart from that, there are military positions, even in the 
central parts of the country, which could be filled for six months without losing 
any of their efficiency. Such positions are mostly technical, military educational, 
or generally administrative types.202 For example, a woman can work in a military 
office for six months without much training and without leaving “unfilled” gaps 
after her departure from the office. She might also be assigned to a six-month 
school, after completing her relevant university studies. 
A great advantage that accompanies the volunteer-based 
women’s draft is the option that the Hellenic Armed Forces might use that for 
staffing specific positions. The essence of that option is that the military could 
estimate the lack of specific draft positions in some specialties or general areas 
and ask women voluntarily to serve in any of these positions. This option can 
raise the military’s efficiency as there will be no wasted manpower in the new 
force of drafted women.  
As we proceed in analyzing that option, we realize that we 
are formulating a system that stands in the middle between the pure draft and the 
pure volunteer force. As our solution approaches the volunteer system, it comes 
closer to the “occupational” system analyzed by Moskos, along with our previous 
analysis of supply and demand in the first part of this chapter. We must design 
the benefits of that roughly described system, which would stabilize the balance 
between benefits and demands for Greek women. 
 
                                            
201 Hellenic Republic, “Conscription Law,” 1763/88 (1988). 
202 At some military schools, soldiers of some professions teach a subject that they are 
experienced in (chemists, lawyers, computer experts and others). 
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(2) Proposal for Benefits for Women Participating in a 
Potential Woman Draftee Force. Apart from considering the “institutional” values 
served by women and their satisfaction from doing so, we should also propose 
some material benefits that might be appealing them. Assuming that full pay is 
not an option for the Hellenic Ministry of Defense - or else they could use normal 
volunteers - we should consider benefits that alleviate the basic problem of 
women and men alike in today’s Greek society. These problems are 
unemployment and the overall difficult financial situation. 
Again, this could be a case for a different study; still, some 
proposals for benefits might be the following. 
• After performing their one year or two-semester service, women 
could attend a military school of their choice. The list of available 
training schools should be made known by the Armed Forces 
beforehand. Such training opportunities might include computers, 
technical skills, communications and many of other training options 
already existing in the Armed Forces. 
This benefit would be of great value for women, as they will 
acquire at no cost a diploma that might be useful for them in their job quest. On 
the other hand, it would be of no significant cost for the Hellenic Armed Forces, 
as these schools and training facilities are being provided anyway.203  
• Another benefit might be giving medical coverage to women 
draftees and their close family members for a period up to twice the 
period they served. This is a significant offering, as we have shown 
previously in the case of the men’s volunteer force.204 Again for the 
military and the state, this could not be a great expense, as most of 
the facilities are already in place. 
• Finally, a valuable benefit specifically for the Greek situation would 
be offering some “points” or preference to women draftees, when 
they are applying for a job in the widely-defined government 
                                            
203 The possible need to increase teaching personnel is not considered a big expense. 
204 See present chapter, paragraph A1. 
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sector.205 In that point system, draft service from women could be 
assigned a specific number of points,206 making their employment 
chances better than before they were drafted. 
This concludes our generic view of the factors affecting the 
decision of men to enlist or participate in the military as draftees, which also 
touched on the possibility and the restrictions of having a women’s draft. 
Although our study is focused on the dilemma of choosing 
the form of the bigger part of the Armed Forces, that of low-rank soldiers, we find 
it appropriate to give a quick look on the other higher-ranking parts of the Armed 
Forces; that is, the middle-rank (petty officers) and the upper-rank (officers). This 
point of analysis will help us in fully determining the “raw materials,” with which 
the “gun” of the Armed Forces is made. Nevertheless, the analysis on high and 
medium-rank personnel will not be exhaustive, as we intend to use it only as a 
benchmark of the whole army. 
C.  A QUICK LOOK AT THE MIDDLE AND HIGH-RANK PERSONNEL OF 
THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES 
Using the analogy, found in many of Eitelberg writings, of the military as 
the “gun” of the society, we will go on viewing who is choosing to enter the 
middle and high military academies,207 or, in another way, what are the “raw 
materials” from which the country’s “gun” is made. 
                                            
205 Greece has a ruling committee called ASEP (High Committee for Personnel Selection) 
which is officially authorized to set national exams for employment opportunities in the widely-
defined public-state sector. To get a position like that, which, in most of the cases, is a moderate 
paid but steady and stable job-career, you have to take part in state-held exams and in the same 
time present your diplomas and past experience which are translated into valuable points.  
206 Of course, this measure might raise some objection from men regarding equity issues of 
the men’s draft. 
207 In general, there are two classes of military Academies in Greece: the ones that educate 
petty officers and the others whose graduates are officers. 
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1.   Who is Choosing to Enter Military Academies? 
It was not before the 1990s that petty-officers’ academies were included 
along with the officers’, in the highly-valued, post-high school general exams. At 
the same time, all the military academies relaxed their restrictions for admitting 
women, which resulted in an increase in women officers and petty officers. 
Especially for the petty-officers academies and for the recent years, the number 
of women entering the academies is close to or even greater in some years, than 
that of men.208 
That means that all the cadets at least completed high school with more 
than average grades. Figure 3.11 below shows the base-points for acceptance 







Several University Schools (Including the Highest
one in points required)
Hellenic Universities (Points Required to be 
admitted)
 
Figure 3.11. Points required to be admitted in the Hellenic Public Universities 
(2008)209 
                                            
208 Especially for 2008 the women’s ratio of acceptance was approximately 35 percent. In 
2005 women surpassed the number of men in the Navy Petty Officer academy (see: esos.gr., 
http://www.esos.gr/80/52/naftiko-epitixontae-4-9-2008.htm) (accessed October 15. 2008). 
209 For a more comprehensive explanation on the public based Greek education design, see 
Appendix 3. Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm 
(accessed October 25, 2008). 
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The first line represents the points required on the public exams to attend 
the highest university school in Greece. The lines that follow are some other 
representative university schools; the green lines in the middle are the Officers’ 
academies and the last ones on the right are the Petty Officers’ Academies. As 
seen here, the distance between the highly estimated universities and the military 
academies is not at all big. Thus, those who enter Hellenic military academies in 
general are not seeking a job opportunity; it is a demanding job-choice, including 
studying and more than average performance.  
To answer the initial question about defining the profile of the potential 
people willing to enter a military academy, we should briefly note some of the 
fundamental advantages and disadvantages of the military academies. The 
advantages of an officer career would be all the advantages referred in our 
present studies for volunteer-soldiers210 along with the following. 
• Steadier career than the volunteer’s 
• Better salary, pension, working conditions 
• University education without financial burden for the parents 
• Higher prestige 
• Some of the disadvantages, again compared with the volunteers, 
include the following. 
• Greater responsibility in their assignments  
• Difficult training in the Academies, including military and an 
educationally intense environment 
• Obligation to stay in the force for longer period (at least 15 
years) 
We can assume that whoever chooses to be an officer should have high 
educational credentials along with the willingness to live a military life. The first 
characteristic could be obtained by children of most of the socioeconomic 
classes, even though it is found more in the middle and upper economic layers of 
society. What this denotes is that a young person who succeeded in a military 
                                            
210 See present chapter, paragraph A3. 
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academy would have probably also succeeded in other universities. The 
determining factor now is the financial status of the student’s family. Can they 
afford to sustain him for at least four years while in a civil university? If not, the 
military-type university seems an appealing choice. 
The second characteristic, the willingness to live a military life, is a 
criterion mostly based on family perception and tradition, still not excluding the 
personal will of the youngster. For example, it is very easy for a child to be more 
familiar and acquainted with the military academy choice if a member of his 
family is an officer.211 On the other hand, it is normal that a family that opposes 
the military profession will influence its child negatively in this regard. To our 
understanding, this factor is not connected to socioeconomic or economic 
criteria, and is tied to family perception and traditions.  
Finally, based inevitably on the more clear first characteristic of the 
educational competence of prospective cadets, we could conclude that 
academies have as their input personnel, children of medium to high 
socioeconomic status, without excluding some exceptions of poor families that 
determined to educate their children properly.212 
Although petty officer military academies have been much upgraded 
recently, it is the officers who rule the Armed Forces; so, we will give them a 
closer look. 
2.  Are the Officers in Greece Considered Reliable and 
Representative of the Society? 
As graduates of a military institution equivalent to a university, officers 
have a high educational base; this fact gives them a high level of prestige, as 
                                            
211 This is my personal case, as my father was an officer; even though I was not even 
advised to enter in the military family, I did so. In addition to that, and without having certified 
data, a great part of my officer colleagues have a member of their families somehow related to 
the military.  
212 We should repeat that this is a rough estimation used to give us a generic idea of the 
higher-ranking soldiers. Some of its abbreviated conclusions are based on previous findings in 
the present chapter, paragraph A2, regarding mainly socioeconomic status and educational level. 
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they succeeded not only in military training, but also in high level educational 
requirements. Apart from that, the perception of the Greek military in Greek 
society is favorable, mainly based on the long history of Greece, which is closely 
tied to numerous battles from all services of the Armed Forces. 
The only historic anomaly took place during the period of 1967 to 1974, 
when a group of Army officers orchestrated a coup d’état, imposing a dictatorship 
on the country.213 Nevertheless, as the years went by, military officers gained 
back their prestige and reliability. Our conclusion above is enhanced by the 
research made by Smokovitis,214 which clearly denotes the following points 
regarding attitudes that cadets of Hellenic military academies hold. 
• They highly value the personal accomplishment and social 
commitment, while they do not believe in politics 
• Their political preferences are somewhat in the middle between left 
and right 
• They trust the military the most, but they did not feel the same 
about civil servants 
• They support the conscription system and the idea of conscripting 
women, as a way of exchanging values between the society and 
military 
• Their main goal is to defend their country 
• They find life in the academy difficult but they seem to understand 
the need for that 
Apart from that, we find useful elements on how the Greek military is seen 
by society in later surveys done by Eurostat.215 In these studies, conducted in 
1997 and 2000, we observe that Greeks are very fond of and confident of their  
 
 
                                            
213 For more see C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels (New York: F. 
Watts), 1985. 
214 Research conducted in mid 80s. Dimitris Smokovitis, in Military Sociology, ed. Leena 
Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999), 321-322. 
215 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 327; 
Eurobarometer 48/1997 and 54.1/2000. 
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Armed Forces. Also, when compared to other European countries, their level of 
confidence is the second highest, after Finland.216 A more comprehensive view 

























Figure 3.12. Confidence for the Armed Forces by the respective country’s 
society.217 
In general, the Armed Forces are respected and highly regarded by Greek 
society. Still, are they representative of the society? In the following chapter, we 
examine the social representation inside the Armed Forces. Although the 
analysis focuses on the soldiers, we do need to have an idea of the social 
representation of their leaders. 
                                            
216 Finland also keeps a draft force and faces a kind of instability at its borders. 
217 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 327. 
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The requirements to enter the Officer’s Academy define mainly the 
socioeconomic status of the cadet; as  seen in Figure 3.11, one should have 
good grades and be in the middle to upper group of high school graduates. He 
also has to go through athletic tests to eliminate those that do not have the 
appropriate stamina and body qualifications. Finally, a candidate has to pass 
psychological tests that one generally considered reliable. 
As we can see, no financial expenses are normally involved in one’s 
decision to enter in a military academy, neither before entering nor during the 
cadet’s stay, as the government pays for the tuition and the living expenses of 
cadets in the Academy. This institution turns out to be less expensive for the 
parents compared to a university, as in the Academy, cadets have limited leave; 
in addition, they get a small income218. 
The only factor that restricts the wide representation of officers is the 
educational prerequisite, as described previously. We have also shown 
previously219 that there is a relation between educational achievement and 
economic status. Still, the representation of officers is wide, and it is not affected 
by social-status, or closed castes, or even rich families.220 This may help to 
explain why Greek society sees officers as a healthy and valuable part of society. 






                                            
218 At present, cadets get approximately 200 Euros per month and normally they get a leave 
every weekend, if not in training or under penalty. 
219 See present chapter, paragraph A2. 
220 This happens mainly due to the way that officers are picked through general exams, thus, 
avoiding external influences on their acceptance, by the military academies. An interesting finding 
of Smokovitis (Dimitris Smokovitis, in Military Sociology, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: 
Rawat Publications, 1999), 281) is that the political preferences of cadets are quite wide. This fact 
shows the big spread of the cadets in the socioeconomic levels of the country. 
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specific caste or do not rule by some common perceptions. They have the 
common logic of the society to which they belong, and they are closely related to 
that society.221 
In this chapter, we attempt to depict the people joining the army by 
answering who they are. Which are their criteria to enlist or be drafted? Why only 
men? What other alternatives exist for women? Who are the prospective leaders 
of the army? Do they belong to a specific caste? 
As these people move into the army to form the “gun” of the nation, they 
move along with their perceptions, strengths, weaknesses, and emotions. We will 
also try to observe them while they form the inner body of the Armed Forces, and 
we will also try to “measure” the efficiency of the “gun,” by using Eitelberg’s 
MRM. 
                                            
221 A very interesting survey took place in the U.S. (Congress of the United States, Social 
Representation in the U.S. Military (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 1989), 85, 91), 
which asked for the postal codes of the houses of officers. This method, without revealing 
identities and while respecting the personal secrecy, gives valuable results. The postal codes can 
be related to the worth of land in that area and consequently to the socioeconomic or economic 
status of the officers. This might be a proposal for a future study in Greece; plotting an officer 
class as cadets at first and again later on as officers. This survey could show useful results: first, 
what is their initial socioeconomic/economic status; second, what is their later status after being 
officers: is there any change?  
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IV. INSIDE THE ARMY 
Looking now into the base of the Hellenic Military, we focus on two 
separate groups, volunteers and draftees, which coexist in the body of soldiers, 
and produce a common outcome for the Armed Forces. We more specifically 
examine which are the strong and weak points regarding the army’s 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
A.  VOLUNTEERS; WHAT DO THEY HAVE TO OFFER TO THE HELLENIC 
ARMED FORCES? 
1.  Analyzing Three Main Factors 
Having already a rough idea about which group is most represented in the 
volunteer corps,222 we further analyze the factors affected in the military 
establishment by the volunteers’ participation. These factors are mainly three: 
Economic, Operational/Training, and Mobilization.  
a.  Economic 
The basic economic disadvantage for the state, in the case of 
volunteers, is their salary. Their monthly allowances, specifically for Greece, are 
close to 1,000 € (as a first salary).223 As a result, comparing Volunteers to the far 
lower-expense draft force brings to surface a clear disadvantage accompanying 
the Volunteer Force.224 
At this point, we should acknowledge the argument that there are 
actually fewer expenses associated with the Volunteer force, due to their 
                                            
222 In general terms, we could say that the lower to middle economic status groups are 
represented in the volunteer force. We will see that in more detail in the paragraph F(2)b of the 
present chapter. 
223 John Androulakis, “Volunteers, Scopia.gr, (2008), http://www.ellinikos-
stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as (accessed October 24, 2008).  
224 The salary of draftees is approximately 50 € per month. Still, the military main expense 
for them is the cost for their meals and their military uniforms. 
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continuous training. For example, many damages to equipment happen because 
the operator is not adequately trained. As military equipment becomes more 
expensive, such losses represent a greater expense.225 
The salary of volunteers not only affects the budget of the Ministry 
of Defense, it also affects the perception of society about their jobs. This factor is 
explored later in this chapter.  
b.  Operational 
Embedded in this factor are the concepts of effectiveness and 
efficiency of military operations. Training, learning, cooperation, and cohesion are 
also elements of this factor. 
Training of the personnel of the Armed Forces is a top criterion for 
achieving the overall goal of effectiveness. The degree of learning, along with the 
right procedures followed, forms the efficiency factor of an army. 
On this factor, volunteers seem to be in a better position compared 
to draftees. Several factors support this position. For example volunteers: 
• Have continuous training and an accrued experience 
• Are assigned a specialty and, for the most period of their service, 
are working in that specialty field 
• Attend more general and specialty courses 
• Are regularly examined on all the specialty courses that they go 
through. Further, officers usually refer first to volunteers instead of 
draftees for accomplishing a job, a fact that gives them higher 
esteem and overall gained experience. Additionally, most of the 
time, volunteers are assigned to train the draftees. This places 
them in the position of an instructor, which enhanced their position 
in the organization. The training and experience gained by the 
Volunteers becomes a fundamental element of achieving the 
operational goals of the military unit and the Armed Forces in 
general. 
                                            
225 Especially as electronic devises overarch modern military equipment, potential damage 
to them might result in thousands of Euros lost.  
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A useful concept that use for examining the operational factor is the 
“Learning Curve” theory. This theory is normally used in examining the incurred 
cost of every recurring procedure. The essence of the theory is that the cost of a 
general production or a specific product - which could be defined in various ways 
(e.g., labor hours) - continuously decreases as the procedure is repeated.226 
This theory could be applied to the military-unit field, where most of 
the drills are repetitive and – especially in the case of volunteers - involve the 
same people. In this way, the operational efficiency for a military unit composed 
of Volunteers is increased over time, as the time needed to perform a task is 
decreasing. 
To demonstrate the concept, we present below the graph of the 
“Learning Curve” theory227in Figure 4.1. 
                                            
226 For more see Harold Bright Maynard and Kjell B. Zandin, Maynard's Industrial 
Engineering Handbook (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2001). 
227 The theory says that the more labor intense is the task, the less cost incurs every time 
the task/product is repeated. The military field, being labor-intense, is a perfect field for 
implementing that theory. 
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Figure 4.1. Learning Curve Theory (Reduction of expenses, due to the 
repetition of a procedure)228. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, volunteers grow efficient in the tasks they 
undertake as they learn more and they eventually perform more quickly than 
draftees. Nevertheless, we also have to consider the number of soldiers 
demanded for each operation. For example, it will surely be more efficient to 
perform a training operation with an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), but what happens  
 
 
                                            
228 For more information see Harold Bright Maynard and Kjell B. Zandin, Maynard's Industrial 
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in the case of a war? Will the state be able to mobilize a great number of 
Volunteer Soldiers, exploiting only the AVF, without having any draftees for back 
up? This brings us to the next factor of mobilization. 
c.  Mobilization 
This is considered as a major disadvantage of the AVF, as it does 
not have the back-up force to quickly fight a major war, especially a defensive 
one.229 This aspect of the military design of a country is closely related to its 
strategy and its geopolitical position. As discussed below, Greece is a country 
with a medium-to-small population compared to its neighbors, in a very strategic 
area which witnessed numerous wars in the past. Greece’s strategic dogma is 
mainly to sustain a defensive and deterring army. All these characteristics of the 
country, and the region in general, reinforce the need for mobilizing quickly and 
effectively. 
In an AVF, where no military experience is gained by most citizens, 
the possibility of having an easily and effectively mobilized army is very low. The 
advocates of this argument might argue that even today, where a draft is in 
parallel effect, the soldiers do not get adequate training,230 and, moreover, they 
are not kept up to date in technologies and procedures after their service 
ends.231 The argument might be correct; yet, it is better to have little experience 






                                            
229 When attacking first, you normally have planned for the manpower reserves to be used. 
230 Nikolaos Toscas, “The Conscription, Strategy 5 (2008), 
http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com (accessed November 15, 2008). 
231 Normally, the current training of civilians who were former draftees is approximately ten 
days every year. 
 84
procedures and standards of draftees’ training and not the draft-system itself. 
Especially for the factor of mobilization, we had the honor of interviewing Mr. Gus 
Moutos, a very experienced retired U.S. officer.232 
According to Mr. Moutos:233 
The nation of Greece must consider two areas in formulating a 
policy: 
A.   Strategic needs. For defense, the Greek Army needs to be as 
large as today’s force to address the challenge of defending a 
nation with vast borders as Greece has with its great number of 
islands. Forces have to be permanently stationed there or quickly 
deployed within hours. The force has to be well trained and 
equipped and have the close relationship it now has with the Greek 
nation….The answer to small volunteer force is a well trained, 
equipped and available reserve of equal size or greater than the 
volunteer force. 
B.   Costs. A volunteer force will be expensive, in fact, very 
expensive, to the tune of four to five times as much. The soldier 
now becomes an employee. You have to pay market price for each 
soldier and when the economy is good the price goes up. 
…Obligations will have to be established for volunteers to serve in 
the reserves when leaving active duty to insure reserve manning 
and quality levels for the reserves (efedries). The cost is an area of 
major concern. If inadequate resources to maintain the reserves 
are provided a small active army force is in great jeopardy in time of 
war.234 
                                            
232 Mr. Gus Moutos is an important member of the U.S. Military; while serving for more than 
30 years , he also had the command of a recruiting department for many years. His Greek origin 
and his deep knowledge of both Greek and U.S. recruitment systems were helpful to me when I 
asked him various comparative questions about each country’s military and social reality. Apart 
from his professional competence, Mr. Moutos happened to be a close friend to the late Professor 
C. Moskos, whose theories form the basis of this study. There were more than a few times, as 
Moutos remembers that he would pick up the phone and call Moskos to discuss a military-related 
subject. As expected, their common Greek origin reinforced those discussions.  
233 That discussion/ interview took place on the September 17, 2008 in California. Both 
parties were knowledgeable that the material of the discussion would be used in the present 
study.  
234 A full presentation of Mr. Moutos’ views, can be found in Appendix D. 
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Returning again to the Greek Strategic reality, it is useful to further 
examine the mobilization factor. Apart from considering the disheartening factors 
of the small Greek population, the imminent threat from Greece’s neighbors, and 
the defensive military dogma, it will also be useful to consider that Greece might 
be the one and only country in the EU whose borders are threatened by neighbor 
countries.235 
Furthermore, mobilization is not only a matter of a number of men 
needed in battle. It represents also a qualitative criterion for the civilian 
poopulation to participate in the decision of activating the Armed Forces when in 
danger. We could imagine a civilian that never belonged to the Armed Forces to 
be called upon in the midst of a dangerous situation. Apart from being naïve 
about what he should do, he would also counteract such a mobilization decision.  
Even though we devote this chapter to examining the inner function 
of the military “gun,” we will include the views that the society has for each soldier 
group: the volunteers and the draftees. These views are useful to our analysis. 
2.  How are the Volunteers Viewed by the Society? 
Before examining society’s perception of the Volunteers, it is useful to 
explain why we include this kind of analysis in the study. 
While officers are the leaders of the army, soldiers are the base, with no 
significant power of acting and contributing to the decisions, even though those 
decisions affect soldiers themselves. If we try to find their strength, it is most 
probable to find it mirrored by the society in general and more precisely by the 
politicians. So, by measuring the acceptance and the value of the Volunteers and 
draftees in the society, we realize the strength they maintain in the military 
establishment and we estimate more effectively the “gun’s” component strengths. 
                                            
235 For more see: Ministry of Defense, “White Bible,” 
http://www.mod.mil.gr/mme/all_publication_ comhtml?dr_ html_ url (accessed September 15, 
2008).  
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We start with volunteers. As Greece has a short history with this type of 
organization, we will draw comparative conclusions from U.S. history, which has 
used the AVF uninterruptedly since 1973 and the end of the Vietnam War.236 
We try to formulate a picture of U.S. society through many sources, and 
finally through a personal concept about how societies view the AVF. 
a. The U.S. Case  
Authors Douquet and Schaeffer believe that U.S. society 
misunderstands and underestimates the military, mainly due to the fact that there 
is no representation of the powerful citizens, who are able to access the media 
and the state authorities.237 That is the reason why a “gap” between civilians and 
the military is growing. They also comment that there is a social ignorance 
creating an underestimation of duty and, furthermore, of volunteer service as a 
personal choice. They continue by saying that military people are strangers to the 
American upper classes.238  
In another book, Feaver and Kohn conducted research in the U.S. 
by asking questions on all aspects of social life.239 The outcome of the answers 
reveals that a real gap exists between these two groups in most of their beliefs. 
In the same paper, the authors collected and summarized the collective opinion 
of elite groups regarding defense spending. Their results indicated that:  
                                            
236 Greece started using volunteers in 2000 with quite a success, after passing a relevant 
law in the Greek Parliament. Later on, several competitions took place for recruiting volunteers. 
All of them were successful and the applicants’ numbers were more than two times the positions 
available (John Androulakis, “Volunteers, Scopia.gr (2008), http://www.ellinikos-
stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as (accessed October 24, 2008). 
237 Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's 
Upper Classes from the Military and How It Hurts the Country 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 
2006), 1. 
238 Ibid., 32. Also, in the same book (98) the authors present the evolution of that civil-
military gap and how U.S. went from “us” to “them”. 
239 They questioned soldiers and civilians about political, religious, and finally foreign policy 
issues, (Peter D. Feaver, and Richard H. Kohn, The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and 
Civilians (Massachusetts: MIT Press: 2001), 20. 
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...prior military service and social contact with military people are 
associated with more support for defense spending and military 
service.240 
In another article, titled “Equal Obligation versus Equal 
Opportunity,” Jeffrey Record presents a thorough description of the evolution of 
the draft and AVF in the U.S.241 His views are mainly that the AVF was created 
for coping with  domestic political problems that came after the Vietnam War. 
This decision to go to an AVF affected U.S. military efficiency, as the number of 
soldiers (active and reserves) dropped dramatically.242 But returning to the initial 
question of what people believe about the AVF, the author discusses opposition 
of some politicians in the “Gates Commission” in 1969. The core arguments of 
the politicians who were against the AVF were that it “would be manned 
predominately by the poor and the black, and that it would encourage the 
emergence of a military isolated from society and antagonistic to civilian 
control.”243  
As we see, the concern for a socially unrepresentative AVF arose 
from the first moment of its conception. On that issue, Eitelberg, in extensive 
studies, concludes: 
• “…the basic concept of representation is a keystone in 
democracy…” 244 
• Practical necessity has opened the doors to military service for 
many ambiguous groups over the years245 
                                            
240 Peter D. Feaver, and Richard H. Kohn, The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and 
Civilians (Massachusetts: MIT Press: 2001), 328. 
241 National Defense University, Fort Lesley, The Anthropo Factor in Warfare (J. E. Endicott, 
Washington, 1988), 225-240. 
242 Ibid., 232. Numbers were given for the period 1964 to 1986, where the active duty 
personnel felled from 2.68 million to 2.18 million.  
243 Ibid., 233. The “Gates Commission” was created by President Nixon in 1969, to study 
and propose a future military system for the USA. 
244 Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations.” 
Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and 
Society, Baltimore, MD (October 1989): 2.  
245 Ibid., 18. During WW-II, 300,000 illiterate men and 100,000 convicted fellows were 
enlisted. 
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In 1989, Senator Sam Nunn and Congressional Representative 
Dave McCurdy, representing a common concern of U.S. society, proposed an act 
that would reform the existing U.S. military. The proposed act intended to 
“strengthen national defense by making the composition of the Armed Forces 
more representative of the country at large.”246 Eitelberg notes on that issue that 
“[t]he Nunn-McCurdy proposal [for a system of national service] is probably 
attractive to many American citizens, who would agree with its fundamental goals 
of equity, patriotism, and civic responsibility.”247 
Regarding the contemporary view that U.S. society has about its 
AVF military, we would base our remarks on the two major U.S. war operations in 
2008: Afghanistan and Iraq. These operations started in 2001 and 2003, 
respectively, and at the time of this writing, U.S. troops are still deployed in these 
hostile regions. The losses for the U.S. Armed Forces in both fields are close to 
5,000 soldiers, as of 2008.248 
A great part of U.S. society argues that all these wars would have 
been more effectively designed, and losses of U.S. Volunteers would have been 
much less, if compulsory service had been in place. They mainly argue that 
those who were in powerful positions in U.S. society would have changed their 
attitudes if their own children, along with the rest of the society’s children, was 
serving in a war zone.249 
Finally, as a general conclusion on the perception of the AVF 
military by U.S. society, we would say the following. 
                                            
246 Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations.” 
Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and 
Society, Baltimore, MD (October 1989): 22. (Initially taken from “Citizenship and National Service 
Act of 1989” s.3, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 3-4.) 
247 Ibid. 
248 “News Report,” CNN, November 11, 2008. 
249 In fact, that was the case for Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The 
Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How It Hurts the Country. 
1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006). 
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• There is an evident concern for a growing gap between the military 
and the society 
• There is a lack of social representation, affecting military 
effectiveness 
• There is great apathy on military issues. Furthermore, the losses of 
U.S. citizens are seen as a matter, that only affects the families that 
“offered” a volunteer to the U.S. military 
As we see, society does not oppose the Volunteers themselves; 
rather, it reacts in apathy, which is evidence of the lack of society’s controls. As 
we show below, this situation can result in military ineffectiveness. 
As we believe that any civilized western country would react the 
same way on that issue, and having the U.S. as a “guide” to our project, we 
assume that the same perceptions would be found in Greece, as well. 
b.  “The Police-like Armies”: (A Personally Developed 
Analogy of Society’s Perception for AVF Militaries) 
This personally developed analogy serves to explain in a way the 
inner concept when a citizen views the AVF army. It is mainly based on two 
factors: first, the type of potential wars in the future, and second, the increasingly 
individualistic and over-capitalistic way of our lives. 
To begin with, we will use a survey conducted in Europe in 2001 by 
Eurobarometer.250 In that survey, as shown in Figure 4.2, the percentage of 
citizens who answered positively for the possibility of a world war, or a war in 
Europe’s territory was less than half (45 percent). On the other hand, those who 
believed in the possibility of terrorism or organized crime in Europe was far 
higher (74-77 percent).  
                                            
250 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 


















Figure 4.2. Fears of Europeans251  
This suggests that European citizens do not believe that a mass or 
national war would occur in their neighborhood. They are mostly afraid of terrorist 
attacks; at the same time, they agree about sending their Armed Forces abroad 














Roles of the military
 
Figure 4.3. Roles of the military, according to Europeans253  
                                            
251 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 328. 
252 Ibid., 330; (From the initial survey made by Eurobarometer 5401, 2001). 
253 Ibid., 330. 
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The results shown in Figure 4.3 indicate that citizens understand 
the role of the military in maintaining the internal stability of a country by fighting 
terrorists or other dangerous group. They also seem to believe that the 
professional military is the long hand of the state’s foreign policy to remote 
regions that need help and where their country has an interest.  
The second factor, of the highly individualistic and materialistic 
societies of the developed world, is obvious, especially when compared to the 
era of the last massive war (1945). In this sense, all citizens want their safety, 
and they will pay to keep on with their lives and economic prosperity. This 
expense for the “hired professional guards” is, in our case, done through state 
taxes.  
Finally, does not that perception of the contemporary military, seem 
too close to the “police force”? Most probably, yes. Implicitly or not, one can find 
several “similarities” between these two professional groups. We list some of 
them, as follows. 
• They are both professional, law-enforcing groups (based on state 
or international laws) 
• They are both paid by the government 
• They both have the ability to carry and use guns 
• They both call new members on a volunteer basis 
• They have uniforms and hierarchies, and they are both placed 
under a Ministry/department 
These and many other similarities raise some simple self-imposed 
questions, such as why not use all Volunteers in the Military, as in the case of the 
police force. Why would it not work for Armed Forces as it works with police? The 





The will of most of the people to pay somebody to do the hard job 
of security finds its analogy in an effective corps with which all citizens are 
familiar: the police. The dangers of that analogy, though, are lurking underneath 
some facts that do not validate the simplistic equalization of the previous 
statement. 
Briefly, the counter-arguments to that modern definition of the AVF 
Armed Forces as the “Country’s Foreign Police” are the following. 
• While internally the country has precise and accepted laws and 
rules to follow, this is not the case with international laws and 
procedures. There is an inherent vagueness on those laws under 
which a military force should act abroad. 
• Police are continuously doing the same task of protecting their co- 
citizens from unlawful persons or acts. Military tasks are not steady 
and are changing from one moment to the other as balances and 
actions of other countries change. 
• Killing, and living with the consequences of it, is much different 
when it is done while chasing a criminal in one’s own country, than 
when it involves a foreigner in his own country under vague 
regulations and orders.254 
• In the case of a defensive war, all citizens should contribute to the 
defense of the place they plan to raise their children.255 
• Police are continuously monitored and controlled in a direct and 
indirect way,256 while operating in common view of the citizens, 
giving them the ability to have a solid idea of the way the police 
function. This is not true for military, especially when they operate 
abroad. Not only there is a national interest in controlling the news 
that comes back to citizens from the war-frontier, but also people 
prefer to believe that their military is performing effectively, without 
examining their acts. 
 
                                            
254 For more on that issue see Dave Grossman, On Killing, 1st ed. The Psychological Cost of 
Learning to Kill in War and Society (Canada: Little, Brown & Company, 1995). 
255 A very well-put argument on that was made by C. Moskos: “what kind of country excludes 
its most privileged members from defending it?”  
256 Direct could be observation and reporting of policemen during performing their 
operations, while indirect could be through democratic procedures and through relevant civic-
requests/protests/law proposals. 
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• Finally, the issue of losses, which is somewhat connected to the 
previous argument. For that, we use an analytical hypothesis based 
on true data. During the ongoing Iraq War, the U.S. has already lost 
more than four-thousand soldiers; although there has been some 
protesting, the operation is continuing. What if the U.S. lost 4,000 
policemen in the same period of time all around the country? Even 
being a pure assumption, it is evident that a lot of different citizen 
and state actions would have taken place, including protests by 
policemen/citizens, the demand from citizens for increasing the 
police force,257 politicians alerted trying to pass new laws, and 
possibly many more actions. 
The above arguments suggest that the analogy of the Military as a 
Police Force is not real, and it only rationalizes the need of some citizens to have 
their life going and pay somebody (or even anybody), to keep them safe, even by 
committing to lose his life. 
In this way, volunteers are viewed by the society to which they 
belong to as a useful but separate body, with an obligation to defend the country, 
as police do, and by being paid to do so. 
After examining what volunteers have to offer in the A.F., we now 
examine the same question for draftees. 
B.  WHAT DRAFTEES HAVE TO OFFER IN THE MILITARY? 
Some of the advantages of an AVF discussed previously constitute 
disadvantages of compulsory service, and vice versa. By examining the same 
factors as previously, this time for the draft soldiers, we  compose a 
comprehensive picture of the military’s base force. 
1.  Analysis of the Three Main Factors 
One can begin by reviewing the economic, operational and mobilization 
factors for draftees: 
                                            
257 The same demand for increasing U.S. forces in Iraq occurred only recently. 
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a.  Economic Factor 
As we noted previously, this is a disadvantage for Volunteers, and it 
turns to be an advantage for draftees. Again, we do not have specific numbers, 
but as discussed above, the economic benefit of keeping compulsory service is 
large. At the same time, we must also take into account the expenses resulting 
from untrained draft soldiers. Further, we now have to examine the way in which 
draftees lead the military to savings. 
Most of the time, soldiers who come from all the socioeconomic 
classes of society have already gained a level of expert knowledge of a subject 
that they studied beforehand. As a result, they help the unit, in which they are 
serving in many ways, saving time and sometimes money. Some fields of 
expertise in which knowledgeable soldiers could be useful include computer 
systems, engineering, plumbing, and many other technical jobs.258 Of course, it 
is an economic/resource aid that cannot be effectively measured.  
Overall, draftees have the advantage on that aspect, but what 
happens when considering the operational factor in drafting? 
b.  Operational – Training – Learning Factor 
This time, compulsory service has a disadvantage compared to 
volunteer service. Operationally, a draft soldier does not get to the level of a 
volunteer, as the training of the former is less, and sometimes is interrupted due 
to the change in unit on his sixth-month period of service.259 
The learning curve theory that we used previously for depicting the 
benefit from continuous Volunteers’ learning, is again useful for another concept 
                                            
258 In fact, from personal experience in working with draftees, there were a number of cases 
where a soldier who had previously studied mechanical engineering solved a mechanical problem 
that even officers could not solve; more often, soldiers organized and worked on the computer 
systems of a ship or an office better than their superiors. 
259 The system of Greek Draft, at present, is a year service in total (six months at a remote 
military unit and six months in a central one). 
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that is embedded in it: the breakage of the learning process. This happens when 
a production or task stops for a period and then begins again with the same 
working force. In our case, the military tasks are not interrupted, but in a draft 
system, the “working” force is changing approximately every six to twelve 




Figure 4.4. Breakage of learning curve of the military, due to the duration of 
the draftees’ service. 
                                            
260 For more information see Harold Bright Maynard and Kjell B. Zandin, Maynard's Industrial 
Engineering Handbook (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2001). 











           









This graph shows that roughly every six months, a breakage of task 
repetition takes place.261 When level a on the “expenses” axis is the initial cost of 
a task, after a period, the cost drops to level b, and, if the procedure were not 
interrupted, the cost would fall more to an expense level of c, (or a labor hour 
level of c for completing a task). The next time we perform the same task with the 
new soldiers, it is sure that we will take level a hours again, clearly more than the 
level c hours needed before the breakage. The amount of hours needed after the 
breakage represents the loss of resources/working hours, or else the lessening 
of the effectiveness and efficiency of a military unit, due to the duration of service 
for the draftee soldiers. In other words, the graph reveals that, even though we 
repeat the military procedures/tasks, when there are draftees involved, we do not 
get better in the labor hours needed, and our military effectiveness and efficiency 
are seriously hurt. 
One objection to this argument might be that draft soldiers are 
coming from all kinds of educational levels. Thus, as explained previously, some 
of them might be university graduates or even more highly educated. This could 
lead us to believe that their initial draftees’ learning curve is much more efficient 
than that of volunteers, whose education/knowledge level is from low to 
average.262 So, even though draftees experience a breakage on their learning 
curve, they still might be even better than the respective “unbroken” Volunteers’ 
learning curve. To depict that argument on the learning curve graph, we created 
a diagram in Figure 4.4 showing the hypothetical superiority of the draftees’ 
learning curve. 
                                            
261 For our case, it could be from six to 12 months when soldiers are reassigned or relieved 
from service. 
262 As we have shown in Chapter III- paragraph A, the greater part of the volunteer force is 
formed by high school graduates with no higher level studies. 
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Figure 4.5. Hypothetical comparison of Volunteers’ and Draftees’ Learning 
Curves 
Of course, the above argument is hardly evaluated, even when 
knowing the portion of highly literate draftees compared to Volunteers. Another 
fact that devalues this argument on a draftee’s potential superiority is that 
conscription calls all men in the country; as a result, not only the highly educated 
will be added in the military units, but also those who have less than high school 
education and possibly even the totally illiterate.263 
                                            
263 Specifically for Greece, the number of those who are lower than high school educated is 
very low. (Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm (accessed 
October 25, 2008). 
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In a very detailed description of a conscripted soldier’s training, P. 
Zorzovilis, editor of the Greek military magazine “Strategy,”264 argues that twelve 
months of service under the current system, where a soldier spends two 
semesters in two units, lacks the perspective of proper training for the soldier, as 
the latter is also going to be used for other administrative or other labor-intense 
tasks. The same opinion is expressed by Vice General (retired) Hellenic Army N. 
Toskas,265 who also offers proposals regarding the best way Greek soldiers 
should be trained and the tasks for which they should be used. 
As a conclusion to the operational/ training factor, we find that a 
purely compulsory military service would lower the overall efficiency of the armed 
forces by incurring breakages in the experience levels of the force. 
As we did previously in analyzing the Volunteer Force, we next 
consider the mobilization factor of a draftee force. 
c.  Mobilization 
As previously described for the Greek Volunteer Force, this factor is 
a very critical one for Greece. The country’s sensitive geopolitical position, its 
small population, existing open issues with some neighbors, and its defensive 
military dogma, make the factor of mobilization a real and substantial one. 
These factors are also discussed in an article by Smokovitis 
regarding the formation of the Greek military.266 In another work, Smokovitis 
questions a group of cadets on several military and social issues267. His main 
                                            
264 Periklis Zorzovilis, “Time for Decisions, Strategy 7 (2008), 
http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index (accessed November 15, 2008).  
265 Nikolaos Toscas. “The Conscription, Strategy 5 (2008), 
http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com (accessed November 15, 2008). 
266 Dimitris Smokovitis, “Greece,” in The Military, More than Just a Job? ed. Charles C. 
Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1988), 249-253. Event 
though the article is dated in ‘80s, the author gives a clear picture of the factors leading to the 
Draft Force at the time 
267 Dimitris Smokovitis, in Military Sociology, ed. Leena Parmar (New Delhi, India: Rawat 
Publications, 1999), 314-331. 
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point in that article is that the Greek military represents a unique case in the 
European context due to the same factors as those referred to previously. The 
majority of his research subjects found that the most important possible task for 
the future Armed Forces would be the defense of the national territory. Based on 
the cadets’ super-positive view on the draft system, we can conclude that the 
mobilization factor was implicitly considered in their minds.268  
This research group leads us to consider the next literature 
question, of how conscripts are perceived by Greek society in general. 
2.  How are the Conscript Soldiers Viewed by Greek Society? 
We examine Greek society’s perception in two dimensions: first, the more 
generic one, which is how the average person in society views conscripts; and, 
second, how conscript soldiers are viewed by their families, which represent a 
major part of Greek society.269 These data are also useful when considering the 
interrelation of society and the military in the next chapter. 
a.   Society’s Opinion of Draftees 
We have ample data to support the notion that, during Greek 
history, the soldier was considered a man of dignity and courage. This perception 
is also related to the numerous stories told after the many battles that the Greek 
Armed Forces fought over the years. It is also widely believed that serving as a 
soldier reinforces one’s ties with his nation and affects the sentimental part of his  
 
                                            
268 We have to note that this focus group does not represent the general social group; 
however, since they were only in their first years of military life, it is most probable that they still 
carried with them their civil-perceptions, and thus were a small but quite representative group of 
Greek youngsters.  
269 A rough calculation of the family members directly connected to a soldier while in duty 
would be: (50,000) x (6) =300,000, where 50,000 is an average number of draftees serving and 
six is a rough number of family members directly affected by him. So, in total, 300,000 people, 
usually politically active and voters, have a direct relation at all times with a conscripted soldier. It 
is interesting to consider that, in both the past two national elections in Greece in 2004 and 2007, 
the difference between the two leading parties was close to 300,000 votes. 
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logic, forcing him to consider the group instead of the individual. Numerous 
examples of sacrifice can be identified, not only during a war period, but also 
during peace.270  
Of course, there are also some people who might argue that, 
specifically in Greece, the draft system is counterproductive and soldiers are 
disappointed instead of proud of their service.271 Yet, a retired Greek general, N. 
Toscas,272 notes the lack of draftees’ training, and fells that their overall 
dissatisfaction would be addressed mainly by reviewing the training and other 
general procedures used in the draft system, and that this should not be a reason 
for demolishing the whole draft system. The majority of political parties agree 
with this argument. 
Currently, there is a debate, in Greece over whether to cease the 
draft system. As many people, institutions and political parties take part in that 
open dialogue, we have a great chance of exploiting their views. We could start 
with the ideas of the most responsible person on that issue: the Minister of 
National Defense. In a TV interview in 2007,273 he supported the draft system, 
considering it a vital part of the military and a supreme life experience for the 
youth. He also connected conscription with the ties among society members that 




                                            
270 This fact could be considered as self-evident; nevertheless, some very well presented 
examples of sacrifice in the military can be found in the article: Nikolaos Toscas, “The 
Conscription,” Strategy 5 (2008), http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com 
(accessed November 15, 2008).  
271 To get a more live feeling of what a part of Greek society argues, see Omiri.gr, 
http://www.omhroi.gr/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article (accessed September 
15, 2008). 
272 Nikolaos Toscas, “The Conscription, Strategy 5 (2008), 
http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com (accessed November 15, 2008). 
273 Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231 (accessed 
October 27, 2008). 
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to exist, but also that an earlier call for service at nineteen years of age, 
irrespective of the ongoing studies of the prospective soldier, should be 
considered.274 
That last point, and the overall concept of draftees, raised some 
counter-arguments from the opposing political parties. The second biggest 
political party at the time (PASOK), which leans to the center-left side, is critical 
only of the current way the conscription system is working. Their opinion is not a 
definite yes or no to conscription, but rather a proposal to renew the idea of 
conscription step-by-step, from what it is today to a model of conscription of a 
modern type of Armed Forces. Specifically, the organized youth group of that 
party proposed a package of measures for reforming the present draft system, by 
even enforcing a soldier’s ombudsman, who will resolve any issues reported to 
him by soldiers or other related parties.275 
On the same path, even though in a more aggressive way, P. 
Korvesis, a parliament representative of a smaller left-wing party 
(SYNASPISMOS), argued that we should consider changing the system that was 
initiated in 1911 when major wars took place.276 He went on to say that the way 
that conscription is enforced today is useless and even counterproductive.  
In conclusion, to estimate society’s general view on the draftees, 
we can look at the opinions of their political representatives, which in the highest 
ratio agree on the following.  
 
 
                                            
274 As of today, a youngster can get up to six years postponement in conscripting in the 
Army, if he is able to enter into a public university. 
275 “Time for Ombudsman in the Army.” Eleftherotipia Newspaper, August 25, 2008, 2, 
http://www.enet.gr/online/online (accessed September 12, 2008). This, along with the rest of the 
proposals by PASOK, was driven by the unfortunate incidents of three soldiers’ suicide during the 
summer of 2008. 
276 “Time for Ombudsman in the Army.” Eleftherotipia Newspaper, August 25, 2008, 1, 
http://www.enet.gr/online/online (accessed August 13, 2008). 
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• Conscript soldiers are closely watched by society along with their 
political representatives 
• Approximately 85 percent of society, as represented by the two 
major political parties, supports the draft system 
• The same population (and even more) support the reform of the 
conscription system277 
• All of the political parties seem very sensitive to the individual 
soldier’s well-being278 
This analysis, assumes that there are connections between the 
political parties in Greece and their voters, as well as the whole society. But what 
are the views of those directly connected to the soldiers? 
b.  Opinions among the Soldiers’ Close Social Circle  
As we can understand, the soldiers’ social circle constitutes a 
subgroup of the general population. Thus, they primarily follow the ideas 
described above. Still, their direct connection, and the fact that family in Greece 
is closely connected, produces more intense results. One of them is the 
interference of the parents in the positioning of their sons in their military duties. It 
used to be a general phenomenon - parents trying to achieve military positions 
for their sons as close as possible to their homes. That deficiency forced the 
Ministry of Defense to pass a law regarding the time period for a conscript to 
spend in remote and urban areas.279 
Another point that evidently shows the youngsters’ avoidance of 
service - and as a logical consequence the same logic by their parents - is that in 
most of the cases, youngsters postpone their military service to study. This can 
                                            
277 The views of the political parties on how to reform the draft system might be different, but 
still they agree that a sort of action should be undertaken. 
278 This could be a direct result of the draft system and its political reflections on voting, as 
presented earlier. 
279 It was determined as six months at a remote base and the other six months at an urban 
base.  
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only be done with the financial assistance of their parents. This was what the 
Minister of Defense, Mr. Meimarakis, also noted in an interview in 2007: 
Normally 80 to 85 thousand of soldiers should be conscripted every 
year; of those only 45 to 50 thousands appear for service. The rest 
30 thousands are postponing their service, due to educational 
reasons. So, a ratio of roughly 40 percent is avoiding to be enlisted 
on time.280 From those 30 thousand that avoid enlistment, roughly 
10 thousand never serve, by using several ways of avoiding 
conscription.281 
That clue became the basic argument for the Ministry of Defense’s 
2007 proposal to enlist youngsters at the age of eighteen, after the completion of 
their high school studies, and before they enter the higher educational level. 
In general, what we keep from all these numbers is that at least 40 
percent of the youngsters have higher dreams than becoming a soldier, not only 
a conscript but a volunteer, too. This fact of 40 percent avoiding conscription can 
be extremely useful to us, as, logically, the same portion of the youth is avoiding 
enlistment in the volunteer force, too. Their ambitions and their potential are well 
beyond the Volunteer Force offerings. So, this leaves us with the other 60 
percent of the Greek youth, which forms the pool for choosing volunteers. In 
other words, Volunteers are chosen among the lower 60 percent of the educated 
Greek youth, while the upper-educated 40 percent remains out of the volunteer 
force and is also avoiding conscription. This can be depicted graphically, as 
presented in Figure 4.5. 
                                            
280 This ratio is a very interesting one as, apart from showing the avoidance of obligatory 
military service, it also shows the portion of the youngsters that were successfully accepted in a 
university and preferred doing so rather than going to the military in general. This ratio will be 
cross-checked later through the official data from the Ministry of Public Education. 
281 Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231 (accessed 
October 27, 2008). 
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Figure 4.6. The pyramid of youngsters willing to volunteer   
The draft system suffers not only from the low birth-rate in Greece 
but also from the avoidance of service by youngsters.Even for those youngsters 
who enlisted properly and on time, their parents are greatly concerned for them, 
as most of the soldiers used to live in their close family environment before 
conscripting, and thus have strong and live connections with it.282 
                                            
282 At the age of 18, usually a man lives with his parents and after his service, he most 
probably would return to his family house (see relevant data presented by Eurostat in the survey: 
The Gallup Organization, “Youth Survey,” Flash Eurobarometer Series 202 (2007): 70.  
The top of the 
pyramid 
The highest 40% 
of the educated 
youth, avoiding 
the Military
The base of the pyramid :  
Volunteers’ Force choosing-pool   
Lower 60 % of educated youth  
(High School Graduates) 
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As a generic outcome of attempting to see through the eye’s of 
soldiers’ parents, we would say. 
• Parents are very closely related to their soldier-sons and they 
watch them continuously 
• Parents give priority – if they can afford it - to their sons’ studies 
instead of letting them serve in the Army 
• There is no sign from the parents of rejecting conscription;283 still, 
they try to ensure the best living conditions for their sons during 
their service 
These conclusions are crucial for the next chapter, where we show 
the connections between society and the military and how these connections 
affect military efficiency. 
In the following discussion, we focus on the people whose opinions 
were not yet expressed in this study: the military officers and leaders. We try to 
find what kind of soldiers they prefer to have under their orders. This gives us a 
wider perspective on how volunteers and draftees are seen, not only in the 
society, but also in the military environment. 
C.  MILITARY LEADERS AND OFFICERS: WHAT KIND OF SOLDIERS DO 
THEY PREFER? 
1.  Examining the Three Main Factors 
We have already tried to examine the Greek society to see its beliefs. We 
have already estimated the preferences of the youngsters themselves, and the 
options they have. Now, we try to understand the military part of the puzzle, and 
figure out what form of conscription military officials consider best for the 
effectiveness of the Armed Forces. We take into account perspectives of the 
Hellenic, European and U.S. military personnel, considering the mentality and the 
                                            
283 The argument for that is that parents belong in the general population that was examined 
before and supports the draft; possibly under a better form. 
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culture of all these militaries as closely related.284 Once more, we use the factors 
examined above: Economic – Operational – Mobilization, and try to estimate 
which of these has the greater gravity, according to military officers. 
To start with the economic factor, it is evident that military leaders are 
least concerned about that, as the budget of the Armed Forces is not made by 
them, but by the politicians and the higher Ministry administration.285 Military 
officers and leaders are mostly concerned on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the “weapon” they are charged to operate. This is the reason for their shift of 
concern mainly to the operational and mobilization factors.286  
The operational factor for conscripted and volunteer soldiers has already 
been examined and gives us sound proof that volunteers have the advantage on 
that. For this reason, officers generally prefer to have volunteers under their 
command.287 
The mobilization factor is a critical one, too. Officers, and especially the 
higher-ranking ones, want to know that in a case of a military threat, they will be 
quickly given the soldiers they need, who preferably would have some 
experience in the duties they would be called to perform. So, as analyzed before, 
conscription has a positive outcome on that. Therefore, in the instance of  
 
                                            
284 The NATO Armed Forces in particular have been working and operating together for 
more than 50 years, and have acquired a common understanding on building and operating an 
army, mainly on the operational field. For instance, the tactics used in NATO countries are the 
same, so what is demanded by soldiers in each country is about the same. 
285 An opposite observation is made in the survey conducted by Smokovitis, where a group 
of military cadets answered that AVF is difficult to be implemented, due to high costs. 
Nevertheless, their remark came as an answer to a theoretical question and they did not answer 
as experienced officers . (Dimitris Smokovitis, in Military Sociology, ed. Leena Parmar (New 
Delhi, India: Rawat Publications, 1999). 
286 It is sure that the higher rank officers overlooking the Defense Budget would be much 
interested in the economic factor. Nevertheless, in this part we consider the opinion of the 
majority of officers in charge of the command of an operational unit. 
287 From personal observations and experience while serving in the Hellenic Navy, before 
changing to volunteer crews on ships, most of the officers felt tired and disheartened after trying 
continuously to train a draftee and after a few months, lose that person and go all over again with 
a new one. This was also presented scientifically with the use of learning curves, earlier in this 
study. 
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immediate danger, officers would probably prefer to have a conscript system 
where the coverage of the army positions could be quick and by quite 
experienced persons.288 
On the other hand, there is the continuous need of peacetime 
mobilization, meaning the soldiers needed to man the military units as a part of 
their service to the country. As mentioned previously,289 40 percent of the eligible 
draftees do not appear and postpone their service. This lack of soldiers is a 
degrading factor for military effectiveness and directly affects the officers, as they 
have to come up with ways to try and operate their units with fewer personnel 
than needed. This has a counter-effect on the previous factor, that of operational 
effectiveness. 
Thus, mobilization has two aspects: first, in the short-term, for filling the 
current military positions needed; and, second, in the long-term, when a major 
mobilization might be needed under a military threat to the country. 
Logically, for short term mobilization, officers would prefer an AVF, where 
the acquisition of soldiers needed would be more assured and more stable.290 
Mobilization in the long-term is a clear advantage of the draft system. Still, 
middle-rank officers in charge of operational units do not usually consider that 
aspect of mobilization much, as they have first to manage short-term 
mobilization. Mobilization in the long-term is mainly a concern of the higher-
ranking officers, who are in charge of the strategic structure of the Armed Forces. 
As a result, a rough weight of the above factors gives a lead to volunteers, 
as they are more suitable than draftees when considering the operational and the 
short-run mobilization factors. 
                                            
288 Usually mobilization affects mainly the Army and not the Navy and Air Force, where the 
combat units are fully manned by volunteers from the peacetime. For more on operational 
aspects of mobilization in the Greek territory see: Nikolaos Toscas, “The Reserves in a Battle, 
Strategy 6 (2008), http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index (accessed November 15, 2008).  
289 Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231 (accessed 
October 27, 2008). 
290 A volunteer soldier fills a position for at least four years, while a conscript for only one. 
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In addition, another aspect that leads officers to prefer volunteers, is that 
the chain of command is more stable and efficient. This happens because 
volunteers serve longer than conscripts, and, as a result, the hierarchical 
structure is steadier and more embedded in the military personnel. Apart from 
that, it is easier to command someone who is paid for doing something, than 
someone who serves his country without any return. It is normal to react with 
more compassion and less military professionalism in the second case. 
A very interesting analysis of this issue, regarding the U.S. Army, comes 
from Colonel W. Raymond.291 In a paper on the draft in the U.S. Army and the 
Armed Forces in general, he supports the reestablishment of a form of a draft 
system, mainly for the full mobilization of the Army while in operations. On that 
argument, he also adds that being drafted is a patriotic act, which shapes the 
youth and the society in whole. 
In the same study, views from high-ranking officers of the U.S. Armed 
Forces are presented. General Gordon Sullivan, former army Chief of staff, 
stated in 2005: “The Army and, indeed all the services need an increase in end 
strength to meet the high operational temp that shows little sign of abating in the 
continuing war on terrorism.”292 Another opinion from retired Major General 
Edward Atkeson in 2005 was that “the all-volunteer force is close to breaking 
right now…when it does break, that’s when you will see the draft come back.”293 
Of course, there are also many U.S. military officers who oppose the draft; 
still, we are getting an idea of the turbulence that the mobilization factor mainly 
brings into the U.S. volunteer Armed Forces. 
                                            
291 William M. Raymond, “Uncle Sam says, “I Want You!” - The Politics of the Draft and 
National Service,” Monograph (2005).  
292 Ibid., 52. 
293 Ibid., 53. 
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Looking now upon Europe, we analyze the data given by Volker 
Gelhausen in his 1998 NPS Master’s thesis294. Reserve Ratio (RR), displayed in 
the table below, determines the state of readiness of a force, or, in other words, 
its mobilization ability. Thus, Reserve Ratio is defined as the ratio of Reserves to 
the total national active forces. As the author suggests, the role of the Reserve 
Ratio is getting even more important because military organizations usually 
reduce the number of active-duty personnel after implementing an AVF.295 













Figure 4.7. Reserve Ratio (RR) of European Countries in 1996-1997296  
Greece stands approximately in the middle of these countries, tending to 
have equal weight in its active and Reserve Force.297 
                                            
294 Volker Gelhausen, The Effects of Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the 
Successful implementation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1998), 105-109. 
295 Ibid., 106. 
296 Volker Gelhausen, The Effects of Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the 
Successful implementation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1998), 105-109. 
297 This denotes that draftees have a substantial gravity when the long-term mobilization 
factor is considered. 
 110
Figure 4.6 and the accompanying analysis verify that long-term 
mobilization is a goal better accomplished having conscripts than volunteers, 
especially when the population of a country is not large enough to provide 
adequate numbers of ex-volunteers acting as reserves. 
In spite of the draftee’s superiority in the long-term mobilization, we 
believe that Greek officers prefer volunteers for their superiority in operational 
and short-term mobilization factors. 
An additional reason that officers might not prefer having conscripts is the 
intervention they might have, from their military and civilian superiors, regarding 
the way draftees are treated, or, in other words, the pressure from society to the 
military for the wellbeing of the soldiers. 
2. How an Officers’ Job is Affected by Social Intervention on the 
Draftees’ Service? 
Apart from the reasons examined before, officers face another difficulty 
with their conscript soldiers: the pressure that comes indirectly from the society 
via their superior officers for special treatment of soldiers. This is a negative 
aspect of the social control over the military. Most of the time, parents try to 
arrange for their sons to have the best treatment possible, and are sometimes 
driven to exaggeration.298 
Apart from articles of newspapers and magazines, certain clues can be 
found showing that the Ministry of Defense, and more specifically the officers of 
military units, was disturbed by such attitudes. Therefore, several measures were 
implemented, to counter those phenomena, such as the following. 
 
                                            
298 Numerous are the incidents described in the daily press for these issues. To get a 
comprehensive idea of that reoccurring fact visit: “Omiri,” Site for Conscripts, 
http://omhroi.org/modules/ (accessed November 15, 2008). 
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• Establishment of strict and specific criteria for reduced service 
time299 
• Six months obligatory service on distant bases300 
• Official proposal to not allow youngsters the choice of postponing 
their service duty and conscript them at 18 years of age whatever 
the circumstances301 
• Acquisition of an electronic system to evaluate the capability of 
draftees, according to each one’s strengths and weaknesses302 
The above actions are, of course, beneficial; still, they reveal a need for 
action in that direction. That need was based on the injustice and the inefficiency 
occurring in military units, through the pressure of conscripts’ parents on 
politicians or other powerful public employees. These, in turn, pressed the high-
ranking officers for favors for the soldiers and, lastly, middle-ranking officers were 
losing abilities due to the decreased manpower they had in their command303. 
This attitude not only degraded the ability of a unit, but also devalued the officers 
in charge of the soldiers. Finally, the rest of the soldiers who did not have the 
ability or the will to use such means were disheartened and also carried the extra 
burden left to them by their colleagues. 
As a result, we could say that we presented one more negative part of the 
draft force for the officers: the intervention by their civilian leaders, mainly on the 
way they could manage specific individuals under their command.304 Overall, on  
 
 
                                            
299 Source: Law Ν. 2510/97 (FΕΚ 136 Α'). 
300 Ibid. 
301 Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231 (accessed 
October 27, 2008). 
302 The existence of that system was personally witnessed by the author.  
303 These favors, were also experienced personally, and included “easy” changes, excuse of 
certain jobs in the unit, extra leave or any other favorable treatment. 
304 As we will show in the next chapter, social intervention in the military is not always a 
negative type of control. Nevertheless, when this intervention occurs on an individual basis and 
not as a proposal for a new generic procedure/ control or operation, it is deflating to the morale of 
the military and produces inefficiencies. 
 112
that issue, we could support the argument that officers would probably believe 
that, specifically for completing their military tasks, a volunteer force would be 
preferred to a draft force. 
We made the above brief argument for collecting more pieces of the 
puzzle, regarding the design of the military-soldier force. What have we seen up 
to this point? We observed that society and political parties question the form and 
even the existence of today’s conscription in Greece; that at least 40 percent of 
parents and sons try to avoid military service; and that officers prefer volunteers 
to conscripts. 
One might ask: why hasn’t an AVF been created in Greece since it would 
apparently please most of the social groups directly affected by conscription? An 
answer this question comes from a related issue, representation.  
D.  WHICH FORM OF MILITARY STRUCTURE IS REPRESENTATIVE OF 
THE NATION? 
This part of the study is crucial, as well as theoretical. The meaning of 
representation resembles the ancient Greek myth of Lernea Hydra; a monster 
with numerous snake heads; for every head cut, two more emerged. Finally, the 
monster was destroyed by the mythical hero, Hercules, who aimed with his 
sword into the heart of the monster and not at its heads. 
The resemblance lies in the fact that for every answer given for the topic 
question, two more questions emerge, such as: How do we define 
representiveness? Why do we need a representative Armed Forces? 
We attempt to respond to these questions by using the help of military 
sociology. Further, we employ the basic concept presented by Eitelberg in his 
MRM. 
1.  What is “Representative”? 
As Eitelberg states: 
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“The idea of perfect representation is perceived as a 
microcosm or specular image of the total population”305 
In another comment, the same author says: 
Representation conversely classifies individuals according to 
groups; it draws attention to stereotypical qualities (i.e, statistics are 
segregated according to distinctive group traits or qualities), and it 
encourages, rather than obviates, consciousness of innate group 
differences.306 
Eitelberg defines perfect representation, yet, he also states that this 
concept is an illusion and, apart from that, that perfect representation is 
undesirable within a highly specialized institution such as the Armed Forces. He 
also moves on to say that, even the concept of “approximate representation” is 
difficult to grasp in the abstract.307 To elaborate on the above arguments, we 
pose some theoretical questions: 
Q: Is it representing to facilitate all social groups in the Army? 
A: No, because there are many groups such as criminals/ convicts, 
physically or mentally disabled, the very old or very young, the 
uneducated or ill tents,  conscientious objectors, etc., that by definition 
might harm the army institutions. 
Q: Is there a state institution that might be characterized as representative 
of the population? 
 
                                            
305 Mark J. Eitelberg, and Martin Binkin, “Military Service in American Society,” Report of the 
Atlantic Council's Working Group on Military Service (1982): 235-259. 
306 Ibid., 251. In that article and in his MRM model, Eitelberg suggests the blacks and the 
women as the distinct social/racial groups for measuring representiveness. This is quite similar to 
our analysis for representation in Hellenic military, as we use “poor” and women as distinct social 
groups. Blacks in today’s U.S. society, as the same author implicitly suggests in many points, are 
perceived as a low income social group and not a pure racial one. For example, an employer in 
U.S. nowadays, might not hire a black not because his skin color, but due to probable lack of 
education/ credentials. A strong evidence on that change of the U.S. society’s “color of skin 
perception,” is the recently elected African-American President of the U.S., B. Obama. 
307 Mark J. Eitelberg, “Military Representation: Reflections and Random Observations,” 
Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and 
Society, Baltimore, MD (October 1989): 3. Even though the “approximate representation” is 
difficult to specify we will use it, in rough lines, in the MRM model for checking the overall 
representation.  
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A: Yes, we might find similar social equality characteristics in other public 
institutions/ organizations. These might be the public schools, and the 
parliament. The common characteristics of all of these institutions are the 
following: 
• Everybody in these “institutions” has an equal obligation to the 
society/ state in general (e.g., to defend it, to be obliged to follow 
laws passed in the parliament).  
• Everybody is receiving the same benefits from the country (e.g., 
education, benefits of security). 
• Everybody has equal strength say/vote (representiveness of the 
deputies in parliament).  
So, according to the above three factors, we could give a potential 
definition of representiveness of the society, in a specific group as follows: A 
(military) group is representative of the society from which it is drawn, when its 
members are called upon to serve – and when they are capable – irrespective of 
race, gender, social status, or other demographic factors. Of course when one 
has an obligatory service, this representation is obvious; nevertheless, the more 
one mixes volunteers in a conscript force, the greater the danger of becoming 
unrepresentative of the society. 
Now, coming back to the definition we gave, we see an evident problem: 
gender. In a draft force, and specifically in the Hellenic Military, are women 
represented equally? The answer is negative, but before degrading the 
representation of the draft force, let us make an analogy with the two state 
institutions we used before: public schools and the parliament. Through these 
institutions, we might find some representation characteristics, which are not 
affected by gender. Then, we will have a strong clue that military gender 
unrepresentiveness is of no meaning for the function of military effectiveness. We 
start with the totally representative institution of the public schools and later we 
examine the representative Hellenic Parliament, according to the Constitution’s 




of the society of a specific age are required to attend the education offered by the 
country. In case they do not attend, there are penalties for the parents, as well as 
exclusion of the children from the mainstream of society.308 
The Parliament of Greece is not representative of women, as in 2008 the 
proportion of women was 16 percent, while their respective proportion in the total 
population of the country is a little above 50 percent.309 
The Parliament is a close analogy to a volunteer force with steady and 
common entrance criteria. So, can we say that Greek women are not 
represented in the Greek parliament, or even in the European parliament? 
Although it is a generic question, we should answer that all women can vote and 
there are several women candidates from which to choose. The fact that some of 
the women candidates are not elected shows that the woman voter’s first 
criterion is not gender but the perceived ability of the political representative for 
whom she would vote. 
This perceived ability is composed of two factors: First, the person who is 
elected is capable of doing the required task; second, that same person has 
nothing more critical to do except the required task. This sequence of thoughts 
leads us to a proposed innovation of this present study: a suggestion that the 
way representiveness is measured by gender, is wrong; it should be measured 
according to the core of Greek society, the family.  
Thinking representation in the concept of a society composed of families, 
we could say, that in a way, the family elects the men to represent it in war, and 
leaves women behind to raise the children of the family and gives society the 
chance to be reproduced in case the men are lost in the war. 
 
                                            
308 Meaning that the person without a high-school degree cannot move to other studies and 
not many jobs are waiting for him in the future. 
309 Hellenic Parliament, http://www.parliament.gr/ (accessed November 17, 2008); National 
Statistical Office of Greece, “Demographic Analysis,” National Surveys (2006). 
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In fact, that was the concept historically in Europe, where in the Middle 
Ages and before, each family in the village or town sent forth a “representative” in 
order for an army to be formed. Later on, that concept was standardized, and we 
had the stereotype of the man-soldier.310 
In Europe in general and especially in Greece, family plays a significant 
role and many obligations are dependent on that core of society.311 
This proposal explains also the findings of the first chapter, where we 
noticed that there is a remarkable problem with the low birth rate in Greece, and 
women in general are married later than they used to be some years ago. Apart 
from that, their unemployment rates are higher than those of men and a potential 
conscription would lead them to even higher unemployment rates. It might 
possibly be a concept that is not so well understood in the U.S., but there are 
many authors that implicitly, or explicitly, present the issue of the incompatible 
roles of the woman/ mother and the soldier.312 
If we accept that change of the unit of representation from a person to a 
family, we could rewrite the definition of “representation” given before as:313 A 
                                            
310 Of course, when there was a severe lack of men, women participated and gave their lives 
in defending their country – we can think as an example the State of Ancient Sparta, where 
women participated in the Army; other more recent examples are Iran and Israel.  
311 For example, family-law is an extensive part of the legislature system of Greece and 
includes many obligations as well as benefits to families. Another example would be the tax-
policy where families can – and in most of the cases do – make their tax reports as one person/ 
taxable unit. 
312 A very detailed and complete approach on that issue is found in Mady Wechsler Segal, 
“The Military and The Family as Greedy Institutions,” Armed Forces and Society 13, no. 1 (Fall 
1986): 9-38; Mark J. Eitelberg, “Your Mother Wears Combat Boots. But Should She Pack a 
Gun?” Presented at the 98th Annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Boston, 
MA, August 1990. 
313 When we say family, there is no need to be a young married couple; it might be a 
parental family with their children at the age of 18-20. As we noticed in the previous chapter, 
families in Greece stay together for a long time. Of course the women of 18 to 20 might not be 
mothers, but they are perspective ones, and as analyzed in Chapter III, they would “lose” critical 
time if drafted at that age in the military. A relative example in a different context though would be 
the evacuation of a ship in danger. Who do they call first? Women and children. Why do we not 
look for representation in loading the rescue boats? Most probably, because there is an imminent 
danger and the logic, along with the navy-culture, calls for preservation of families by giving to 
them the ability of being reproduced in the future. Thus, just as men march towards dangerous 
war, they also stay back in the dangerous sinking ship. 
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(military) group is representative of the society it belongs to, when its members 
are capable to serve and are proportionally equal to the relative social groups, 
inside the society. 
As we see by the new definition, we eliminated the gender and the specific 
categories of society and we included two prerequisites for the representation 
goal in a group. 
• Capability to serve 
• Equal representation of the social groups 
The first prerequisite is already fulfilled in Greece, as calling for service 
excludes people who are physically or mentally disabled, convicts, conscientious 
objectors,314and certain others. 
For the second prerequisite, the equal representation of Greek society in 
the military, we have refined our search into only one basic concept. This 
concept is the socioeconomic representation, more simply described  as the 
“rich” and the “poor” in the Greek Armed Forces.315 
Hopefully, we have cut off one head of “Lernea Hydra” by giving an 
answer to what is representative, in broad terms, of Greek society: It is the 
relative representation of the socioeconomic groups of the society. 
To our disappointment, a new snake head emerges: why do we need 
representation in the military?  
                                            
314 Hellenic Republic, “Conscription Law,” 1763/88, (1988). Convicts and homosexuals are 
two categories that are physically and mentally able to serve but they are considered as malicious 
influences for the military body. The last category of conscientious objectors are mentally 
opposed to service, so according to a recent law, they perform another kind of national service, in 
the general civic sector. 
315 Of course, the demographic representation is one more factor to be examined; still, it is 
beyond the capabilities of the present study and is also considered less important from the 
socioeconomic factor. 
 118
2.  Why Do We Need a Military Representative of Society? 
Using Eitelberg’s mental sword,316 we would answer that military 
members should do the following. 
• Be “citizen-soldiers” who can “re-present” the variety of community 
interests and recreate the social fabric. (Political Legitimacy) 
• Ensure a capable, cohesive and effective fighting force, in symbol 
as well as in need (Military Effectiveness) 
• Be selected and treated fairly, and in a way that distributes the 
benefits and burdens of service throughout society (Social 
Equity)317 
The same author continues:318 
Consequently, approximate representation must be evaluated in 
relation to the set of “higher” goals that have made it an important 
policy concern. These higher goals are depicted in the model as 
political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity. 
As we see later when examining the MRM model, these three factors form 
the theoretical limits or boundaries for a representative army. 
Now is the time to test the pillars of the MRM model for the Greek reality. 
Thus, we examine if these three factors concerning the social representation in 
the U.S. military stand true for the Hellenic Armed Forces and society, too. This 
is the first step of testing the MRM model; the second is to evaluate the 
theoretical limits of these factors in the Greek Armed Forces.319 
                                            
316 Mark J. Eitelberg, https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb (accessed May 31, 
2008). 
317 These three factors as identified by M. Eitelberg, are in fact, the three factors that the 
MRM model is based on, as we will see later on. 
318 Ibid. 
319 These limits are not exact as they represent social situations where definite limits are 
rare. For example, a social turbulence cannot exactly be described by grading it as serious. In 
one country it might lead to dictatorship, in another to the passage of a social beneficial law. For 
that reason, the main “test” for the MRM model is the first one; as to whether these three factors 
mentioned above, are valid and critical when applied to the Greek reality. 
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a. Validation of the First Factor of the MRM Model: Political 
Legitimacy 
What kind of society excuses its most privileged members from 
defending it? 
Charles Moskos 
The Armed Forces are a social type body ruled by the state 
authorities and the government, where community interests have to be reflected 
on every military aspect and act. This factor is mostly about the obligation of the 
country to make sure that this vital part of the state is mirroring the social 
structure and interests of the country itself.  
We will list some points that explain the validity of this factor in 
Figure 4.7 in the Hellenic Armed Forces. For a better presentation, we created a 
diagram depicting these points and the relation among them. 
 
Figure 4.8. Elements of the Factor of Political Legitimacy, applicable to the 
Hellenic Reality. 
• Democratic tradition: The political system of Greece is democracy. 
It is well known that the first democracy in the world was that of 
Athens.320 The democratic representation is historically embedded 
                                            
320 This fact does not mean that ever since, Greece has had democratic governments. In at 
least two instances in its modern history, the country had the misfortune of having a dictatorship 
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in every citizen from his early age. Consequently, justice in 
representation of social groups in this important state-institution 
(military) is vital for Greeks. 
• Society’s control of the military: As mentioned before, there were at 
least two major historical instances where the military force turned 
against the political legitimate leaders, suppressing democratic 
values and individuals’ liberties. The most recent one was relatively 
recent, between 1967 and 1974, when seven years of military rule 
of the country321 was in existence. That evident weakness of state 
control and power over the military is a deficiency that Greek 
society is trying to ensure will never happen again. As a result, the 
pure representation of the society, which elected its political 
leaders, will be a deterrent to military personnel who might work on 
a plan to demolish the political power over that of the military322. 
• Demographic diversity: Even though there is great homogeneity in 
race and in religion in the Greek population, the unique territory of 
the country is an aspect of social representation that needs to be 
considered. In Greece, there are numerous inhabited islands, as 
well as remote mountain villages. To recreate the social fabric of 
Greek region, one should represent these communities in the 
military institution, too.  
• Unity of the society in the case of a national war: Political legitimacy 
is a critical factor in the case of an urgent need for mass country 
mobilization for a national war. The representation in that case is 
critical, as it unifies the society and enhances the government’s 
decision about going to war. 
• Government considers and handles the Armed Forces as a part of 
the society and not as a separate group: This factor affects the 
equity of institutions and the personnel handled by the government, 
and this factor is directly related to democratic values in Greece. It 
is evident that having representation in the Armed Forces makes it 
difficult for the government to neglect or act inappropriately to that 
social body. We could imagine, for example, that if the state would 
like to pass a law for the educational institutions, they would have 
to consider all possible aspects of side effects to the society that is 
fully represented in these institutions as active or passive “actors.” 
                                            
321 For more on the causes of that military deviation you can read Konstantinos 
Paparigopoulos, History of the Hellenic Nation (Athens, Greece: Kaktos, 1975). 
322 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 133, 153. 
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This type of state ruling, which considers the society, would provide 
the greatest benefit for the country. Now, what if the army was not 
representative? The government could probably enforce military-related 
measures, without considering the overall well-being of the society in the long 
run. Furthermore, they would possibly not get any reaction from the society that 
is not affected, especially in the short run, from army-related decisions.323 
It is very interesting to study some historical examples of Greece 
that are related to this factor. For instance, Alexander the Great (356-323 BC) is 
said to have lost his empire because, as he was kept going into the Far East, his 
army became more and more unrepresentative of the Macedonian social fabric 
that it initially had.324  
Another example from Greek history would be the downfall of the 
Byzantine Empire in 1453 CE. In that case, we can distinguish several 
resemblances with the contemporary social reality. The Byzantine Empire at its 
final period of decline was addicted to individualistic values and self-pleasures, 
neglecting the social obligations. As rich an empire as it was, it hired volunteers 
and missionaries to defend Byzantium and its capital, Constantinople.325 At first, 
that measure worked, even though it required huge sacrifices of men and whole 
cities. But, finally, when Mohamed the Conquer, a Muslim political and army 
leader, surrounded Constantinople, there was an immediate need for 
                                            
323 This is a very fundamental sub-factor of political legitimacy, or could even be a separate 
factor by itself: the democratic military control by the society and not only by the government. We 
will have the chance to focus on that issue in the next chapter, so as to realize its special 
importance. For now, we will only provide a plain example, in order to show its relevance: let us 
consider the imaginary scenario that a country hired only mercenaries for defending its borders, 
(which was a real case for some European countries in the medieval times). Will the society be 
considered for their administration and for the missions assigned to them? Most probably not. 
Nevertheless, the long term effects of a decision for going into a war might be a counter-attack by 
the opponent into the home country’s territory. This would vastly affect the society in whole; still, it 
would not be hindered beforehand by the society controlling its Armed Forces. 
324 Due to losses in his army, Alexander the Great, conscripted men from the lands that he 
captured. For more on that you can read: Heckel Waldemar, Alexander the Great. Historical 
Sources in Translation, J. C. Yardley (Ottawa: Blackwell, 2003). 
325 Named by the Emperor Constantine 272-337 CE, who officially acknowledged 
Christianity in Byzantium and in Europe.  
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mobilization of the inhabitants of the city, and a compilation of a bigger army than 
the existing volunteer one. This mobilization was unsuccessful, due to various 
reasons, one of them being the perception that it was not the civilians’ job to fight 
wars, along with a lack of understanding of how serious the situation was. 
• Avoiding the gap between military and civilians by “injecting” 
individuals’ ideas into the Army Body: The fabric in the military will 
be representative of society if civilians are represented equally in 
that institution and “inject” it with ideas that are commonly found in 
the society overall. If the military is not representative of the society, 
it becomes distant from the latter, and finally opposed to it. 
Unfortunately, Greece had that experience during the dictatorship 
of 1967, where the military body had far different thoughts than 
society regarding what was better for the country326. Another 
paradigm of that “gap” is also found in American society, which 
evolved from a draft to an AVF system, with the consequence of 
widening that gap at the same time. Various authors examined that 
social-military gap in the U.S. at the beginning of the new 
millennium.327 In the book, Soldiers and Civilians, the chasm 
between military and society is evident, and it is also widening as 
years of AVF go by.328 A very useful and brief analogy depicting 
that gap is the use of “we” for society’s opinion, and “they” for the 
military’s opinion, or vice versa. 
• The future political elite to be “baptized” in the pool of the Armed 
Forces: As a low-population nation that is situated in a strategic 
region, Greece should be on alert for potential future wars it might 
be called on to fight. For that reason, Greece’s future political 
leaders, who will normally come from all the layers of society, 
should have a thorough understanding of the Armed Forces that 
they might have to send to war. The more representative the Armed 
Forces will be, the greater the chance that a large part of the 
parliament will be ex-soldiers. This is not only beneficial for 
understanding the reality and the potential of the country’s Army; it 
is also essential for the political Members of the Parliament to have 
a mental and emotional connection with the Armed Forces in 
general, and the individual soldiers, specifically. This might possibly 
                                            
326 At that time, the soldier force was totally representative, as it used to be only a draftees-
type army. The problem of unrepresentativeness was in the officer corps, which used to be 
chosen by not so clear and equal procedures. Fortunately, that changed drastically immediately 
after the dictatorship’s downfall in 1974.  
327 Doug Bandow, “The Renewed Call for Conscription,” Policy Analysis 351 (1999): 1-38. 
328 Peter D. Feaver, and Richard H. Kohn, The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A.. Soldiers and 
Civilians (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001). 
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happen if every Parliament member would have served in the 
military. These emotional links are not irrelevant to the ruling of the 
Armed Forces, as that organization is performing a sacrificing duty, 
partially based on sentimental and romantic ideologies. In fact, it is 
difficult for a soldier to kill another human being- even when a mass 
psychology is the basic motive - without having an imperative 
scope to serve.329 This imperative scope is mostly based on 
sentimental-based perceptions and beliefs. For that reason, a 
future politician’s sentimental and logical connection to the soldier 
will enhance the informed decision-making over military issues and 
will make soldiers trust more their political rulers. 
• The representation of the fellow countrymen who are returning back 
to Greece: This is an aspect that should be considered for the 
Greek situation, as there is a great number of immigrants who are 
Greek in origin, who were, in a way, incarcerated in years past in 
some socialistic countries north of Greece.330 This former part of 
the Greek population was able to return back to its home country 
after the opening of the borders in 1993 and later on. They were 
granted the ability to serve if they wanted to. Their inclusion in the 
Armed Forces, through a representative conscription, would 
enhance their social links with the society, which initially viewed 
them as a foreign body in the native society. 
All the arguments and facts presented above are drawn from the 
Greek situation and support the Political Legitimacy factor, as an answer to why 
we should have population representation, specifically in Greece. So we are 
convinced to accept that first pillar of the MRM model as a valid one. 
Before moving to the second pillar of the MRM model, we should 
look upon a possible bewilderment that some readers might have: Is it not 
evident that Political Legitimacy should be a universal goal of any state? To our 
understanding, it is not evident. Let us consider some examples: First, a non-
democratic regime would probably avoid the recreation of community interests in 
the Army, as the ruling party’s sovereignty would be negatively affected. Second, 
                                            
329 For this aspect of killing while in the Armed Forces, D. Grossman, describes it in a very 
real and detailed way, arguing that the basic act of a war in reality is done very unwillingly (Dave 
Grossman, On Killing. 1st ed. in The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. 
Canada (Little, Brown & Company, 1995). 
330 This is a complex situation that arose from many historical incidents after the Balkan 
Wars of 1908-1912 and later on.  
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in a state that historically has had confrontations between the tribes or regions 
from which it is composed, it is very difficult to seek political legitimacy through 
the representation of all tribes in its Armed Forces.331 As a conclusion, we should 
say that this pillar of Political Legitimacy is valid in nations under democratic 
constitutions, which also do not face instability due to social conflicts.332 
Next, we examine the second reason, according to the MRM 
model, as to why we need a representative force.  




«Nobody is excused» 
Alexander the Great (356-323 BC)333 
This factor explains the need for representativeness, as far as the 
military itself is concerned. In other words, we focus on the military function to 
determine if that factor is valid in the Greek Armed Forces. 
Although military effectiveness is a wide strategic subject, we will 
try to analyze briefly some of its most crucial elements in Greek reality.334 The 
diagram in Figure 4.8 summarizes these elements of military effectiveness. 
                                            
331 An example would be Iraq’s current military force, which is constituted by only one of the 
two tribes of Iraq. Another example would be undeveloped African nations that are composed of 
opposing tribes (e.g., Congo). 
332 The subject whether they should or not be politically legitimate is not discussed here; the 
conclusion is based on whether we can apply this model’s factor in such cases.  
333 That was the recruiting policy for Alexander the Great in the ancient era, which means all 
should enlist; there are no excuses for not doing so. 
334 This part should be also viewed in connection to the analysis of the operational factor 




Figure 4.9. Elements of the Factor of Military Effectiveness, Applicable to the 
Hellenic Reality. 
• Scope of the Hellenic Armed Forces: As is the purpose of every 
army, the Hellenic Armed Forces are first and foremost in place to 
defend the country from external enemies who might try to deny it 
its sovereignty on its territory. In Greece, unlike the rest of the EU 
countries, we have a lot of incidents of aggression and denial of the 
legal boundaries of the country by neighboring countries.335 This 
fact makes the region very tense and dangerous for future border 
conflicts or even nationwide wars.336 Due to the tense strategic 
area that Greece lies in and to the historic instances in Greek 
history, we would value that scope as the major one, without 
forgetting that Armed Forces can, and do ,play other roles, too.337 
In this, we will find the majority of Greeks having the same opinion; 
in a 2001 Eurobarometer survey among the fifteen core countries of the E.U, 
                                            
335 For more on these issues you can see Thanos Ntokos, “Policy for aNnational Strategy on 
the Hellenic Defense,” Eliamep (2007).  
336 See also the opinion of the Ministry of Defense on strategic issues, “White Bible of the 
Armed Forces – 2007” Ministry of Defense, “White Bible,” 
http://www.mod.mil.gr/mme/all_publication_comhtml?dr_html_url (accessed September 15, 
2008). 
337 Peace keeping/stabilizing operations in other countries are very usual nowadays for the 
Greek military in the context of NATO forces. Apart from that, nowadays the army assists the 
society by giving aid during big events or natural or other disasters (e.g., earthquakes in Greece, 
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Greece and the United Kingdom were the only countries that perceived the main 
role of the military to be “preparing for and waging war” in a proportion of ninety 
percent.338 
We present Figure 4.9 for the additional reason of showing the fact 
that approximately 0 percent of Greeks questioned, answered positively as to 


















Figure 4.10. Roles of the military, according to Europeans339 
Regarding the scope of an Army, several authors present a dual 
military function: one in peace and the second during times of war. By dividing 
the scope of the Army into these two periods, they find social representation as a 
less critical factor in peacetime, when armed forces play a role of employment of 
last resort and alleviate the unemployment problem of the society. 
 
                                            
338 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 330 (initially 
from Eurobarometer Survey 54.1 in 2001.) 
339 Ibid., 330. 
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For the Greek case, we will not draw this dichotomy for two main reasons. 
• First, as we described previously, 90 percent of Greeks recognize 
that the primary function of the military is for fighting wars 
• Second, history in Greece has taught us that conflicts and wars 
occur rapidly, many times without prior alert. This means that, even 
in peacetime, Greece has to maintain a military force that can be 
effective at least during the first days of a conflict/war. If during 
peace, we focus on employing unrepresentative forces for the sake 
of lessening the unemployment rate, we will find ourselves in a bad 
situation after a potential enemy attack.340 
In ancient Greece, Plato remarked that a state must be prepared 
for war to have peace. Essentially, this means that a nation must never lose sight 
of the primary purpose of its army, especially during peace, when all preparations 
take place. 
More recently, J. Record supported the same idea and noted that: 
These functions (non military tasks), however, important they have 
been and continue to be, are incidental to the military’s main 
purpose, which is to fight and win wars. No military establishment 
that is ineffective on the battlefield that is professionally 
incompetent or otherwise constrained from fighting effectively or 
that is simply too small to do the job asked of it, can justify its 
existence.341 
Closing that parenthesis of war and peace periods, we pronounce them as 
unified, leading to the same objective of defending effectively the country and 
preparing for potential wars/conflicts. Consequently, as national wars are the first 
priority, representation is a central axiom for those that will defend the country. 
 
 
                                            
340 This does not mean that this function of the military is not an actual one; what it means is 
that we will not focus on secondary army objectives (lessening unemployment rates) rather than 
on the crucial one of defending the country and being prepared for war. 
341 National Defense University, Fort Lesley, The Anthropo Factor in Warfare (J. E. Endicott: 
Washington, 1988), 226. 
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• Representation brings confidence by the society and consequently 
high morale to the Armed Forces 
Considering the Greek military as a representative one, at least 
until now,342 we realize that families that send their children to serve will be 
supportive of the military, too. This is evident in a survey conducted by E.U. in 
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Figure 4.11. Confidence of the military by the society it serves343 
In 1997, the highest confidence level for its military by a society 
was that of Greece (85 percent), which further increased to 87 percent in 2000. 
Finland, which keeps a conscription army too, was the only country above  
 
 
                                            
342 Greece nowadays has an obligatory one year service for all men. Before 1995, it used to 
have only conscripts and no volunteers. 
343 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 327. 
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Greece in the level of society’s confidence.344 This confidence of the society is 
transformed into high morale for the military forces, and constitutes one of the 
major requirements for achieving military effectiveness.345  
• The need for a large army according to missions and the 
geographic formulation of the country 
If we were facing a military mission of enforcing peace abroad, 
would we need a mass representative army? Probably not. But since we are 
focusing on a country that has a mission of protecting its territory from invasions, 
we need to have a relatively large army. Moskos, Williams, and Segal would 
agree on that, as they have created the relevant table (Table 4.1) presented 
below. 










(Post Cold War; 
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Perceived threat Enemy invasion Nuclear war Subnational (e.g., 
ethnic violence, 
terrorism) 
























                                            
344 Finland also had some border conflicts with Russia, a traditional enemy of Finland. 
345 Considering also the U.S. AVF and society, the gap is evident and is described by the 
distinction of “we” and “they,” for the two groups. For more see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. 
Kohn, The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and Civilians. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001). 
346 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
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We can see in Table 4.1 that,  when the perceived threat is an 
enemy invasion, the force structure would most probably be a mass-like army. 
Even though the authors place this kind of enemy threat in the pre-Cold War era, 
this is the reality for Greece even today. If we add the factor of the geographic 
diversity of Greece, (many islands and remote mountain areas), we discover an 
additional need for dispersed military bases and, consequently, personnel.  
Someone would ask, what do mass armies have to do with 
representation? It is simple; when we have a small army that has to perform 
abroad, the numbers and ratios of representation play a minor role. On the other 
hand, when we have to deploy many soldiers in many places, we need to 
consider the composition of the military units among them, and additionally the 
representation of the general society’s values in them.347 
 
                                            
347 An example on that would be a dispatched military unit from a developed country in a war 
or conflict abroad, which performs uncivilized acts (torture, rapes) and consequently lowers the 
morale of the whole military and society to which it belongs.  
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• Military culture 
As we have seen before, military effectiveness is graded highly in 
Greece. This effectiveness is also tied in the culture embedded in the military 
force. Up to today, that culture is related to conscription, and consequently to the 
representation of all social groups in the army.348 If this culture of extensive 
representation changes, it might negatively affect military effectiveness, too. 
• Cohesion of the fighting force:   
The society that draws a line between its fighting men and its 
thinking men, will find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done 
by cowards, 
Sir Williams Francis Butler349 
 
Last, but not least, we present the factor of military cohesion, which 
is driven by the representiveness of society in the military. 
For the Greek Armed Forces, cohesion was the main reason 
identified for winning wars, well above the country’s abilities. G. Siebold in his 
very interesting study of cohesion in the military,350 presents the fight of the 300 
Spartan warriors in ancient Greece as the first evidence of the positive relation 
between cohesion and effectiveness.351 
The same author notes also that “the level of unit cohesiveness is 
defined as the degree to which mechanisms of social control operant in a unit 
maintain a structured pattern of social relationships between unit members, 
                                            
348 A quick history of the military composition of Greece can be found in Appendix A. 
349 National Defense University, Fort Lesley, The Anthropo factorin Warfare (J. E. Endicott: 
Washington, 1988), 225. 
350 Guy L. Siebold, “The Evolution of Measurement of Cohesion,” Military Psychology 11, no. 
1 (1999): 5-27. 
351 Ibid., 8. There are numerous other examples of military feats done by groups highly 
unified. For the sake of giving honor by referring to at least one of them, we would refer to the 
heroic fortress Rupel, where in 1940, less than 300 Greek soldiers deterred the Germans from 
proceeding south towards the capital, Athens, for more than ninety days and nights. When these 
soldiers, finally surrendered to the Germans, without any strength left from the hunger, the latter 
presented arms to honor their stamina and cohesion.  
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individually and collectively, necessary to achieve the unit’s purpose.”352 In short, 
the author suggests that the cohesion and the social relationship among the 
soldiers help a military unit to achieve its goal. 
In a similar research study, Oliver and Harman found a positive 
relation between the cohesion of a military group and its outcomes, or else with 
the effectiveness of that group.353 Apart from that, they also found a very 
interesting positive relation between soldiers’ cohesion and their personal 
satisfaction, which again leads to high morale and increased performance.  
As we have seen, in Greece, military cohesion is historically and 
culturally embedded in the Armed Forces. So, cohesion being a direct outcome 
of society’s representation, it finally results in the desired outcome of military 
effectiveness. 
As a result of the above analysis, we are convinced that the second 
pillar of the MRM model that of Military Effectiveness, is an outcome of social 
representation, not only in the U.S. Military Force, but also in the Greek one. 
As we did for the previous factor, we question this one too, whether 
it is self-evident or not; or else, are there any exclusions from the rule of placing 
military effectiveness as a primary goal? So, is there a nation that does not care 
for military effectiveness, and in turn not care for a representative military? Yes, 
we could refer to at least one example: Luxemburg. This is the case of a small, 
peaceful country that has no threats from its neighbors or other countries. Does 





                                            
352 Guy L. Siebold, “The Evolution of Measurement of Cohesion,” Military Psychology 11, no. 
1 (1999): 5. 
353 Laurel W. Oliver, “A Quantitative Integration of the Military Cohesion Literature,” Military 
Psychology 11, no. 1 (1999): 76. 
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not. So, we have found a restriction that applies on that factor of MRM analyzed 
above: the country in question should have as a primary mission, that of 
defending its own territory from enemies.354 
Especially for the factor of military effectiveness, we have to note 
that representation provides only the basis for the effectiveness and not the 
assurance of a positive outcome just by itself. This means that even a 
representative army would not produce the preferred outcome if it lacks training 
and efficient administration. So, the operational factors analyzed previously in 
this chapter with regard to the draftees and volunteers are also relevant to our 
analysis. Later, at the final stage of implementing the MRM model in the Greek 
military, we also use these operational factors for reassuring the validity of our 
conclusions. 
Next, we examine the final factor, that of Social Equity, and whether 
it can be valid to Greek society. 
c. Validation of the Third Factor of MRM: Social Equity 
As soon as public service ceases to be the main business of the 
citizens, and they prefer to serve with their pocket-books rather 
than their persons, the state is already close to ruin. 
Jean Jacques Rousseau355 
While the first factor of Political Legitimacy was connected mostly to 
the state’s ruling, and the second of Military Effectiveness was connected to the 
military establishment, the third factor, that of Social Equity, affects mostly the 
society in whole. 
                                            
354 When examining this factor of military missions for Greece, it would be more complete to 
examine any potential future variations in the strategy and the threats that the country might face. 
Despite the wide content of that issue, history teaches us that this specific part of the 
Mediterranean is a strategic point that never loses its strategic value and had always provoked 
conflicts and wars. So, we are quite certain that threats will be approximately the same in the 
future.  
355 National Defense University, Fort Lesley, The Anthropo Factor in Warfare (J. E. Endicott: 
Washington, 1988), 225. 
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How is this factor connected in Greek society? We could list quite a 
few reasons for that positive relation between representativeness and social 
equity in the Greek society. The elements connected to Social Equity in the 
Hellenic social environment are depicted in Figure 4.12. 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Elements of the Factor of Social Equity, applicable to the Hellenic 
Reality 
• The democratic constitution of Greece  
Greece, as would be expected, has a deep-rooted democracy 
embedded into its constitution and laws. There are many regulations in every 
part of the legal system that enforces equity and equal burdens and obligations 
for every citizen. So, representation in the Armed Forces enhances this 
constitutional regulation.356 
Greek democratic values were greatly driven by the French 
Revolution (1789), as the Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Empire took 
place in 1821. Jean Jacques Rousseau, who enlightened the French Revolution 
with his ideas on the democratic government and society, also helped the Greeks 
                                            
356 In fact, article 6 of the fourth paragraph of the Greek constitution regulates that: “All 
citizens able to bear arms must contribute to the nation’s defense.” This article is accompanied by 
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to picture a preferred constitution, based on the political philosopher’s 
masterpiece, “The Social Contract”.357 In that way, representation of the people 
is an axiom for the Greek political rulers, and also applies in the sensitive and 
wide establishment of the Armed Forces. 
• Religion 
As is well known, Greeks have a strong religion and have followed 
the Greek Orthodox faith from its origins during the Byzantine Empire in the 
twelfth century. Today, more than ninety percent of Greek society is Orthodox 
Christian. The basic belief of Orthodox faith is that all people are equal under 
God358. This element of Greek culture is deeply embedded in the society and its 
beliefs. 
• The type of operations Greek Armed Forces undertake. 
As noted previously, the geopolitical environment in the region 
where Greece lies can be very ambiguous and dangerous. Through the years, 
Greece fought numerous wars against its neighbor countries. Fortunately, the 
last Great War to be fought was World War II. Since then, there have been many 
incidents where the Armed Forces fought over some border conflicts; the major 
one of these was in 1974, when Turkey occupied a part of Cyprus. As we can 
understand, the Greek Armed Forces, along with its political leaders, are mostly 
focused on national security threats, and their aim is to defend the country’s 
borders. As this scope is a generic one and affects the whole of Greek society, it 
is very logical to place a requirement for representation on the Army that will 
defend all the people in the country. 
• Greek Military history/ tradition 
Closely connected to the factors above is the military tradition 
throughout the recent history of Greece (after the national Revolution of 1821). 
As is obvious in Appendix-1, the Greek Armed Forces have utilized the draft, in 
                                            
357 Jacques J, Rousseau, The Social Contract (Athens: Polis Publications, 2004). 
358 For more analysis of the Orthodox faith see Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 
http://www.goarch.org/ourfaith/ (accessed November 17, 2008). 
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various ways, from the past until today. So the military culture is closely related to 
the draft, and, as a result, to the social equity about taking on common social 
burdens that accompany that obligation. 
• Equal loss in case of a war 
In the unfortunate case of a war, the people that would defend their 
country and sacrifice their life should be representative of the society they 
defend. Due to the reasons presented above, this is a common fact for Greek 
society. If there is a suspicion that a specific social group was asked to offer its 
life disproportionate to protect other social groups, there would be a dispute in 
society with painful results. Greece has a sour historic memory of the society’s 
partition immediately after the end of the World War II, when the civil war took 
place359. In effect, there is a subconscious memory in Greek society, which 
disapproves of any partition or unequal allocation of social burdens, among 
Greeks. 
• Lack of ample resources 
Apart from the ethical standpoints, we should also consider some 
specific real facts for the Greek case. Greece is a country that lacks physical and 
other resources. So, the country has no ability to spend its resources in giving 
extra benefits to Volunteers who would defend it. If Greece were a rich country, it 
could devote some of its budget to pay volunteers well enough so as to form an 
effective volunteer army that was capable of defending the country. In that case, 
we would examine the need for social representation as a second step in the 
army’s formulation. Now, we are not even capable of the first step of providing 
adequate benefits to an AVF360.  
                                            
359 For more information see Konstantinos Paparigopoulos, History of the Hellenic Nation 
(Athens, Greece: Kaktos, 1975). 
360 To make things more difficult, Greece already spends the largest budget proportion, 
among all European countries, for military functions. As a result, many arguments were presented 
recently for lowering the military budget to benefit public education. 
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Some very interesting research concerning European countries 
was presented by Haltiner.361 The author found a positive relation between 
Gross National Product (GNP), or how rich one country is, and the Conscript 
Ratio (CR), or draft ratio, of each country, which denotes the ratio of soldiers to 
the overall population of the relevant age group (18-22). Figure 4.12, below, 
comes from that study: 
 











































Figure 4.13. The reverse Correlation between GNP and the Conscription 
Ratio, in European Countries.362  
Greece’s CR is 72 percent, the second highest; despite that, its 
GNP is not low enough to explain the reverse correlation form by Haltiner. The 
author explains this by referring to the territorial conflicts that we mentioned 
previously. 
                                            
361 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 361-384. 
362 Ibid., 379. 
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Another critical resource that Greece lacks is people. As discussed 
previously, the population of the country is declining and the population of young 
people declines more than the general average. That means that the burden will 
be divided among fewer people, a fact that does not leave any space for 
exclusions. 
• Military Participation Ratio (MPR) 
Closely connected to the above analysis is the MPR; this is a figure 
that expresses the level of society’s participation in the Armed Forces. Several 
authors and sociologists examined that ratio and the outcomes it brings. 
Andreski363 first proposed the ratio. What he suggested, in brief, 
was that high levels of MPR can lead to the lessening of social inequality. Graeft 
and Mehkop tended also to agree with that finding in a recent study of theirs.364 
For the same subject (MPR), Weede365 presented similar results but applicable 
only to not highly-industrialized countries, which is the case of Greece, too. 
In his study, for the declining European mass armies, Haltiner366 
presented an evident decline of MPR in the European armies. Nevertheless, 
while the average MPR of Europe was around three percent in 2000, Greece had 
an MPR close to five percent. The author proposes as a reason for the MPR 
decrease, the diminishing importance of National Militaries in Europe, while for 
Greece, he argues that: 
These (hard core conscript)…nations had become a small minority 
by the year 2000. Two of them are involved in border conflicts: 
Greece and Turkey. Another is the neighbor of the largest land 
power in Europe and does not rely on a military alliance: Finland.  
 
                                            
363 Peter Graeff, and G. Mehlkop, “The Link between MPR and Inequality,” Journal of 
Political and Military Sociology 34, no. 2 (2006): 257. 
364 Ibid., 257-279. 
365 Erich Weed, “The Impact of MPR on Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” Journal of 
Political and Military Sociology 21, no. 2 (2006): 241-258. 
366 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 361-384. 
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Since the territorial defense component is still of great importance 
here, a deviation from the general pattern of the trend can be 
explained to a certain extent.367 
In conclusion, we find ample evidence that the factor of Social 
Equity is more than valid in Greece, as is the case in the U.S. 
As we did for the two factors examined previously, we should 
question whether social equity is self-evident and whether it applies as a 
beneficial outcome of representation to all countries and cultures, or not. Again, 
we find anti-paradigms, where social equity is not the preferred outcome. 
• A first anti-paradigm would probably be when a country does not 
face a national threat: does it need to have social equity in the 
army? Most probably not, as it would be more critical to cope with 
unemployment and satisfy the need for a job (volunteer), rather 
than the need of equal burden during a future battle. Directly 
connected to that is the fact that such a type of country would 
probably undertake operations abroad under a coalition not by 
itself. So, again there is no need for representativeness, as it is not 
a purely national concern or need that these operations fulfill.  
• Another counter-example of the need for Social Equity in the 
military would be when the military and the society do not have a 
relative history of society’s representation in the army. For a 
country that depends heavily on an AVF, it is difficult to sustain an 
argument of the benefits derived from the social equity on carrying 
the country’s military burdens. The routes of such perceptions 
might have their origin in religious or cultural ideologies. 
• Religious or cultural ideas: many countries follow some dogmas 
that divide people into castes or partition men and women as 
unequal persons. For example, extremist religious countries, such 
as Afghanistan, would not like to fulfill the social equity factor, as 
they do not believe that all members of the society are equal 
among them (men-women). Another example would be countries 
that follow the Hindu religion, where society is said to be 
legitimately divided into social castes with unequal obligations and 
rights. 
As we saw, all the above three characteristics constitute the 
exceptions and restrictions that apply to the final pillar of the MRM model. 
                                            
367 Emphasis added. 
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Nevertheless, Greece is a good example where all three MRM factors are valid 
and applicable for measuring the outcome of the social representation in the 
Hellenic Armed Forces. 
Now that we are sure about the applicability of the basis of 
the MRM model, we will present it briefly in the next paragraph. Our scope is to 
finally test the Greek case through that model, and derive conclusions that 
benefit the Greek Military. 
E.  SYNOPSIS OF THE MRM MODEL 
Before testing the full model in Greek reality, we describe it briefly in the 
following summary by Eitelberg. 
Proponents of population representation in the American armed 
forces call upon three basic principles to argue their position. 
Briefly, military members should: (1) be “citizen-soldiers” who can 
“re-present” (or “present again”) the variety of community interests 
and recreate the social fabric of American life; (2) ensure a 
capable, cohesive, and effective fighting force (in symbol as well as 
in deed); and (3) be selected and treated fairly and in a way that 
distributes the benefits and burdens of service throughout society. 
These three areas—political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and 
social equity, respectively—frame a core of concern around an age-
old question: Who shall serve when not all serve? 
A reasonable balance of opposing objectives is the key to 
reconciling differences between, say, benefits and burdens, internal 
organizational needs and external national goals, equal opportunity 
for individuals and equal representation of groups, compulsions and 
freedoms, and other areas of discord. A trade-off or compromise is 
similarly needed to mitigate fundamental conflicts between the 
goals of legitimacy, effectiveness, and equity. Yet, the search for a 
reasonable balance to guide military manpower policy, even though 
it offers a means for reconciling sometimes conflicting objectives, is 
ultimately an exercise in subjective reasoning. After all, how does 
one strike a balance between realistic military needs or 
requirements and the perceived social good? Can one, or should 
one, even attempt to balance and trade between separate 
categories of demands on the nation and the body politic? Indeed, 
what is “reasonable?” 
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The American experience is one of civil-military convergence, 
where the outcomes and objectives of military representation are 
described in social and political as well as military terms. Assuming 
that it is possible to establish evaluative criteria and balance 
competing objectives, we can attempt to build a conceptual 
framework and functional definition of military representation. 
Perfect representation is often described as “microcosmic” 
representation, a miniature reflection or copy of the larger 
population. Perfect representation in the armed forces is depicted in 
the Military Representation Model as a smaller replica of the 
national population, located somewhere within that body. Since the 
idealized state of perfect representation cannot be achieved under 
normal conditions—and may not even be desirable—it is necessary 
to establish some boundary of “approximate representation” in the 
model. Once the notion of approximate representation is accepted, 
however, the presumed certainty of outcomes associated with 
perfect representation is lost. The problem is that approximate 
representation can mean one inch or a thousand miles, one 
percentage point or many more, depending upon one’s point of 
reference. Consequently, approximate representation must be 
evaluated in relation to the set of “higher” goals that have made it 
an important policy concern. These higher goals are depicted in the 
model as political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social 
equity. As long as the population of military members (inner 
triangle) stays within the established boundaries of being “close 
enough for comfort” (shown as the middle steady triangle in the 
model below), the armed forces are seen by most as approximately 
representative.368 
                                            
368 The passage above can be found in the electronic based teaching materials of MN-4114 
Course (Foundation of Military Sociology/ Psychology), which Professor M. Eitelberg teaches at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/MN4114_Eb/content 
(accessed July 10, 2008). For a full presentation, see Appendix E. 
 142
 
Figure-4.14. Convergence/Divergence Model of Military Representation 
(MRM)369 
Now that we have concluded the presentation of the model itself, we can 
attempt to put it through the last test, and if successful on that, too, we can apply 
it to the Greek reality. 
F. IS THE MRM MODEL VALID IN GREEK REALITY, IN RESPECT TO 
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS? 
1.  Validation of the MRM’s Two Main Principles 
Eitelberg model has two main principles. 
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• Social representation in the army is “measured” by three factors: 
political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity 
• These three factors that represent the outcome of social 
representation in the army are not solid. They move between 
boundaries that cannot be completely specified, as all three of them 
are qualitative measurements that cannot be judged precisely and 
collectively by social scientists. In addition, it is difficult to predict 
the magnitude and the significance of each outcome for every 
different country. For example, the reactions of a developed society 
when a bigger proportion of a social group sacrifices itself to a war 
would be much greater than in an undeveloped society.370 
We have already shown that the first design principle (the three basic 
factors) of the MRM model is valid in Greece.371 What remains now to be 
examined is the flexibility of the boundaries of those factors. If we show that 
these factors, apart from being valid, are flexibly defined in the Greek society too, 
then the two design principles of this model are fully validated. Thus, they could 
be implemented to the Greek reality, to provide a solution on the issue of 
constructing the best soldiers’ base for the Hellenic military. 
Let us consider each factor separately. 
• The first MRM factor’s flexibility validation: Political Legitimacy: The 
question is: Are there absolute values when measuring Political 
Legitimacy? Evidently, the answer is no. When we consider the 
government and the parliament, which is the top public institution 
that mirrors the country’s political legitimacy, we surely do not have 
absolute values, not even absolute limits. For example, the party 
that rules the country, in most of the elections, gathers less than 
half of the country’s votes; still, it is considered representative. In 
the same public establishment, the parliament, a party is not 
elected when its votes are below three percent overall. In effect, 
three people out of a hundred are not represented in country’s  
 
 
                                            
370 An analogy that we can draw for this theoretical model is cooking. We have many 
elements to add when cooking food. The proportion of each one determines the outcome. By 
measuring the tastiness of the final product we estimate that the “representativeness” of the 
cooking elements was right from the beginning. Still, not all of us have the same taste 
preferences; so, we might disagree over the elements’ proportion. On the other hand, we all 
would agree that there are no specific rigid recipes for using each element. 
371 See present chapter paragraph D2. 
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decision-making. These percentages fluctuate among countries, 
which is evidence of the flexible nature of the factor of political 
legitimacy. 
• The second MRM factor’s flexibility validation: Military 
Effectiveness: Is that factor flexible, too? The answer again is yes. 
The reason for that is that we already have 40 percent of youth that 
delay their enlistment and one third of that forty percent (about 
twelve percent) will never enlist.372 Apart from that, approximately 
two percent of Greek society is made up of conscientious objectors 
who do not serve.373 Despite the approximate twenty percent of the 
society that does not participate in the military,374 Greek Armed 
Forces are generally considered highly capable and effective.375 So 
Military Effectiveness is not hurt by this 20 percent 
unrepresentativeness. In conclusion, this factor is also a flexible 
one which moves between some limits. 
• The third MRM factor’s flexibility validation: Social Equity: This 
factor is the required outcome for every democracy around the 
world and, despite the progress most of the countries are making, it 
still remains an unattained goal. Apart from that generic remark, the 
fact presented previously (20 percent unrepresentativeness in 
military) is also a proof that social equity is not absolutely met. If we 
consider specifically the 15 percent of those that never serve 
although they are obliged to do so, we could easily figure out that 
their burden is carried among the shoulders of the rest, who do not 
avoid their service to the country. Despite that fact, there is no  
 
 
                                            
372 Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231 (accessed 
October 27, 2008). 
373 “Omiri,” Site for Conscripts, http://omhroi.org/modules/ (accessed November 15, 2008). 
374 Adding those that never show up for enlisting (15%), with the conscientious objectors 
(2%) and other categories that do not serve (mentally or physically unable) or serve less (those 
with many kids-6 months service) we would roughly get at least a percentage of 20 percent, or 1 
out of 5 that is part of the society but not of the army. So roughly we would say that the social 
representation in military is less than 80 percent. This rough estimation, is verified by a research 
made for European Armies by K. Haltimer (Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed 
Forces,” in New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: 
Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 379, who found the conscript ratio of Greece to be 72 percent (average 
value between 1970 and 2000) 
375 Greek forces are effectively participating in several operations around the world, under 
NATO, UN and EU forces. 
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social turbulence in Greece or any public objection.376 This fact 
proves that the last factor of social equity do not have specific 
values, but only some acceptable boundaries to move within. 
Finally, we came to the point of verifying also the second principle of MRM 
model: the flexibility of its preferred outcomes. Now we are ready for the next 
step: to proceed with the application of the MRM model. 
2.  Applying the MRM model in Greek Reality: The Solution 
a.  How We will Proceed 
Before applying the model, we should answer some possible 
questions of our readers: 
Q: What are we looking for by applying that model in Greece? 
A: We are trying to find the best army synthesis according to the 
socioeconomic distribution of the Greek society. 
Q: Are we going to find specific numbers/proportions for designing the 
best army? 
A: Most probably, not. It is difficult to find specific numbers when the 
factors that measure the outcome of representativeness are relative by 
themselves. Despite that, we will find the proper system we should follow 
(e.g., total or no conscription or a mixed system). 
Q: The fact the three factors embedded in the model are valid does not 
exclude the possibility of having more factors that could also measure the 
outcome of social representation. 
A: That is true; nevertheless, we consider those three as the most critical 
ones. Apart from that, in this phase of the paper, we apply the MRM model 
as designed by its creator. In the next chapter we expand the model a little 
more and identify an extra factor that might be considered, too. 
Q: How are we going to use that model in Greek society? What about the 
military? 
 
                                            
376 Of course the situations would be more difficult and tense in case of a war. We can 
imagine that if somebody was avoiding his service, then there would be real social messiness. Of 
course, in the case of a war the enlisting practices would probably change dramatically, by not 
considering as valid excuses for not serving, most of those that are considered valid during 
peacetime.  
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A: We will take advantage of the logic theory and the mathematical 
method of “Proof by Contradiction” first described by the ancient Greek 
philosopher/mathematician, Aristotle.377 The substance of that procedure 
is that, if we only have three potential outcomes and we eliminate two out 
of the three possible solutions, then the right solution is the third one, even 
though we did not show it explicitly.  
b.  The Application of the MRM model – The Solution for the 
Military Design of Greece 
Using the “Proof by Contradiction” method described above, we 
first set the data of the problem. There are only three possible systems for 
designing the soldier base of the Greek Armed Forces. 
• Full conscript system (draftees only) 
• Semi-professional system (mixed draftees and volunteers)378 
• All volunteer system (volunteers only) 
We chose to examine the first and the third one, which can give 
more evident results than the second one. We test each system for the three 
factors of the MRM model, and if the system fails for even one of them, we 
consider it as not proper for the Greek case. 
Let us start with the first one. 
(1) Full Conscript System. As is obvious, in this system 
we would have only draftees and not volunteers.379 We will examine this system 
according to the three MRM factors / outcomes. 
 
                                            
377“ Reductio ad absurdum” is a Latin phrase. Generally, it is also known as Proof of 
Contradiction. In logic and mathematics it is a method of proving something. The phrase can be 
traced back to the Greek, “η εις άτοπον απαγωγή.” This phrase means “reduction to the 
impossible”. It was often used by Aristotle. The method of proving something works by first stating 
something is true. Then other things are deduced from that. In the end, there is contradiction. 
This contradiction then shows that thing stated first cannot be true. Extract from Wikipedia: 
http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum (accessed October 10, 2008). 
378 In fact, that is the system in force today. 
379 We will only consider the system which is already in force in Greece, that of obligatory 
service for all men; not the conscription by lottery or any other partial conscription. We leave the 
period of conscription undefined, but relatively close to today’s one year. 
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• First Factor Test: Political Legitimacy: It is obvious that when all 
youth are called under arms, the society groups are represented 
equally; nevertheless, we will consider the elements of political 
legitimacy, analyzed earlier, and consider if they are fulfilled or not 
by that system.380 
• Democratic constitution: equal participation is parallel with 
the democratic constitution of the country. 
• Military control by the society: when all sons of Greek 
families participate to the Armed Forces, these families tend 
to have an opinion which is a type of control for the military. 
• Demographic Diversity: again it is obvious that this is 
achieved through the obligatory service. 
• Unity of the society in the case of a war: since no one is 
excluded, war becomes a matter that unites instead of 
divides. 
• Government handles the military as part of the whole 
society: this element too, is obvious, as the control of military 
through the society is intense.  
• “Infecting” society’s perceptions/ideas into military: since all 
youngsters participate, they will bring with them their own 
ideas along with their families’ idea and ways of thinking into 
the military. 
• Future politicians to be “baptized” into the army experience: 
this too is an explicit advantage of the draft system. 
• Representation of the former Greek immigrants, who return 
to the country: the draft system gives the basis for this 
accomplishment; nevertheless, it is up to further state 
regulations to include this group to the military force. 
Thus, we conclude that the draft system is capable of 
providing political legitimacy to military service. Next, we will test the elements of 
the second factor of social representation: military effectiveness.381 
• Test of the Second Factor: Military Effectiveness: As we did for the 
previous factor, we test each of the elements identified earlier for 
that specific factor. We should not forget, though, that this factor 
has to be considered in conjunction with the analysis made earlier  
 
                                            
380 See also Figure 4.8. 
381 See also Figure 4.9. 
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in this chapter, when operational learning/training factors were 
examined for the draftees’ army. Let us look now at each element 
of military effectiveness separately: 
• Fulfill the scope of national defense: In a draftee army, 
people in unison defend their country, so this fundamental 
scope of the Greek army is aligned to the draft system. 
• Support from the society, resulting in high morale: As 
everybody’s son will participate in the army, it is normal for 
society to support and express its gratitude to the soldiers. 
• The need for big army for National Defense missions: 
Surely, the draft system assures the biggest number of 
soldiers, which is especially useful in defense operations.  
• Military culture: This is a factor that depends on history and 
cannot be absolutely definite. Before now, the culture in the 
Greek Armed Forces was for the draft; despite that, this is 
slightly changing recently to a semiprofessional culture. 
Surely though, the military culture is not familiar with a total 
absence of draftees. 
• Cohesion of the fighting force: This is an advantage of the 
draft force when considering the representation of all 
society-which is considered cohesive. On the other hand, 
cohesion has another parameter: that of duration of the 
common service among soldiers. For example, a 
professional group that stays together for three years or 
more becomes well-acquainted and, in effect, cohesive. On 
the other hand, a draftee force will change its station every 
six to twelve months.382 Finally this factor is quite ambiguous 
and requires trends from both draft and volunteer force. 
Nevertheless, in general, a draft system should not possibly 
detract from cohesion of the Armed Forces. 
• Operational/Training/Learning: As analyzed thoroughly in 
paragraph B1 of the present chapter, this is the point where 
the pure draft system presents the greater inadequacy. The 
continuous need for training, the breakage of learning 
curves, and the restrictions on operational assignment of 
draftees,383 make that element and subsequently the military 
effectiveness factor not valid for a hard core draft system. 
                                            
382 This of course happens when they are not self identified as a minority-group of the 
society. In that case they will be cohesive among themselves, but not with the rest of the military. 
383 Except for the reduced time period they spent in remote military bases-where is mainly 
the operational need- they also do not participate in operations of Armed Forces abroad (except 
for a national war). 
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Inevitably, we conclude that the pure draft system did not 
pass the test of the MRM model and is not applicable to the 
Hellenic Armed Forces384. 
Consequently, there is normally no reason to examine the 
final factor of the MRM model, but for having a complete picture of the appliance 
of that model in a potential Greek pure draft system, we will proceed further.  
• Third Factor Test: Social Equity: This is a factor that we can easily 
identify in which representativeness plays a significant role. so, we 
expect that the draft system will support that factor. Still, let us look 
at its specific elements:385 
• The principles of democracy: calls for representation in all 
the state’s institutions. Thus, a draft covers that element’s 
directive regarding the Military Institutions. 
• Equal burden on Armed Forces operations: it is also evident 
that the burden is divided equally among the society/army 
members with a draft system. 
• Greek military history: the draft system has been in force 
uninterrupted through Greece’s recent history.386 
• Equal loss in case of war: As the contribution of soldiers is 
equal from all socioeconomic castes, the unwished loss 
would probably be equal.387 
• Lack of ample resources: This too, is an advantage of a draft 
force, which saves public money and contributes a big 
number of soldiers to the army. This is the reason why the 
military participation ratio is higher in countries with a low 
gross national product.388  
                                            
384 According to the proof by contradiction method, since one element is not true, the overall 
initial assumption is not true. 
385 See also Figure 4.12. 
386 Sometimes though, the Draft System was complemented by other volunteer-type 
systems in parallel, as is the case today. 
387 This is also dependent on other administrative orders from military regarding for instance 
special treatment of the upper socioeconomic classes. (e.g., service in safe regions and not on 
the warfront). This was an allegation made for U.S. Military Administration during the USA-
Vietnam war.  
388 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 379. 
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As expected, the draft system completely covers the factor 
of social equity. 
Yet, since it did not pass all the MRM outcome tests, the 
pure draft system is considered not applicable to the Hellenic Armed Forces and 
society. 
We will proceed with the same test for a potential all 
volunteer force system. 
(2) All Volunteer Force Military System. Under this 
system all soldiers would be volunteers. We apply the MRM model to that 
system, beginning with the first factor test: 
• First Factor Test: Political Legitimacy: This is an ambiguous factor 
for an AVF and is highly depending on the specifics of each country 
under examination, along with the historical period in which the 
examination takes place. Of course, in the present study we will 
focus on Greece, and we will assume that no big social, economic 
or other changes will take place. in the following, we examine the 
specific elements of political legitimacy:389 
• Democratic constitution: It is not a negative factor for AVF, 
as volunteers enlist through democratic procedures, laws 
and admission tests. 
• Military control by the society: For this and the subsequent 
elements that compose this factor, we need to figure out the 
socioeconomic structure of the volunteer force. Fortunately, 
we have specific data that will help us in determining the 
social representation of the volunteer force. First of all, we 
know that the existing volunteer force is composed by at 
least twenty percent that have only concluded the 
compulsory education.390 In addition, the number of 
volunteers who have a university diploma391 is close to zero 
(0.05%). Next, we will combine this fact with the official data 
                                            
389 See also Figure 4.8. 
390 The middle school (the first three of the total six years of the middle level education- 
children ages 10 – 14). 
391 John Androulakis, “Volunteers,” Scopia.gr (2008), http://www.ellinikos-
stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as (accessed October 24, 2008).  
 151
tables from the Ministry of Education of Greece.392 The 
Figure 4.15 provides a clear picture of the numbers of youth 
(18 to 22 years old) participating in the higher level 
education:  
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Figure 4.15. Trend of high level educated Youth in Greece (1987-2005)393   
From the Figure 4.15, we extract some very useful 
information: 
• The overall youth population of Greece from 18 to 21 years old in 
2002 was 712,000 persons, while those of the same age studying 
at universities were 324,000. This shows that 45 percent of the 
whole Greek population was university students. 
• The population of youngsters 18-22, was steadily being reduced 
from 1995 and is projected to be reduced more intensively till 2010. 
On the other hand, the population studying at universities is steadily 
increasing, thus, the percentage of youth at universities is 
increasing.394  
                                            
392 Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm (accessed 
October 25, 2008). 
393 Ibid.  
394 Another survey by the same university, this time for age group of 18-21, gives us similar 
and even higher university participation by this age group (Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, 
http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm (accessed October 25, 2008). 
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We can combine the above facts with what the Minister of 
National Defense (DoD) noted in an interview, which is that approximately 40 
percent of the youth avoid being drafted and get postponement from serving.395 
This postponement according to the Greek law is granted for health reasons or, 
more frequently, when studying in a university. The above statements are 
validated in Figure 4.16 , which comes again from the Ministry of Education and 
shows the percentage of those who entered universities and other educational 
institutions in 2008. 
 
 
Figure 4.16. Ratio of High School Students entering the Public Universities in 
2008396 
If we combine the above data, we would get an evident 
equation:  
                                            
395 Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231 (accessed 
October 27, 2008). 
396 Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm (accessed 
October 25, 2008). 
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Percentage of those In Universities  = Percentage of those who Postpone their 
Military Service397 = 40 percent 
 
Let us review what we have found thus far. 
• Approximately 40 percent of the youth eligible for service avoid it 
• That forty percent comes from the higher education youth group, 
which not only avoids being drafted, but also does not want to enlist 
in a volunteer force. In addition, this proportion represents 
approximately the total percentage of university students of Greece. 
• While the staffing needs for the military, we assume, will be steady, 
the population of the youth group that might serve becomes less; to 
make things worse, the population that achieves the entrance exam 
of universities grows bigger every year; thus, it is possible that a 
greater percentage of young men will avoid military service or 
enlistment in the future 
So, roughly, we would say that 40 percent of upper educated 
people do not want to enlist, and avoid military service, too. One could ask: how 
is this related with the socioeconomic status? The answer is that education, even 
when it is public, as in Greece, is closely related to economic and finally 
socioeconomic factors as we have shown previously in Chapter III.  
Now, after that useful overview of the composition of the 
Volunteer force, we can proceed with our analysis. Specifically, for the pending 
test of the element of military control by the society, we examine it in the next 
chapter; so, for now we leave an unanswered question here. 
• Demographic diversity: This is a weak point of the AVF. 
Fortunately, we have some data that show the following 
dispersion:398 
• 45% of the volunteer force comes from Macedonia 
• 15% comes from Thessaly 
• 13.3% comes from Thrace 
 
                                            
397 We should note that we refer to the same age group 18-22, which normally face the 
dilemma of being drafted or enlisting in the military. 
398 John Androulakis, “Volunteers.” Scopia.gr (2008), http://www.ellinikos-
stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as (accessed October 24, 2008). 
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• 13.3% comes from southern (inland) Greece 
• Other small proportions come from the rest of the country 
It is evident that southern Greece (including Athens),which 
counts for more than 50 percent of the population, gives only 13.3percent to the 
volunteer force, while the northern regions, which are known for their high 
unemployment rate, contribute approximately 75 percent of the volunteer force. 
Normally, we could assume from this invalid match that AVF is not politically 
legitimate; yet, we overcome that factor, as one might argue - possibly correctly- 
that Greece has not many demographics or other differences in its population 
and it is a relatively homogenous country. So, considering these results 
ambiguous we proceed to the next element. 
• Unity of the society in case of war: considering the composition of 
the AVF military force, a definite and solid 40 percent of the upper 
educated class is not participating. It is normal to argue that the 40 
percent, close to one-half of society, will be detached from the 
military in case of a war. In effect, no unity will be achieved. This is 
the first element that the AVF clearly fails to accomplish. The same 
will happen with some of the following elements of Political 
Legitimacy, which as a factor excludes the solution of an AVF for 
Greece.399 
• Government handles military as part of the society: Again this is not 
true for an AVF, due to the fact that only the lower-educated sixty 
percent is present in an AVF. 
• Injecting society’s ideas/perception into the army: It is not only the 
fact that the perceptions of the lowest educated 60 percent of 
society will be “transferred” to the military, but also the 40 percent 
who don’t join the military, have higher education, and technical 






                                            
399 Again, for the completeness of the study we will continue to examine briefly the rest of the 
factors even though the application of the MRM model excludes the proposal for an AVF in 
Greece. 
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• Future politicians “baptized” into the army’s experience pool: This is 
a very critical factor that the AVF fails again to accomplish. We can 
see some results that came out of this discrepancy in today’s 
American politics.400 We examine this factor further in the following 
chapter. 
• Representation of the former immigrants in the Armed Forces: This 
is an element that should be examined in accordance with 
socioeconomic status. Due to the lack of relevant data, we consider 
this element as neutral for the AVF. 
• Second Factor Test: Military effectiveness: As we have already 
proved in Chapter I, AVF is very effective when concerning the 
operational/training/learning elements. Next, we will focus on the 
composing elements of that factor:401 
• Fulfill the scope of National Defense: As an effective force, 
volunteers would probably defend the country properly. 
• Support from the society: Normally, they will have support 
from the society as volunteers constitute a part of the 
society, even though they represent the lowest sixty percent 
of the socioeconomic structure. 
• The need for a big army for National Defense missions: This 
is another element that an AVF can’t fulfill without great 
government expense. 
• Military culture: Even though a mixed system is currently in 
force in Greece, a volunteer military is not in the culture of 
the Armed Forces, due to the continuous use of draftees for 
roughly two centuries. On the other hand, there is no 
evidence that this culture could not change. 
• Cohesion of the fighting force: As described previously in the 
draft system testing, this element is quite unclear to judge, 
as there are two parts of cohesion in a fighting force: one 
that comes from the satisfactory representation of the 
society in the military groups, while the other is derived from 
the duration that this group stays together. On the first 
element, the draft system has the lead, while on the second, 
the AVF surpasses.  
 
                                            
400 Roth-Douquet, Kathy, and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of 
America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country. 1 ed. (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2006). 
401 See also Figure 4.9. 
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The AVF test for the second factor of the MRM model 
(Military Effectiveness), gave neutral to negative results. As that AVF system is 
already excluded according to the first factor of the MRM model (Political 
Legitimacy), we briefly conclude the test on the third factor. 
• Third Factor Test: Social equity: As approximately the upper half of 
the Greek socioeconomic castes will not be represented in a 
potential AVF, we expect the volunteer military to fail the test of 
social equity, too. Let us examine, each element separately.402 
• The principles of Democracy: Even though it is a democratic 
principle to choose what you want to do personally, when it 
comes to a community matter, democracy dictates that all 
people should get equal dividends from the obligations and 
the rights that occur from a civilized society. One of the 
fundamental benefits of a society is the safety that it 
provides to its members. Yet, this benefit is accompanied by 
an obligation to contribute to the military force. With an 
AVF system, the upper socioeconomic class does not 
participate in the military force.  
• Equal burden on operations: This, again, is a negative 
aspect of a Volunteer Force, as it is a direct outcome of the 
unrepresentativeness of the Armed Forces. 
• Greek Military History is against the AVF, as never before 
was this system applied. Of course, this does not mean that 
if applied, it will not be accepted. Nevertheless, there might 
be a hindrance to change. 
• Equal loss in case of war: Unrepresentativeness also 
strongly affects this critical factor, as historical memories of 
those who avoid the highest duty to the country never fade 
completely.403 The AVF fails this important element, which 
becomes even more important as Greece will possibly be 
called to fight National Wars. 
• Lack of ample resources: The AVF fails also in that Greece 
cannot afford a large volunteer corps for two reasons: first, 
there are not many financial resources to sustain such a 
force; and, second, the personnel pool to be enlisted is small 
as the population of Greece is not large.  
                                            
402 See also Figure 4.12. 
403 We see that in the U.S., there is still discussion about the Vietnam War, and which social 
group was sacrificed and which avoided the obligation of fighting. 
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Evidently, the AVF failed in the third factor of the MRM 
model, too; the AVF Social Equity factor and, overall, did not pass the test of the 
MRM model.  
According to the “proof by contradiction” method, we 
eliminated the first two military-structure options. Thus, we come to the 
conclusion that the most effective military structure for Greece is the mixed 
system, or the so called “semi-professional” one. 
(3) Semi Professional System. Based on the MRM model 
and the specifics of the Hellenic society and Armed Forces, this study was led to 
the semi-professional structure as the most effective of all three structures 
available. 
We will not examine this system analytically like the other 
two, as its validity is already proven by the logic method of “proof of 
contradiction,” and for the additional reason that it is a very difficult task to do, 
due to the multiple potential combinations between draftee and volunteer 
mixes404. This could be the subject of a subsequent study that contains more 
specific numbers and uses mathematical and computer models to be solved. 
Nevertheless, a more political suggestion would be: not to 
reduce the draft force from today’s levels before having adequate evidence to do 
so. This is proposed for two reasons: first, it is difficult to rise later on, if needed, 
the proportion of the draftees, due to the social turbulence it will bring. Second, it 
is evident that the youth population of Greece is projected to be declining, for at 
least ten years from today, which means that the draftee pool will become even 
smaller. 
                                            
404 We can have from 1 to 99 percent, theoretically, of draftees or volunteers; thus, 
numerous combinations of the mixed soldier structure. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
As this chapter comes to an end we will quickly review its results, as these 
results are mainly the answer to this project. 
Initially, we asked ourselves what volunteers and draftees have to offer in 
the Greek military regarding the three factors of economy, operations, and 
mobilization. We showed in rough lines that economy and mobilization were 
advantages of the draftees, while operations were an advantage of volunteers. 
Later on, to have a more complete picture of all the military and social 
“actors,” we examined the military leaders’ and officers’ positions on the choice 
between draftees and volunteers. it became evident that lower-ranking officers 
preferred the volunteers, as they operate more effectively, while the higher-
ranking military officers preferred both equally, mainly considering the 
mobilization factor. 
As we continued our analysis, we asked again what represents the 
society, and we answered that only the socioeconomic criterion determines 
representation in the Greek society. Later on, we focused on why we need 
representation in the Hellenic Armed Forces. We examined that through the 
MRM model, which we validated in the Greek reality before using it. 
The final step was to examine all three possible military structures by 
testing them through the MRM’s three factors. The draft system failed in Military 
Effectiveness, while the AVF system failed in Political Legitimacy and Social 
Equity. Finally, by using the methodology of “proof by contradiction,” we 
concluded that the proper military structure for Greece is the “semi-professional”, 
the one that contains elements from both draftees and volunteers. the exact 




Finally, considering the first factor of the MRM model (Political 
Legitimacy), we would find it beneficial for our study to further explore a sub-
factor, or maybe a new factor, closely related to it: “The factor of Interconnection 
between military and society.” 
This search is the subject of the next chapter, which in turn examines the 
feedback of the society to the military, offering more proof to the conclusions 
derived above. 
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V. THE SOCIAL SPACE OUTSIDE OF THE MILITARY – THE 
INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND THE SOCIETY IT 
SERVES 
To picture the relationship between THE military, society, and other official 
institutions, we can construct a diagram, which is common for democratic states 
such as Greece. As seen in Figure 5.1, three powers of state interact generally 
with the military and society. 
 
 

















This kind of division of state powers was first described by Montesquieu in 
his “Trias Politica,” dividing the different powers of the state into three branches: 
1) the executive branch, 2) the legislative branch, and 3) the judicial branch.405 
Throughout the years, numerous discussions have focused on the 
democratic control of the Armed Forces by the state and its institutions.406 We 
touch on that subject only for conceptualizing the inner part of Democratic 
control: the interconnection of the military and the society. As Born, Caparin, and 
Holtmer407 state in their ERGOMAS408 research project, there are three types of 
democratic control: 
• Top down, vertical control: This refers to parliaments and 
governments controlling A.F. (depicted by the downward green 
arrow on the exhibit above); 
• Horizontal control: This refers to the control exercised by other 
social-type institutions, such as media, unions, and other opinion-
formulating institutions. It is called horizontal due to the lack of 
official hierarchical ties between social institutions or society in 
general and the Armed Forces. It is depicted in Figure 5.1 by the 
two common-centered circles and in more detail in Figure 5.2: 
                                            
405 Hans Born, M. Caparini, and K. Haltiner, “Models of Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces,” ERGOMAS Research Project (2000): 1-7.  
406 For more see: Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The Unexcused Absence 
of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country, 1st ed. (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2006); Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. 
Soldiers and Civilians (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001); Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the 
Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New 
York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003); Hans Born, M. Caparini, and K. Haltiner, “Models of Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces,” ERGOMAS Research Project (2000): 1-7.  
407 Hans Born, M. Caparini, and K. Haltiner, “Models of Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces,” ERGOMAS Research Project (2000): 1-7. 
408 ERGOMAS is an association of scientists who study and analyze the relationship 
between the military and society, and related phenomena. It focuses on Europe. Joint 
transnational research and intercultural comparisons in thematically oriented interdisciplinary 
Working Groups constitute the core of ERGOMAS.  
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Figure 5.2. The Inner Construction of the Social groups and the Military 
• Internal Control: this is the third type of democratic control, which is 
in general the military’s control of itself through its procedures and 
internal controls. 
In a democratic state and society, the problems of controlling the AF 
vertically and internally are in a way already solved. The only part that seems to 
be currently changing is the Horizontal Control of the A.F. by the society: the 

































Two main reasons explain the changing interconnection. 
• First, the evolution of modern societies and youth to a different type 
of citizen: a citizen who is not much concerned about general 
society issues, but rather values personal well-being and believes 
in professionalism and job specialization 
• Second, the different structure of Armies, which have initialized 
several new elements such as volunteers, reserves, social 
contribution service, women’s service, and others 
Rukavishnikov and Pugh (2003) agree with the above changes in society 
and the military. They note that every country has its own democratic control of 
the A.F. related to its history, sentiment, and tradition, as well as to the political 
type of government. They also comment that “the very nature of the 
problem…(Democratic Control)409 is permanently changing, because both 
society and the military are constantly changing as well.” 410 
This second point is the one that we focus on in this chapter. As we did in 
the previous chapter, we will examine how the horizontal control, or 
interconnection of military and society, is affected by an AVF and a conscript 
force. The results of this study should validate, or not, the solution that we found 
previously. Normally, the mixed volunteer and draftees’ military structure. This 
direction of horizontal control examination was also proposed by Born (2003); 
when writing the results of his article, he noted that “All the fields mentioned 
above…. (new topics of research)411 ..are influenced by the social 
transformations of civil military relations in the post Cold War period. It is 
necessary for scholars to start researching these upcoming issues in an 
interdisciplinary fashion.” 412 
 
                                            
409 Definition added. 
410 Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in New Handbook of the 
Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Publishers, 2003), 131. 
411 Explanation added. 
412 Ibid., 165. 
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First, we examine the effects of the totally draft force on this horizontal 
type of control. 
A.   WHAT ARE THE INTERCONNECTION EFFECTS BETWEEN THE 
MILITARY AND SOCIETY WHEN ALL PEOPLE SERVE? 
As we shown in the previous chapter, the upper-socioeconomic groups 
are not well-represented in the volunteer force, and furthermore avoid and 
postpone their duty of serving in the military as draftees. So, we have every 
reason to believe that this 40 percent of the upper classes (socioeconomic and 
economic) would not serve in the case of an AVF.413 Consequently, an effect of 
the draftee force is to gain that upper 40 percent of society. Still, is it a gain just in 
numbers of soldiers, or it is something more than that? 
In the following discussion, we examine several cases where the 
participation of this part of society’s youth in the military is adding benefits to the 
military and to society generally. 
1.   Who is Closely Related to the Conscript? Who Cares for Him? 
Of course, the first people to care for the conscript are his parents. We 
see the effects of this concern as it involves the upper socioeconomic class 
parents. 
As previously discussed, the socioeconomic status of the young is 
synonymous with the socioeconomic status of their parents. So, the result of an 
all-draft-force, is the upper-socioeconomic part of the society of a country 
keeping track of military-related issues. Except for the vote, these upper classes 
have many other means by which they influence the government on military  
 
 
                                            
413 This is also the case for the U.S. AVF, see: Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, 
AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts 
the Country, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006). 
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issues. This is depicted roughly in Figure 5.2, by the arrow pointing up from the 
society circle. This active feedback by upper classes is a major concern also in 
countries that use the AVF, such as the U.S.414 
It is evident that the answer to the question, “who cares for the soldiers?”, 
is a simple one: their families. In a conscript environment, the most important of 
those related to the soldiers are the influential upper-socioeconomic classes.415 
One could ask, what is the difference between the upper-socioeconomic 
class and to the lower and middle-socioeconomic classes related to the military? 
The answer is examined below. 
2.  Interaction of the Upper-Socioeconomic Classes with the 
Government 
The arrow pointing up in Figure 5.2 results from a variety of pressures on 
the government of a country. Especially for the upper-socioeconomic/ economic 
classes, there are various ways to make their voice heard to the executive 
branch of the state and, as a result, receive favorable treatment. 
                                            
414 In a very interesting narrative type, though scientific-based, book K. Roth-Douquet and F. 
Schaeffer, depict the reality in U.S.: “One way to turn up the disconnect between the wealthiest 
and most influential class of Americans and our military is to ask yourself this question: would you 
be surprised to hear that actor Leonardo DiCaprio or Steven Spielberg’s son, or the daughter of 
the president of Yale or one of George Bush’s daughters or a Kennedy grandchild or the son of 
the president of Microsoft had enlisted? If the answer is yes, then why would you be surprised? 
What assumptions have you made about our AVF and who is the ‘appropriate” volunteer?”. 
Except for the masterfully theoretical question posed above, the authors using research data, 
concluded that most of U.S. contemporary soldiers are strangers to the most influential segment 
of the society; a division that is depicted by the distinction “we” and “they”. See: Kathy Roth-
Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes 
from the Military and How it Hurts the Country, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 30. 
415 Ibid. This is the case in the book, where two different families of upper U.S. 
socioeconomic status, found themselves related to military volunteers. Their descriptions of their 
changing perceptions are very powerful and also based on research data. 
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Figure 5.3. Various ways that Upper Socioeconomic Groups Might Influence 
the Executive Power of a State. 
As seen in Figure 5.3, the upper-socioeconomic classes can influence the 
actions of government and the society in a number of ways. These are 
summarized below. 
a. Rich or Famous Families 
These types of groups have two ways to influence those in charge. 
(1) Directly Reach Politicians. As being in the same high 
socioeconomic strata, they would normally have relations with them as 
fundraisers or as social friends. This ability is probably the most powerful, as a 
politician can very easily bring an issue in the parliament through an official 
procedure called “question” in Greece. Politicians of all the parties often pose 
“questions” in the Greek parliament concerning issues with soldiers.416 As we  
 
                                            
416 See: Hellenic Parliament, http://www.parliament.gr/ (accessed November 17, 2008) for 

























understand, this way of making one’s voice heard  is probably very effective, 
since an opinion is forwarded into the most official institution and touches some 
of the most influential people, the legislators. 
(2) Use Publicity. As it would be very easy for them to 
find a way for publicize an opinion on an issue in a newspaper, magazine, or 
T.V.417 
b. Professors/ Teachers 
(1)  Influence. Educators have the opportunity to discuss 
with and probably influence the young people and perspective soldiers and their 
families, too. Numerous historical incidents are seen where professors and their 
students sought to bring about democratic control of the military. A first example 
would be the resistance to the Greek dictatorship, initially in 1973, by professors 
and students of the Law School of Athens University, and later by the Athens 
Polytechnic School in 1974. In fact, these two small riots are said to have caused 
the beginning of the end of the dictatorship. 
In U.S. history and during the Vietnam War, university 
professors and students had a very active position, and even marched side-by-
side in protest demonstrations and other events. On the other hand, in the U.S. 
of the AVF today, most university professors and students admire the service of 
soldiers, but they just do not want the latter to be closely associated with them.418 
(2) Publicity. Another ability of professors and the 
nation’s intellectual leaders is to publish an article or write a book expressing 
their views. This probably does not have as instant an effect on society as is  
 
 
                                            
417 We will discuss the power of contemporary media later on. 
418 Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's 
Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 
2006), 43-51. Ibid., 44, We can find some very interesting surveys done by Moskos. 
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caused by the media. Still, it is a slow but long standing influence on society and, 
more specifically, the segments of society that read related journals and books. 
These intellectual leaders are often called the “opinion makers” of society. 
c.  Higher-Level Public Employees 
Normally, these employees have at least an indirect connection 
with politicians or even belong to their close environment. The consequence of 
that relationship is the same as that described above for the rich and famous.  
Apart from that, higher-level public employees know better the 
structure and procedures of the country’s public institutions and administration. 
For example, if a father of a soldier is a high-level employee in the state courts 
(without even being a judge), he could easily take care of the procedures needed 
for a lawsuit against anybody, in the military or not, who mistreated his son. 
Imagine a labor-worker in the same position; a lack of “knowledge” about using a 
state’s institutions might result some hesitation to sue anybody. Of course, we do 
not even mention the money needed to pursue a lawsuit. Higher level public 
employees, bureaucrats, and publicly-elected officials are often seen as the 
“Rule-makers”. 
d.  Journalists or Others Connected in Some Way to the 
Media 
In our society, the role of the media is crucial. It is very difficult to 
find a single person in a developed country who does not watch TV or read 
newspapers. These means of communication are consequently very powerful 
and efficient. 
Nevertheless, not all people have access to forward an opinion to 
the media. The privileged group of journalists composes, as it is said, the “fourth 
state power” of the political structure of a democratic country. So, after the “Trias 
Politica” model of Montesquieu, the journalists and the media overall are 
emerging as a new power that is considered as powerful as the officially 
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established powers of the state. To be more specific, we do not have to be 
economists to know that media survive through their circulation, so through the 
numbers of people watching or reading them. As a result, media will pick 
subjects that interest a wide part of the population. In the case of an AVF, the 
number of interested people for Army-related topics shrinks and, on top of that, 
those interested have lower socioeconomic status. 
Let us now imagine another case: the parents or spouses of a 
military member who are working as journalists and who have the misfortune to 
lose a beloved child or husband during a conflict. It is sure that they would give 
all their powers to uncover the reason for that tragic death and bring it to light. 
Even if there were no scandal or problem to reveal, just the news of that death 
would be surely more publicized. Roth-Douquet and Schaeffer examine the 
media coverage of U.S. military actions very graphically,419 coming to the 
conclusion that one of the basic reasons why the gap between U.S. society and 
the military grows is the lack of media coverage of military issues. 
A current break into the privileges of the elites and their access to 
the media is the Internet; various ways of communicating, without cost, such as 
e-mails, web-sites, blogs, Facebook, and other means, contribute to the 
democracy of expressing opinions freely. On the other hand, and without having 
specific data, it seems that the Internet is so widespread that it disperses 
opinions or statements, and in most of the cases, fails to verify the reality and 
objectivity of those who contribute their ideas in the “outer space” of the Internet. 
Finally, it is quite evident that draftees are connected to all 
socioeconomic parts of society. Especially for the relatives of draftees from the 
groups we have seen that they can easily make their voice heard to the public 
policy makers and government officials. 
The obvious next question is what results from this influence? 
                                            
419 Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's 
Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 
2006), 51-63.  
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3.  What Results from the Influence of Soldiers’ Relatives? 
There are two areas that elite groups could influence by their opinions or 
acts: the society in general and the military itself. 
a.  Society Effects 
Elite groups can influence the military in the following ways: 
• Creating better knowledge for everybody (through the media) on 
military issues. 
• Making the government conscious of every military decision, as 
many people are watching that state-military relation. Through this 
decision-transparency of the government, all orders should be 
explained to the public. 
• Avoiding military operations/missions which are not validated by the 
society. This includes operations that do not add anything to the 
country and its people420. 
On the other hand, in an AVF, like the U.S. paradigm, evidence 
suggests that most of the military’s decisions are driven by the military’s will. The 
most dangerous part of this is that the high expertise of the contemporary AF 
gives the advantage of knowledge to military officers, leaving some of their civil 
superiors as followers rather than leaders. In Table 5.1 below, we observe that 
the military’s dominance over its civilian officials is evident. Seven major 
decisions between 1990 and 1997 were forced by the military branch, while only 
four were driven by the civilian side. Additionally, one action was a compromise 
between civilian and military authorities.421 
                                            
420 A potential negative side-effect of that is to push the A.F. to avoid all military actions, for 
fear that the “beloved” sons or spouses might be hurt. This becomes evident for the U.S. in 
surveys conducted by Feaver, where the elite-civilians are counteracting any aggressive military 
action. These data were collected between 1976 and 1992, regarding military-issues’ decision-
making. (Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 39-53). 
421 To that table we might add the Iraq and Afghanistan recent cases, where, if not in the 
beginning of the wars, at least afterwards the public opinion supported the return of  troops, 
something that has not been initiated until only relatively recently. 
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Table 5.1. Whose preferences prevailed in the post-Cold War era in U.S.?422 
Date Issue Civilian Mixed Military 
1990 Gulf War strategy 
(Bush=offensive; 
JCS/CENTCOM=defensive 
X   
1992 Bosnia (intervene or not)   X 
1992-94 Gays in the military 
(Clinton=yes; JCS/Nunn=no) 
  X 
1993 FY 1994 defense budget 
(Clinton/Aspin vs. Powell) 
X   
1993-94 Change services’ roles and 
missions (Clinton/Nunn=yes; 
JCS=no) 
  X 
1993-94 “Win-hold-win” 
(Clinton/Aspin) vs. “win-win” 
(JCS) 
  X 
1994 Invade Haiti 
(Clinton/Talbot=yes; 
Perry/JCS=no) 
X   
1994 No restrictions on women 
(Clinton/West=yes; JCS=no) 
 X  
1996-97 Try Bosnian war criminals 
(Clinton/Albright=yes; 
Cohen/JCS=no) 
  X 
1997 Flinn honorable discharge 
(Widnall=yes; Fogelman=no) 
  X 
1997 Restrictions on land mines 
(Clinton/Gore=yes; JCS=no) 
  X 
1997 Khobar Towers responsibility 
of air force commanding 
officers (Cohen=yes; 
Fogelman=no) 
X   
These operations under society’s control do not have to be nation-
based. Society will also have a say on multinational operations that do not affect 
the nation directly. This is a significant democratic control over the international 
policy of the country and is feasible only in cases where the media cover these  
 
                                            
422 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 200. 
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operations. So, we come to the prerequisite, mentioned previously, for the media 
to cover military news: news must concern a lot of people, or at least those who 
can influence the media.423 
• Another consequence of the transparency of military decisions is 
that youth would be less reluctant to volunteer for an institution that 
is transparent and clearly managed, rather than one where nobody 
knows what decisions are taken and society is not concerned 
enough to find out. 
• An alienation of the military from society will be prevented and there 
will be no gap between civilians and those in military. This gap in 
the U.S. AVF is discussed in a book by Feaver and Kohn424,  which 
describes a division that touches issues in both political and 
sociological realm. To avoid this gap, two factors are needed: 
proper media coverage on military subjects and all citizens to be 
“baptized” in the common pool of a country’s military. This is further 
explained below through a personally-developed model of 
interconnection between the military and society. 
• Avoiding alienation between these two state foundations also 
prevents potential counter acts or a lack of confidence from the 
military side. As Feaver states,425 “…elite military officers far more 
than elite civilians, are proved to view civilian society as troubled 
and in need of reform.” “In short” he adds, “public confidence in the 
military masks latent distrust and a deeper divide in civil military 
relations.”426 
The above arguments constitute an overview of the social results 
caused by the interference of conscripts’ relatives in the procedure of horizontal 
control (or societal control) of the military. 
                                            
423 A very interesting version of the Principal-agent theory is presented by Peter D. Feaver, 
Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2003, 9-15.) This theory is, according to the author, an evolution of Huntington’s 
and Janowitze’s theories concerning the democratic control of the military. In our study, we will try 
to embed into Feaver’s theory, the society; apart from the Principal (Government) and Military 
(Agent). The widening of the model into the society is Feaver’s concern, too. He describes this 
clearly in his final proposals (Ibid., 298-302). 
424 Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and 
Civilians (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001). 
425 Ibid., 160-161. 
426 All the above conclusions of the author come from relevant analyzed research studies 
executed by Triangle Institute Security Studies (TISS).  
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Next, we see the military results of that horizontal control of the 
civilians, and especially those who have a higher socioeconomic position in the 
state. 
b.  Military Effects 
The military would also be affected by intervention between the 
Principal (Government) and the Agent (Military). Mainly, this intervention might 
be seen as a guarantee that the proper procedures are followed by the superior 
executive branch representatives. 
• First, there would be higher self-esteem among those associated 
with the AF, knowing that all people are watching them and really 
care about them. As Feaver and Kohn show,427 there is a 
significant gap in confidence between the military and civilians who 
have no direct contact with that institution and have never serveed 
in the military establishment. Figure 5.4 shows the dimensions of 










































Figure 5.4. Dimensions of Confidence in the U.S. Military428  
                                            
427 Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, The Civil-Military Gap in U.S.A. Soldiers and 
Civilians (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 139. 
428 Ibid., 140. 
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• A second fact is that the A.F. exhibits greater effectiveness in its 
operations when it is felt that all of society is participating in the 
military’s efforts. Douquet and Schaeffer, for example, comment on 
the point that military personnel might ask: “Why should I fight and 
perhaps die for a bunch of rich and powerful people who never sent 
their own sons and daughters to serve with us?”429 Moskos also 
identifies the problem of operational effectiveness. He tracks 
various military engagements in history and shows that “citizens 
accept hardship only when their elites are viewed as self-
sacrificing.”430 He also comments that legitimacy is undermined 
when elites do not serve; as a result, the mission may not be 
supported by the general population  
• The quality of volunteers would rise if they knew that all society was 
following them. A volunteer would like to know that he is a part of a 
“gun” in the hands of somebody (government) who is controlled by 
society. Thus, clarity and transparency of decisions affecting the 
military would positively affect new volunteers, increasing the 
education and general level of the volunteer force. 
• When society watches the AF, it is sure that the living conditions of 
the soldiers as well as their benefits would improve over time. The 
reason is that the media would be more likely to “invade” military 
life, spotting malfunctions or deficiencies of the military system.431 
Concluding the effects of soldiers’ relatives undertaking the 
“horizontal” type control of the army, we have seen how this influences the 
society and the military in general. We focus mostly on the upper-socioeconomic 
class (approximately 40 percent of the population) that, in the case of an AVF, 




                                            
429 Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's 
Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 
2006), 169.  
430 Ibid., 171. From that we derived the following statement from C. Moskos, “Our Will to 
Fight Depends on Who is Willing to Die,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2002, A22. 
431 This is the case for numerous articles such as: “Time for Ombudsman in the Army.” 
Eleftherotipia ,Newspaper, August 25, 2008, http://www.enet.gr/online/online (accessed October 
24, 2008). Especially, “Eleftherotypia” (a Greek big circulation newspaper), has a daily column 
regarding matters that affects soldiers’ lives. There are many well known internet blogs too, which 
focus on the soldiers’ status in the Hellenic A.F. 
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think now: if an AVF is established, would all these influences to the state, as 
described above, be carried out by the lowest-educated 60 percent of the 
population?432  
4.  Does Society React Similarly to an AVF and a Conscript 
Force? 
One might argue that, if the difference of representation in Greece 
between an AVF and a Conscript Force is only 40 percent of the population, the 
remaining 60 percent represents the majority; so, is that not representative, or, at 
least approximately representative enough? We even call “representative” the 
political party that wins an elections by 40 or 45 percent of the popular vote. So 
why would we question whether 60 percent should be representative? 
 There are two main reasons that force us to believe that this 60 percent is 
not representative of Greek society and, in effect, the society would not react the 
same in the case of an AVF compared with a total conscript force. 
a.   The Upper Forty Percent Portion of the Society 
First of all, that 40 percent is not a random distribution of people in 
the Greek society; it represents the upper-socioeconomic/economic groups that 
have the most power in that society, as described previously. In the case of a 
political party, there might be a ruling 40 to 45 percent, but the part of society 
represented by it is normally dispersed through all socioeconomic groups, giving 
them the ability to forward their claims and needs. This separation of the elite 40 
percent creates in the long run a social, and emotional gap among the 





                                            
432 We apply these proportions for the case of Greece based on the analysis of Chapter III. 
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society, which, some thirty years (less than a generation) after ceasing the 
conscript force, has evidently developed significant differences between elites, or 
the ruling society, and military personnel.433  
Thus, if the elites or ruling classes are exempt from the military, all 
the Horizontal-control results described here cannot be accomplished by the non-
elite soldiers’ relatives. Still, one might ask again, are there no other cases where 
non-elite classes are represented? The low-to-medium labor class has no power 
in a democratic society. This potential question brings us to the second reason 
we give for the different reaction of the society in the cases of an AVF and a 
draftee force. 
b. Lack of Representation of Low Economic Classes on 
Military Decision Making 
Low and medium socioeconomic/economic classes are, of course, 
represented in various ways in a democratic establishment. Nevertheless, there 
are certain ways that this part of society finds a means to express its needs and 
demands. For example, there are labor unions that express labor demands; there 
are political parties that represent in a way their needs and possibly many other 
official institutions. Nevertheless, there is not such an institution to focus on 
soldiers’ lives and military operations434. The reason might be that this is a role 
for society as a whole to play. 
So, apart from the ways elites can find to make their opinions 
heard, non-elite groups find it difficult to express their beliefs and their complaints 
about the structure of the military, or more simply, the difficulties their relatives in 
service might encounter. Again, we are reminded of the example in the U.S. 
case, when social turbulence was intolerable, during the Vietnam War. Currently, 
                                            
433 See European Commission, “Study on Intergrading Women In EU,” Directorate-General 
for Employment and Social Affairs (2002); Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, AWOL: The 
Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military and How it Hurts the Country, 
1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006). 
434 Except for some Veterans’ organizations, which generally have not great power. 
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numerous soldiers’ deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan are presented only on the 
bottom pages of U.S. newspapers, and U.S. citizens must wait until national 
elections to formally express their opinion on the wars. 
In fact,  people are still voters, and have the right to demonstration 
against each government ruling. Nevertheless, the critical missing part in that 
consideration is the media. If the media do not present subjects that concern 
non-elite people, it is hard to raise social awareness and resistance. 
The media may be triggered largely by some elite groups that have 
an interest in a subject; so, we come to a dead end, which also becomes more 
evident when we consider that there will be no military news for the media to 
present. This would possibly happen, as the government will not be pressed by 
any powerful persons to distribute military news in public. 
In conclusion, even though the majority of the Greek population 
might serve in a potential AVF, there would be a great division in society, as the 
elite groups would not serve and would consequently withdraw their interest from 
this National function. This elite withdrawal would probably result in a military’s 
devaluation and neglect by the media and powerful individuals, resulting in a 
breakage of “the horizontal control of the military.”  
Prior to this point, we examined the situation for the period that a 
draftee or volunteer soldier is serving in the military. In the model that we present 
later, there is one more parameter: the draftees or volunteers after leaving the AF 
and the influence they would furnish on the overall society. This point is 
discussed below. 
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B.  WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF DRAFTEES AFTER LEAVING THE 
ARMY?435 
The society in every country is a living organism and its memory is not 
short; it carries perceptions and historical moments, just as people do. So, we 
find it relevant to examine the influence of the draftees themselves in society 
after completing their service. We should not forget that these draftees will be the 
future governors, teachers, and workers, and will represent every segment of the 
society. This “baptism” in the military waters will follow them in their lives, in 
several ways. 
1. Affection and Knowledge on Military Issues 
Most men who serve in the military are interested in learning news about 
the Military later on in their lives, or even in contributing to the solution of a 
problem that bothered them while in service. If, on the other hand, a person had 
not served, he would probably not be affected by many, if any military issues. 
In the Greek conscript system, all men are expected to serve in the 
military; therefore, as civilians later on, a wide variety of people - from the 
country’s president to the last labor worker - will all have ideas, as well as strong 
feelings for matters concerning the Greek A.F. These feelings are not only “cold” 
knowledge; they are based on a deep experience and a sentimental tie to a 
unique part of a man’s life.436 
 
 
                                            
435 We will focus mostly on Draftees as their number leaving A.F and their representation is 
wider than the volunteers. Volunteers in Greece normally stay in service for long and they do not 
quit; most of those leaving A.F. are officially rejected. (John Androulakis, “Volunteers,” Scopia.gr 
(2008), http://www.ellinikos-stratos.com/arthra/epop_2.as (accessed October 24, 2008)). 
436 As we all might have heard from ex-soldiers, they always complain for some instances in 
their military life, but the critical thing is that they always mention and remember this special part 
of their life. These active society members, as ex-soldiers, help diminish the gap between military 
and society. 
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This interest from veterans for military issues helps in reducing, or, in the 
Greek case, in not creating, the gap between society and military. Military 
personnel and civilians will have at least a common understanding and a sort of 
shared experience, upon which they look at the military and its related issues. 
2.  Being a Knowledgeable Voter on Military Issues 
A physical consequence of the first factor presented (affection and 
knowledge), will inevitably result in a civilian who cares somewhat about military 
subjects while voting. So, as voters are knowledgeable and concerned for state-
military relations, so would be the political parties. In that way, the feedback from 
the voters will force the political parties - and consequently, the ruling party - to 
include in their political agenda specific military proposals and plans that they will 
follow. This happens today in Greece, where all political parties have entered into 
a discussion on the Army of the future. Even the Prime Minister and the Minister 
of Defense were asked several questions, posed by the public to legitimize their 
choices.437 This element, too, also helps in not creating a gap between civilians 
and military personnel. 
If we consider this political participation of ex-conscripts in military issues, 
we could in turn imagine what would happen in an AVF; primarily, the AVF gets 
the “civilians” out of the Army. This means that soldiers are only those who are 
professionals, and society does not contribute its members for manning its army. 
A conscript is a civilian who interrupts his normal life to serve the country. As we 
mentioned before, he brings his ideas into the military and, later on, he takes with 
him the military’s perceptions, along with sentimental influences. As a result, the 
A.F. without this civilian injection becomes a closed system, unaffected by social 
ideas and perspectives, and, moreover, unable to pass its ideas and perceptions  
 
                                            
437 See Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231. 
(accessed October 27, 2008); Hellenic Socialistic Party (PASOK), “Programmatic Declarations,” 
May 2007, http://www.pasok.gr/portal/gr/000F4240/Data/Binder1.pdf (accessed October 26, 
2008); Hellenic Parliament, http://www.parliament.gr/ (accessed November 17, 2008). 
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to society in general. The latter part of that argument, the affection of ex-soldiers 
for military-related subjects, brings to the surface another beneficial effect of the 
draftees for the military.  
3.  Willingness to be Mobilized 
The mobilization factor of a draft force is discussed previously. As stated,  
mobilization is a clear advantage of a draft force, as the soldiers who will be 
called in case of a war or other imminent need are more knowledgeable and they 
contribute more to the military operations. 
Still, aside from the knowledgeable participants in the mobilized military 
units, there is another element embedded in the mobilization factor. This is the 
willingness and the psychological state of a mobilized soldier. This element is, 
again, in favor of the draftee force; we can easily imagine the instance where a 
country with an AVF is calling civilians to arms. This country’s military will face 
three problems: first, is the lack of knowledge by the mobilized civilian-soldiers; 
second, is the civilians who will avoid being mobilized; and, finally, is the fear of 
the unknown and the inherent pessimism of those who do not avoid participation. 
The second problem, that some people might avoid serving, should be 
expected. Indeed, the people who are called to serve do not have an idea of the 
army; further, they would be called during a dangerous situation. If, on top of that, 
they do not believe in their country’s military effectiveness or the reasons for the 
draft itself, they may be reluctant warriors, flee from serving, or express their 
views in protests. 
The third problem is the psychological state of those who are mobilized 
during a dangerous situation. In fact, this might be the most important problem, 
as it is better for an army to have fewer people than to have more with low 
morale. So, these civilians who are willing to be mobilized, or cannot avoid it, 
would probably have an inherent fear of the dangerous situation, along with a 
lack of knowledge on military life and procedures. This is not only a lack of 
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knowledge of the military’s technical weapons or procedures, but it includes also 
their inherent uncertainty of how they would communicate in a military 
environment, how they would react in certain situations, and many other 
questions or issues they might have regarding the military-life norms. Inevitably, 
all these uncertainties and fears could create a poor morale, a tendency for 
pessimism, and potential problems in unit cohesion. These feelings are a real 
“poison” in a military environment, especially in cases where danger exists; this 
creates a group effect and a mass psychology toward pessimism. For military 
commanders, to overcome these situations, especially during wartime 
operations, is a very difficult task and can require harsh measures. 
On the other hand, in the case of a draftee or mixed-type military force, an 
ex-soldier when mobilized, knows at least the psychological and sociological 
expectations of soldierly life and overcomes the problem of familiarization quite 
easily. Of course, he still has the fear of imminent danger, but even that might be 
viewed differently by him. The psychological perspective of that reembodiment of 
a soldier can be viewed by him in the following way: a group that protects the 
whole society, and of which he used to be a part, is in dire need and calls him 
back for help to defend the Nation. 
So, this perspective contains the following. 
• A group bond or preexisting cohesion. 
• The knowledge that he is valued and capable enough to help. 
• A likely shared, upper/ethical goal of the group438. 
As we see, the bond with the military is very beneficial for the A.F. in the 
case of a potential mobilization. Still, the cases where the mobilization might  
 
                                            
438 These three parameters are the basis for many organizations, companies and 
institutions, which want to create strong bonds with it their members/ employees. Another case 
where all these aspects are being employed for attracting youngsters is the modern video games 
which in some occasions “fill” the gap of a youngster to be useful and to contribute to a social 
upper goal. This goal in some case is war; so many video games replace the real army 
experiences with an electronic replica, while they do not forget to embed in these games social 
and personal psychological features. 
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occur are not so many; more common is the everyday interaction of civilians who 
are ex-soldiers. The discussion below, along with a model that accompanies the 
theory, focuses on the relations among ex-soldier civilians. 
4.  The Social Relations among Different Socioeconomic Groups 
This is probably one of the most beneficial effects of the draft in a society, 
although it is not examined deeply in literature. Of course, we are entering now 
into a purely sociological aspect, which is not the purpose of this project. 
Nevertheless, we skim the surface of that element with some brief points and 
also present the Interconnecting Military Society (IMS) model. 
First of all, let us examine the instances in a person’s life where he will 
meet and make friendships with people from other socioeconomic groups. There 
are probably only two: public schools and the military. We all remember 
ourselves keeping and talking to some friends from school days. Really, does 
that not change our perception of looking at things that do not touch our lives? Is 
the following phrase familiar in any way to us: “Oh yes, I used to have a friend 
back from the school days, who finally become a…..I can tell that …(his salary/ 
working hours are not at all satisfactory!)” .Probably, yes. 
Some of us still keep friendships from our schooldays, people who help us 
visualize society and life through various lenses and perspectives and not only 
through our personal views. Furthermore, psychologists would assure us that 
connections to a person from our past not only bring back memories and past 
perspectives, but also awaken the psychological profile we used to have at that 
time. As it turns out, military connections are a more powerful “social glue” than 
school for a number of reasons. 
a.  Military (Draft) is Even More Representative than the 
School 
If we compare the only two connecting institutions in the life of a 
youngster, we realize that school is surely representative of all socioeconomic 
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groups, as it is obligatory for all children to be educated. Nevertheless, school is 
only representative of the area in which it is located. So, a school in a village 
would have the village society, or a school in a city would be representative of 
the people living in that city only. But in a school, we would generally not find 
farmers mixed with city boys and citizens of poor suburbs studying together with 
children from rich suburbs.  
On the other hand, a military draft system is the peak of any social 
representation institution. Not only do all the people serve, thus offering “perfect” 
representation,439 but also all these soldiers are mixed geographically in various 
military units. In these units, soldiers might have no social or working connection 
between them; for example, farmers might meet rich boys from big cities, a 
conservative might meet a communist, an atheist might meet a religious person, 
and many other social interconnections that would normally not happen in our 
everyday lives, in the way we have formulated our lives, strictly constrained in 
our own private social cell. Would we go deliberately in any phase of our life, and 
meet a farmer or a person from another distant profession and listen to their 
ideas, perspectives, or problems? Probably not; yet, the military gives us that 
opportunity, which is, as we called it, a kind of “social glue.” The military is thus a 
“melting pot” that unifies many different people for a common cause. 
b.  Discovering Ours and Others’ Personalities 
Not only the environment of the military is new to a conscript, but 
also it might be the first – and in some cases the only- time to be away from his 
family home.440 This will bring the soldier a new perspective of his personality: 
the psychological feeling of the self-sustained man who is able to cope with life 
and its difficulties without the help of his beloved ones. It is an actual and 
psychological feeling at the same time, that empowers the youngster and makes 
                                            
439 All soldiers are between 18-26, so having completed their school years; they are in time 
to have in a way formulated some kind of personality and individual views of the society. 
440 The family home might be the parents’ house or a married couples’ house. 
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him take a look at the world around him without prompts from his close relatives. 
The simultaneous awakening of all soldiers’ personalities helps in formulating 
strong friendships among them. These friendships or bonds often stay with them 
later on, as they would probably have many instances of coming together and 
thinking back on those “funny” and harsh military moments. It is said, too, that no 
bond is stronger than a shared hardship, if these soldiers are called to serve in 
war. 
c.  Tight Relations among Different People in Cases of 
Harsh Conditions 
Of course, the military is not only a social gathering for military 
training. It is mainly operations, missions, and sometimes even war. All these 
hard times help people create common experiences and strengthen their 
relationships. After coming out of the difficult conditions and back into civilian 
clothes, they would always have affection for the military and their “buddies” with 
whom they served, side-by-side. Dangerous situations always form connections 
between people that lived through these conditions together. Even outside of the 
military, there are a lot of known cases where people who have lived through life-
threatening situations gather regularly to meet each other and discuss not only 
their fearful experience, but other matters, too.441 
So, finally, we have seen why military is even more powerful “social 
glue” than the only other socially representative institutions, such as public 
school. But, finally how does this “social glue” works? 
                                            
441 Notable examples of successful peer-support programs include Oklahoma City following 
the Murrah Building bombing, New York City after 9/11, and Louisiana in the wake of hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita.(See: Daniel Fisher, Kay Rote, LaVerne Miller, David Romprey, and Beth Filson 
“From Relief to Recovery: Peer Support by Consumers Relieves the Traumas of Disasters and 
Recovery from Mental Illness,” Resource paper presented at the after the Crisis: Healing from 
Trauma after Disasters Meeting, April 24-25, 2006, Bethesda, MD, Updated July 2006. 
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C. THE “INTERCONNECTING MILITARY-SOCIETY” MODEL (IMS), OR 
“YOUNG BEES ON SOCIAL FLOWERS” 
To visualize all of the arguments stated above, we created the IMS model, 
which shows in general terms the interconnection achieved in a society through 
military conscription. This interconnection in turn is a basic element for the 
society to achieve its initial goal: the “horizontal” type of control of the military.  
As explained in Figure 5.1, horizontal control takes place inside the 
society-military environment. The Interconnecting Military-Society model (IMS), 
takes place in the core of society, and examines the connection of various 
socioeconomic groups with the military and vice-versa. Finally, it also shows 
some other relations created among socioeconomic groups due to military 





Figure 5.5. The Interconnecting Military Society (IMS) model, depicting the 


























































A brief explanation of the IMS model follows: 
1.  IMS Structure and Interpretation in the Case of a Draft Force 
First, we explain the symbols in the model: 
• Society circle: The double-broken circle represents all the people in 
the society, except for those who have a position of power in one of 
the three forms presented in Figure 5.1.442 Military and Society 
groups are included in the double-broken cyclical society line. The 
outer line of the block arrow heading out of the society circle 
represents the feedback by the society. This denotes the ideas/ 
perceptions of the whole society and not of any specific group. 
• Downward arrow towards the society circle: This arrow, also shown 
in Figure 5.1, represents the state’s legal and executive 
administration of the society, through established laws and 
procedures. 
• Upward block arrow (beginning in the society circle and pointing 
outwards): This is a feature of every democratic society, where the 
people give their feedback in various ways to those who govern. 
The ways that a society can interact with the authorities are many 
and, especially for the military issues, are previously described in 
paragraph A. This block arrow pointing up mainly represents the 
outcome of the “horizontal type” of control of the military. This 
control is not a direct-type control from the society groups to the 
military, but it is mainly an indirect demand from the authorities of 
the country. For example, if a large number of parents believe that 
their sons are mistreated as soldiers, they will not address their 
complaints to the military unit or to their son’s commander; rather, 
they would most likely address that problem to the political 
authorities using any available means. Again, they might protest, 
talk to the media, talk to politicians, make a lawsuit, or whatever 
else they might consider. Then, the political or legal authorities 
would react to their demand and correct any mishandling of the 
military personnel. As explained previously, this government 
reaction would come as a result of the volume of people reacting, 
or to the volume of publicity put on that issue443. So, we imply that 
authorities have in their mind the military issues. This is a very 
critical point to realize, as later on we demonstrate graphically why 
                                            
442 State, juridical, and executive powers. 
443 For those that have a color copy  of the model, the outer line of the downward green 
(administrative) arrow is red. With red we symbolize the feedback, ideas or even reaction for 
military issues. 
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one or more separate socioeconomic groups cannot perform the 
horizontal type of control and need all of society to achieve that. For 
example, if it ware true that this upward feedback (or horizontal 
control) arrow, was not one but many, each one connected to each 
socioeconomic group, then the substance of representation might 
lose its meaning. The reason is that, if every group and especially 
the lower ones, could address their military issues to the 
government, then the horizontal control of military would have been 
achieved directly from each socioeconomic group without the need 
for all social groups to react. In that way, even if some of the 
socioeconomic groups would not be represented in the military, the 
horizontal control would have been achieved by the rest of the 
groups. So, representation of all socioeconomic groups in the A.F. 
would not be obligatory for society to achieve the “horizontal” type 
of control over the military. But, evidently, this is not true. 
• Circles inside the society circle: In the society circle, we represent 
the various socioeconomic groups with different circles. The middle 
circle represents the military force of the country and represents 
those who come in contact with it. A potential objection on this part 
might be the separate representation of the A.F. as a “group” in the 
society. One might ask if the military is equal to the rest of the 
socioeconomic group circles in the society. The answer would be, 
of course not. The military, while not being a socioeconomic group 
in the society, forms a kind of a social group with several similarities 
to the socioeconomic ones. Some of these similarities between 
military and social groups stem from the fact that they are both 
ruled by the same state powers. Furthermore, the military corps is a 
self-sustained group, which especially in the case of a draft system, 
accepts, incorporates and, finally, returns back to the society, 
members from all the socioeconomic groups. Ultimately, the military 
is at the same hierarchical level with the rest of the society. The 
circles of the various socioeconomic groups represent the 
perception, ideas, and experiences of that distinct group. This 
specific circle follows the youngsters when they enter into the Army 
body. 
• Inner arrows between social groups and the military: As we can 
see, each socioeconomic group has two arrows connected to it: 
• The output arrow: This is the arrow that starts from each 
group and ends into the military circle. Its representation is 
the youth that go into the Army body as soldiers. The arrows 
symbolize the ideas, perceptions and generic characteristics 
of each socioeconomic group. The outer line of each input 
(to the military) arrow denotes the familiarity of youth with the 
A.F. before entering the corps. This happens in the case of a 
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draft system, as older men in the family would have already 
served and surely passed an idea - even an old fashioned 
one - of “how it is to serve” to the youngsters. So the outer 
line (military familiarity) of the output arrow, states also the 
smooth transition of youngsters from the socioeconomic 
group’s life-characteristics to the military’s middle-circle 
(military way of life, perceptions of the A.F.). 
• The input arrow: Is mainly the arrow that returns from the 
military to each socioeconomic group444. The military culture 
returns to each socioeconomic group through the ex-soldiers 
who have been “baptized” by that culture for a year (in the 
case of Greece). Now the society is “injected” with the 
army’s perspectives and culture, while before, the military 
was ‘injected” by each socioeconomic group’s culture. The 
medium for these “injections” was, of course, the youth who 
served in the conscript force. These youngsters could be 
characterized as the “culture bees” on “society-group” 
flowers. By giving and taking crucial substances (ideas, 
experiences) among the various social groups (including the 
military), they manage to fertilize the whole society and 
product a common social reaction/outcome, depicted by the 
outward from the society circle arrow (feedback/reaction by 
the whole society, regarding military issues). So now all 
socioeconomic groups and, in fact, all society members have 
some common memories or experiences. This is why 
connecting lines are now created among the various social 
groups. 
• The lines interconnecting the various socioeconomic groups: As we 
noted before, the common experiences among youngsters that 
have served create a common point of interest which can help them 
to be connected during their after-military life. Boys, who lived 
together for a period of time and shared some common moments, 
will probably continue to keep a friendship even though they might 
belong to different socioeconomic castes. This friendship or even 
acquaintance would have been very difficult to form if these people 
were not put in that same military pool.445 This interconnecting line 
between socioeconomic circles, is the bond which unifies society’s 
perceptions and beliefs for the military. This is the line that 
represents also another beneficial outcome for the society in 
                                            
444 For color copies, this has, as its outer line, a line the same color as the socioeconomic 
group that the soldier came from. Still, the larger inner part of the arrow is full of the red military 
color (military culture). 
445 The novel part that accompanies this project, will probably give a more viable picture of 
that relation. 
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general; it connects the socioeconomic groups under one theme, 
and not only for that (military) theme. Thus, it helps the society to 
move together, in the circle, towards the future and not leave any 
socioeconomic group behind or ahead.446 If we make the analogy 
of the society as a living body, the socioeconomic groups would be 
vital parts of the body; the central part (military) would be the heart 
and lungs, where blood comes in, is revitalized, and goes out; and 
finally the connecting lines would represent the veins that transfer 
the blood to the body’s vital parts. If one part is disconnected from 
the veins (circles interconnecting arrows), and stops receiving 
blood (common society culture), then this part will be rotten and, as 
a consequence, the whole body (society) will be unhealthy and 
unable to produce a common output (Red block arrow or Horizontal 
Control Arrow).  
As we have now concluded the presentation of the IMS model in the case 
of a draftee force, let us see what this model shows in the case of a Hellenic 
AVF, and what results come out of that model. Following is the depicted 
“reaction” of the IMS in that case: 
2. IMS Structure and Interpretation in the Case of an AVF 
In Greece, as we showed in the previous chapter, at least 40 percent of 
the educated and upper socioeconomic groups will not participate in the military, 
so what the above figure shows is analyzed in the following lines. The 








                                            
446 The block arrow at the bottom symbolizes the smooth and unified movement of the whole 





Figure 5.6. The Interconnecting Military Society (IMS) model, depicting the 
case of a potential Hellenic AVF. 
The same happens with the line which used to interconnect these elite 
















































around the “social-group flowers,” the society is not fertilized, which causes its 
outcome to be diminishing, disrupted and without containing any military issues. 
This is depicted by the upward feedback block arrow, which used to include 
military feedback to the state powers, and now has broken lines in it. By this, we 
mean that now that society does not have a common voice on military issues, 
elite groups are the most likely to make their voices heard to the authorities 
regarding any demand or feedback they might have, but not on military issues..  
Next, the downward towards the general society circle arrow 
(administrative authorities) breaks its relations with the military, as most of the 
authoritative members belong to the elite groups, which have not served in the 
military. That is why that arrow has a broken outer line (not carrying the actual 
military culture). 
Finally, a schism is created in the society between high and low 
socioeconomic groups, as they now lack common experiences, friendships, and 
possibly common goals that, in the occasion of a military draft, might be the 
sustainment of a viable and democratic military Force. This is the main reason 
that creates the gap between economic or governing elites and the military. This 
same gap for the U.S. is fully presented through various American and other 
authors. Still, as the IMS model implies, this is not a gap between military 
personnel and elites; it is mostly a gap among society groups, which can be 
defined differently for each country’s case.447 
One might ask “why do we want that horizontal control? It might be better 
if the society were not involved as a whole in military issues.” We try to answer 
this question below. 
 
                                            
447 In the Greek and most European countries, these separate social groups are defined by 
their socioeconomic status.  
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D.  DOES SOCIETY AS A WHOLE NEEDS TO HAVE A SAY IN MILITARY 
ISSUES? 
Who is going to guard the guards?448 
Plato (5th Century BCE) 
The same question might be put in many ways: “Does a society need to 
have a say in a major social group under arms?” or “Should a society have an 
opinion on who is going to be killed for defending it?” or even “Does a society 
have to control the corps, which under arms, carries its country’s flag to foreign 
territories?” 
Now that we have broken down the question, it is very easy to answer 
“yes”, to each part. As we have shown previously by the IMS model, the 
horizontal control of the military that we seek will not come if all socioeconomic 
groups are not proportionately represented in the military force.449 
Additionally, we could ask: “Do the various groups need the military to 
formulate a highly valuable goal?” Of course, this is a difficult question to answer, 
but in these days, we tend to value most our own personal goals, the military 
could serve as an institution that, apart from connecting the social groups, will 
also give a sense of a shared, highly-valued goal:  sustaining a strong army and 
defending the country. As noted previously, in the case of a draft, the army can 
also serve as the most powerful “social glue,” as a common ground for persons 
from all walks of life.450 
Finally, one might suggest that the military in total is representative even 
by maintaining an AVF, as officers dilute the unrepresentative society mix of the 
volunteers. This is true, as we have seen in Chapter III. The criteria (points) for 
                                            
448 This age-old question comes from Plato in his writings for the “Ideal Republic”. 
449 The volunteers force as we have shown - for Greece - is not going to be representative 
unless big changes happen to the whole society and military status.  
450 Apart from the school, which is in a way not as strong, a “social glue” as the military, as 
analyzed in the previous paragraph 4. 
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entering in a military academy are close to those needed for the most highly- 
valued universities where elite youngsters attempt to go. Nevertheless, this study 
is not examining the inner relations of the military (officers-soldiers, etc.), but 
rather society’s focus on the military in total. While the Greek military needs 
75,000 draftee soldiers every year, it only needs approximately 500 officers for its 
academies.451 As we understand, the social control of the military is achieved by 
the large numbers of relatives connected to the soldiers. The officers’ relatives, 
even if they come from middle and upper-socioeconomic groups, are not many. 
Furthermore, these relatives might not see the military from the perspective of a 
soldier. As a last comment, officers do not usually become civilians soon enough 
to be mingled again in the society as military veterans. 
In the IMS model, we find that horizontal control comes from the society in 
total, indirectly through the state’s authorities. It is neither an issue linking the 
military directly to authorities nor an issue linking society directly to military. Thus, 
politicians and other authoritative civilians should have both personal military 
experience and a unified feedback from society on military-related issues.  
The analysis of this chapter, along with the IMS model, focus on the 
“horizontal” control of the military by the society. This part of military control was 
created as a new factor for the MRM model that we used in the previous 
chapter.452 
The analysis of the present chapter shows clearly that a draft-type military 
ensures horizontal control of the military and, beyond that, an interrelation among 
many social groups. This outcome does not counter the proposed military type of 
Greece. What was proposed previously was a mixed Volunteer and conscripted  
 
 
                                            
451 See Evagelos Meimarakis, (2007), http://www.meimarakis.gr/press.asp?id=231. 
(accessed October 27, 2008); Hellenic Ministry of Public Education, 
http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_home.htm (accessed October 25, 2008). 
452 “Horizontal” control of the military might also be considered as a sub-factor to “Political 
Legitimacy”; one of the triangle sides (factors) of the MRM model. 
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force, which would also accomplish the demanded social representation in the 
military for its effective operation. Thus, the “horizontal” control analysis verifies 
the validity of our proposal on the semi-professional type of the Hellenic A.F.  
In effect, these two models (MRM and IMS) are not substitutes, but rather 
complements and they are both examining the issue of Social Representation of 
the Military Force in its whole. 
By concluding our analysis in this project, we would like to emphasize 
again its basic advantages and disadvantages, come from the same element: the 
length and the breadth of the subject of the Social Representation in a military 
force. The advantage comes from the fact that the project is not a “closed-
system” analysis, but an interconnecting analysis among social groups, 
institutions, traditions, perceptions, and many more. The deficiency of that project 
is that it might not have been deep enough on all of those issues. Nevertheless, 
even in that deficiency, we can find a bright side, which is the opportunity for 
future research. This is especially true for the IMS model, which was produced 
for this project; it needs a lot of testing and possibly amending to be validated for 
official use in the future. 
The innovation of this project comes in the second part, where a novel-
type story will build on the project’s data and validate our proposals through other 
types of lenses: those of sentimental logic and bare reality. We hope this novel-
part will be a great help to those teaching relevant topics, as they might do so by 
analyzing in class parts of the story that are based on experiential data and 
analysis. 
Finally, in the following brief chapter, we summarize the proposals 
developed in this project. 
 197
VI. PROPOSALS 
As we intend this part to be used as a quick memorandum of the project’s 
proposals, we present them again briefly, drawing heavily upon material 
discussed previously. 
A.  TYPE OF MILITARY STRUCTURE 
This project resulted in a proposed Military Structure of a semi-
professional Armed Forces. In other words, based on the present study, the 
preferred soldier’s base for the Hellenic military is a mixed one, with volunteers 
and conscripts. The ratio of the two different parts of the soldier’s base is not 
defined in this project. Nevertheless, we would suggest not reducing the number 
of conscripted soldiers, and, consequently, not changing the duration of 
conscripted service, without conducting further research. The reason for this is 
mostly political, as it would be difficult to reduce military-service and then 
increase it later. Politically, this would be a very difficult measure to pass to the 
society. 
We now give a brief “road-map” of how we reached this conclusion. First, 
we started with the analysis of the age group of those completing high-school 
and having to decide between joining the military or seeking further education 
followed by a civilian-type job. Then, we analyzed the factors affecting 
youngsters when they choose to enlist, and we found out that these factors were 
mostly socioeconomic. The next step was to refine the meaning of the 
socioeconomic factor, especially for the Greek situation. We came up with a 
rough equation between socioeconomic and economic status. We also 
discovered, through data analysis that at least 40 percent of the society, a large 
portion of the upper socioeconomic segment, would not participate in the military 
in the case of an AVF. Consequently, we concluded that an AVF in today’s 
Greece would not be representative of all the socioeconomic groups. 
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This was our first intermediate result on the project. At that point, we had a 
clue, but we did not have a tool, to measure its effects in the society and in the 
military force. That is where Eitelberg’s qualitative-type model (the MRM) came 
into place. First, before implementing the MRM model, which was created for 
U.S. society, we checked its validity for the Greek military and society. After a 
thorough analysis, we found out that the MRM model is also applicable to 
Greece. Next, we implemented the model for two different and quite distinct 
cases: a pure draft Soldiers Force, and the case of an All-Volunteer Force for the 
Hellenic military. 
In the first case, the model resulted in an inefficient army, due to the 
failure of operational factors and the breakage of the soldiers’ learning-curves. In 
effect, one of the three MRM factors, Military Effectiveness, failed in this total 
draftee force. So, we rejected that option. The second option we chose to test 
through the MRM is the AVF. This type of force structure failed in two MRM-
factors: Political Legitimacy and Social Equity. Thus, it was rejected, too.  
Finally, to find the preferred solution, we used the mathematical-logic tool 
of “Proof by contradiction”, which states that if we only have three solutions 
available and two are rejected, then the third solution should be accepted. Thus, 
we concluded that the semi-professional Military type is the one that best fits the 
Greek case. 
B.  SOCIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY 
As an additional outcome of the analysis conducted on this subject, we 
also proposed that the Hellenic Military should keep a very crucial element:  
Social Representation. Whatever the type of the military structure chosen, the 
military should keep the representation of all the active socioeconomic groups of 
the Greek society. 
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This proposal came as an outcome of the analysis of two parts. First, we 
analyzed the Political Legitimacy factor of the MRM model. This factor evidently 
failed when the structure of the military was unrepresentative of society. Second, 
we developed and analyzed the IMS model, which employed the concept of 
“horizontal” control. “Horizontal” control of the Military by society is absent when 
the military is unrepresentative of that society. 
The validity of this proposal became more evident by using the IMS 
model. This model was created for this specific project to discover a new aspect 
of the MRM model, or to be a supplemental tool for it. The IMS model indicates 
that social representation in the military can achieve three objectives at the same 
time: 
• Performs the “horizontal” type of control to the military by the 
society as a whole; 
• Makes those who have a type of state power knowledgeable and 
affected by military issues; and  most critically, 
• Creates the required interconnections among the social groups, to 
keep the society-body unified and viable. 
• A future study could examine the validity of the IMS model, and 
possibly incorporate it in the MRM model, to cover more aspects of 
the subject of Social Representation in the military. 
C.  WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY 
According to our analysis, women should only serve on a voluntary basis, 
having in parallel some valued benefits related to their future ability to be 
employed. These benefits might be educational or points-bonus for public-sector 
jobs.453 
                                            
453 Usually public-sector jobs in Greece are accepting new employees by using a point-
system in which, for every educational or experience characteristic of the candidate, a number of 
points is assigned. In the case of a women’s draft, an adequate point-bonus can be given for their 
service, which in effect will help them to come closer in qualifying for a public-sector job which 
they applied for. 
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Additionally, we propose that women serve for one year in total, (as do 
men), possibly divided into two semesters of service, to help women undertake 
that task if they volunteer to do so. 
Finally, we propose that, for better efficiency of that measure, the Ministry 
of Defense publicize the female positions required for the next semester, so that 
women would be able to choose a specific position and an area that suits them 
for a period of six or twelve months. In that way, women will be more eager to 
serve, knowing beforehand the area, the position, and the duration of the service 
that they will be assigned to complete. 
Furthermore, the Hellenic Military will be more efficient, as it will fill 
positions that are needed, knowing also beforehand the duration for which this 
position will be filled. 
We developed this proposal, by using logical questions, such as; 
• “Are the women capable of serving?”  
• “Do we need to conscript women?” 
• “Do any potential problems result from conscripting women?” 
• “What are the alternatives?” 
In all the above queries, we were fortunate enough to have specific 
research data from European and Greek sources. Thus, in the first question, we 
easily answered that women are perfectly capable of serving. Except for the 
historic references of Hellenic history, we have real data from the current 
situation, where women serve in all branches of the Hellenic military as officers, 
petty officers, and volunteer soldiers. From the analysis of their past and present 
service, along with some parallel research in the U.S., we concluded that women 




The next question might be answered in two ways, in a practical way as 
well as a theoretical manner. First, the practical answer: we need to conscript 
women to fill the gap created by fewer numbers of men eligible and willing to be 
conscripted. Next, the theoretical answer: women should also be represented in 
the military, so as to have a socially representative force. 
The counterarguments for the above answers refer basically to the facts 
arising from the problems created by women’s conscription. So, through survey 
data analysis, we showed that, by conscripting women, the problem of having 
fewer men eligible to serve is actually worsened, as the already low-birth rate 
would continue to drop when women are conscripted. Regarding women’s 
representation, we set in this project another option of measuring that aspect of 
representativeness; up until now, we considered the representation of the men 
and women separately. In this project, we suggested an alternative type of 
representation: family-core representation. If we consider the representation of all 
families in a society, it is no longer a matter of gender, but rather a matter of 
socioeconomic representation of the families in the society. So the families, in a 
way, elect to send their men (or women), as volunteers to defend their state and 
leave most women behind to bear and raise the new generation of the society. 
This, of course, is an old idea, upon which most historical armies were based. 
Evidently, it is against the contemporary individualistic society; still, it seems to 
be a quite evident argument. Women, compared with men, do not offer any 
distinct social characteristic other than a factor related to gender in the military. 
At the same time if an elite group is not participating, it surely poses a deficiency 
in social representation. Apart from this theoretical argument, Greece has a real 
problem of a low-birth rate, and it cannot bear to have obligatory service for 
women. Consequently, we propose a military service for women only in a 
voluntary basis.  
A main cause for the problem of low-birth rate is, as shown by official 
surveys, the financial issue and, more specifically, the lack of full-time jobs for 
women. This is the reason why we propose that military service for women be 
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accompanied with some employment benefits, which might be diplomas in 
specific areas (e.g., computer use), or even extra points when participating in 
public-sector exams.  
Finally, to make women’s military service easier, we suggest the option of 
serving for two semesters, instead of a continuous full year. With this proposal, 
we hope the problem of low men’s participation in the military draft will be 
alleviated without creating another potential problem for women and Greek 
society generally. 
D.  RESERVE FORCE IN THE HELLENIC MILITARY  
Even though we did not examine the specific subject of a Reserve Force 
in the Hellenic Military establishment, it became obvious at several points of this 
study that a well-organized reserve force should be established. Thus, we 
propose a further deep examination on the preferred future state of the Reserve 
Forces, in order for the military structure to be most effective in coping with its 
future needs. 
Three reasons led us to propose an extra focus on Reserve Forces. First, 
the moderate financial situation of Greece does not allow for big spending on 
preserving the number of soldiers required for defending the whole country. 
Thus, a large number of soldiers should be mobilized in case of a conflict or war. 
 Second, the strategic position of the country has historically created 
tensions and wars in the region. For the near future, there is no evidence that this 
situation might change. In effect, a relatively large number of soldiers are needed 
in case of a conflict. 
Third, the technology of the Hellenic Military systems has vastly evolved, 
following the general trends in Europe. As a result, the soldiers needed in a 
potentially dangerous situation should not only be many, nor only gathered 
quickly, but also be familiar with up-to-date equipment, weapons and modern 
strategies that are connected to the latest technology. 
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All these factors lead us to believe in the need of a modern restructuring of 
the Reserve Force, to achieve the maximum effectiveness of the Hellenic 
Military, when mobilized.  
E.  FURTHER RESEARCH POINTS 
As mentioned in the previous chapter and elsewhere, this project was 
broad enough to contain many factors embedded in Social Representation 
issues. As a result, some points were examined only superficially.  
So, we offer plenty of opportunities and related topics for a student or a 
researcher to examine in the future. 
For example, we propose the following topics for further research. 
• The socioeconomic structure of the Hellenic Armed Forces454 
• The precise ratio of volunteers and conscripts needed for an 
effective Hellenic military force. 
• The specific benefits that would be most attractive and helpful for 
potential female soldiers455 
• The number of reserves needed for the Hellenic A.F. 
• The implications or applications of the MRM in other countries. 
• Further validation of the IMS model and its connection with the 
MRM456. 
As we come to the end of this project, we hope that this work elevates our 
knowledge and understanding of a very sensitive sociological aspect of every 
military in the world: Social Representation in the Armed Forces. 
 
 
                                            
454 Like a relevant U.S. study, the one proposed above might use postal codes of military 
personnel to identify their socioeconomic status. This focus group can also be watched for a 
period of five to ten years, to identify if the initial status became higher or not. 
455 That research might also examine the proper period for women’s service, along with the 
proper position for them to serve. 
456 This type of research might also analyze further the theoretical and practical meaning of 
“horizontal” control of the A.F. by a society. 
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VII. NOVEL - “THE CHOICE” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This novel part is about the choice of a youngster to volunteer for the 
Hellenic Armed Forces (AF) or just wait to be conscripted and continue his 
civilian education and career, hoping for better results. This novel and all the 
characters are fiction; still, the story is based on facts coming from surveys and 
research. Basically, the novel’s characters are based on results that came after 
the scientific, first part of the project.  This second novel part adds coverage of 
the sentimental and other missed aspects of the first part. Furthermore, this part 
adds the innovation of teaching a sociological subject through a practical 
application. This method of teaching, apart from being interesting, triggers lively 
conversations, which is a pure gain for students and teachers alike. It might also 
be characterized as a progression of the case-study. 
The story takes place in Athens in 2008, in a suburb which is neither rich 
nor poor. We could say its habitants have average socioeconomic or economic 
conditions. The company of children in the school will represent socioeconomic 
levels not far above or below Greece’s average. As children mingle in the high 
school, we also see contradicting options and abilities that go with them as a 
result of their socioeconomic status. Later on, we follow them in the military, and 
some years after, in Hellenic society.  
To keep the novel short, as it is mainly designed for teaching purposes, 
we adhere to a technique of presenting and analyzing only certain critical 
moments of protagonists’ lives. We call this technique, “snapshot” story. As it is 
physical, this novel could be greatly amended; and, in fact, this would be a 
positive side-effect of that innovative author's attempt. 
More specifically now, we present the initial protagonists of that novel in 
rough form: 
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JOHN: Seventeen years old, brown hair, black eyes, moderate height and 
quite a good-looking boy; very pleasant in his company and ambitious enough to 
try for the better. Moderate achievements in high school grades, but quite 
successful in subjects that require mathematical logic. His close friend is Alex, 
and last year he had his first girlfriend, Vivian. John’s parents are called Kostas 
and Evi. They are both working in moderately paid jobs in the private sector. 
Even though the family gets two salaries, their economic status is medium to low. 
His parents are both high-school graduates, without any higher university 
education. So, we would position them to medium-to-low socioeconomic status. 
John is the sole child of the family. 
ALEX: Seventeen years old, blond hair and blue eyes, average height and 
in general a good-looking boy; very clever and successful in his studies; a top 
student with great academic achievements. Alex is not very social; still, his 
friendship with John is close. Shortly after starting the final year of high school, 
he found a girlfriend called Mary. Mary is a distant cousin of his friend, John, and 
she is one year older than Alex.  Alex’s mother is called Irene and his father 
Neoklis. His father is fond of ancient names, and named his son after Alexander 
the Great. They are both highly educated, but only his father is working, as a 
high-ranking public servant in the Department of Justice. Alex’s mother is taking 
care of the household and his sister Eleni. Their income is quite high; in addition 
to the father’s high salary, Irene owns two apartments in Athens, which she rents. 
So they clearly belong to the high socioeconomic and economic status. 
VIVIAN: She is a good looking girl and John’s girlfriend. They met last 
year when they were sitting next to each other in a high school class. She is a 
good student,and her parents belong roughly to the middle socioeconomic group. 
Vivian is planning to study music after completing high school, as she loves 




MARY: She is John’s cousin and Alex’s girlfriend. Mary and Alex met at a 
school party and fell in love. She finished high-school last year, took part in 
University introductory exams, succeeded, and is now studying Political Science 
at Athens University. Her parents are rich and they belong to the high 
socioeconomic status of Greek society. 
NICHOLAS: He is a cadet in the Naval Military Academy. Nicholas is a 
neighbor of John, and successfully completed high-school three years ago. He is 
a good student and succeeded in the Naval Academy’s introductory exam with a 
high grade. His parents are well-educated, but of medium income. His father is a 
non-commissioned officer in the Air Force, and his mother has been working for 
15 years as an administrative clerk in a private company. Nicholas’s parents are 
close friends with John’s parents, as they live across the street, and the women, 
for the last four years, commute together in the morning as their jobs are close 
and they have the same working hours. 
B.  THE BOY’S FRIENDSHIP AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD  
Alex: Let’s take neighboring desks to be close to each other. 
John: Yes, why not? Do you remember last year when two teachers threw 
us out of the class for talking? It was fun! Still, my parents did not think so! 
Alex: Do you remember that we had a perfect day after that, going on a 
day trip by ourselves. It was the first time I took the train for such a long distance. 
John: have taken it many times with my parents; that are how I knew the 
route to that wonderful countryside.  
Teacher: You may be seated. Welcome to the final year of your high 
school studies. As you know, this is the most critical year for you if you want to 
take part in the introductory exams of public universities of Greece. The 
achievement of a University degree will lead you to a better-paying job and a 
better future in general. To do that, you have to study hard, much harder than IN 
your last two years. You do not have to employ private tutors: the knowledge you 
get from public schools is good enough to succeed in the University introductory 
exams.  
Alex: If I had not hired private math and literature teachers, I would not 
even make it to the final high school exams! 
John: I wish I could have a private tutor. I’ll ask my parents to hire a math 
tutor for me, at least for this final year. 
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Teacher: Not you again; Alex and John. I see you are stuck close again, 
just like the last two years. Try to be nicer this year and not talk to each other and 
disturb the class like you did last year. Especially you, John: your grades are not 
so good. You have to try harder. 
John: I know. I will do my best this year. 
Teacher: I hope so. Now let’s move to the first section of our book. 
John was finally enrolled in a private tutoring class, which aided him in 
mathematics and literature studies, such as sociology and history. 
On the other hand, Alex had two private teachers coming to his house for 
the third year now, to teach him the five basic high school courses, along with the 
English language. This cost Alex’s parents nearly 600€ per month. 
This amount of money was close to John’s mother’s monthly salary. All 
these thoughts came to John’s mind while walking back home from his private 
tutoring class. “Am I worth this amount of money that my parents are spending 
right now for my private tutoring,” he thought. 
He was puzzled with the question that seemed to remain unanswered: 
“What next? What will be my next step if I do not succeed in the general exams? 
And he continued to whisper to himself…”the worst thing is that I do not have a 
solution, even if I do succeed and am accepted in a university!” 
He slowed his steps and took a small notebook out of his pocket. He does 
not remember how he got this habit, but for some years now, he has used a 
notebook to clarify his thoughts on paper, by making a list or a diagram or even a 
picture. 
He listed the expenses, as money was his big problem. The monthly 
income of the family was 2000€, and even though he was the only child, his 
family found it difficult to cope with the expenses. They lived in their own 




If he did not succeed this year, he would have to study again, without 
working, and take the university exams once more next year. The strange part 
was that, if he succeeded in entering a University, the expenses would be even 
greater: 
 
IF I DO NOT SUCCEED IN 
ENTERING A UNIVERSITY 
IF I SUCCEED IN ENTERING ANOTHER 
CITY’S UNIVERSITY 
PERSONAL EXPENSES: 500€ 
PRIVATE TUITION: 250€ 
 
RENT: 300€ 
PERSONAL EXPENSES: 500€ 
TRANSPORT AND OTHER BILLS: 400€ 
TOTAL: 1200€ 
PART TIME JOB: - 400€ 
TOTAL: 750€ TOTAL: 800€ 
 
John: “So, even if I work part time, expenses will be greater in a University 
out of Athens, and this will last at least 4 years! Things would be better if I could 
succeed in an Athenian University; but my past grades do not allow me to have 
such a hope. I could not possibly ask my parents to get an extra loan for me and 
for the following 4 years at least. This would be too much for them”. 
Even though John’s thoughts were blue, he had a happy feeling as it was 
Friday evening and a whole weekend was ahead. John and Alex had arranged to 
meet for a movie the next day. 
As he took his keys out to unlock the building’s central door, he heard a 
familiar voice from the other side of the road. He saw someone in a nice hat and 
a white shiny uniform, handling a small sword. It was the first time he had seen 
Nick, his neighbor, in uniform. Nick was three years older than John and he 
succeeded in entering the Naval Academy. His life had been harsh for the past 
three years, but next year, after graduating, he would be an officer on a ship, with 
great professional and occupational prospects. 
It was not that John had not thought of becoming a cadet and later on an 
officer. He had, but he also knew that Military Academies required acceptance 
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points as high  as the best universities of Athens. Still, he was determined to give 
it a try, as this would be the solution to not be a burden to his parents while 
studying, and until finding a steady job, too. Military Academies pay your salary 
and tuition, and more importantly, you have a secure job from the moment you 
graduate. 
“I need to study a lot for that,” John muttered to himself as he used to.   
Mrs. Georgia: Good evening John. Do you have your keys or you want 
me to open the door for you? 
John Hello, Mrs. Georgia. No, I have my keys, I was just thinking of 
something. Please, after you. 
Mrs. Georgia:  Thank you, John. Please say hello to your mother. 
John: Of course, good night Mrs. Georgia. 
John was always puzzled with Mrs. Georgia and her husband. He always 
thought that a married couple should have children. They are both close to 40 
and they have been married for 10 years now, and they still have no children. 
John was listening to his parents talking about that a few times. His father said 
that these kinds of couples make the birthrate to drop …” and then the Minister of 
Defense asks for more soldiers! How can we find them Mr. Minister? Since 
women are not willing to bear children any more and they are thinking only of 
their career?” as he said. 
His mother, on the other hand, supports Mrs. Georgia, as she says that 
she was unemployed or she at best did not have a stable job for the first five 
years of their marriage. When they recently tried to have a baby they discovered 
that artificial insemination, which again is a great expense, so now they are 
getting a loan for that. 
John, not being quite sure if Mrs. Georgia and her husband did the right 
thing or not, abandoned these thoughts, unlocked his apartment door, and 
rushed into the living room to watch his favorite TV serial.  
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C.  THE STATUS 
John looked at the paper he was given by his school director skeptically. 
He had to fill in his choices for the upcoming general exams in high school. 
Should he choose to be a lawyer or even a doctor? He was imagining 
himself wearing the white, typical doctor-robe and walking quickly in the 
hospital’s corridor, handling the case of a patient who needs an operation.  
When he lowered his gaze to his desk, his dreaming stopped abruptly at 
the sight of his past quarter grades. Even if he was to do great in the final exams, 
his past marks did not allow him to dream as they were pretty moderate. He 
knew well that only the top students could succeed in getting into Medical or Law 
Universities. 
He decided to call his best friend, Alex. John knew that Alex would go for 
Computer Engineering. He was a good student, and his ambitions, along with 
those of his parents, were high. 
John: Hi Alex. It’s John. 
Alex: John, I was going to call you right now. Have you completed the 
forms they gave us? 
John: No, I called you for the same reason. To tell you the truth, there is 
no meaning for me, and you know my grades. What about you? 
Alex: I will put as first choice the Computer Engineering School, and, 
second, I will probably pick Social Studies. Hey, why don’t you pick a university 
that you like outside of Athens? You can be accepted with lower grades there! 
John: I have thought of that, but I can’t see how this is possible; my 
parents are not wealthy, as you know, and I would need to rent an apartment in 
another city. They can’t afford it.  
Alex: One time when I was at your house your father was talking about 
military volunteers. I know you like it. I got sick of us playing your favorite martial 
video game! 
John: That’s a possible option for me. What do you think? 
Alex: I think it is made for you. Military nowadays is “in,” although my 
father never liked it. He always used to say that militants in 1967 organized a 
coup d’état and destroyed the country’s democracy, while at the same time he 
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boasts that he served 24 months back in 1977, after the dictatorship had 
collapsed. 
John: Yes, but now he does not want you to go to serve. I remember,; the 
other time he was telling me some tricks, through which he would try to help you 
avoiding serving! 
Alex: I know. All parents are contradictory sometimes, aren’t they? I have 
to go now, my private math teacher came, and I am not prepared for the lesson. 
See you tomorrow. 
John: “See you’.  
John would not need Alex to realize that being a volunteer is a solution for 
his situation. He grabbed his personal notebook again and wrote: 
 
A) Not good grades 
B) Poor economic condition of the family 
C) No future economic family prospects 
D) No highly educated parents to force him 
 
But why does it have to be that way? He then drew arrows for each of the 
sentences he wrote. At the same time, he thought that if there were a class that 
included writing in small notebook, he would certainly be an expert! 
 
A)   Not good grades 
 
• If I had good grades I would convince my parents to give it a try for 
something bigger. 
• I know they would listen 
• At least they would let me make a try for a short period and if I could 
not make it, I would still have the choice of Volunteering for the 
military 
• With good grades I could also go to a Military Academy. I would not 
bother my parents financially and I would have a steady career and a 
good salary – like Nick. 
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John heard Nick’s mother while talking to his mother, saying that she is 
relieved that she and her husband do not have to pay a fortune to educate Nick 
and still he is well educated with a career in front of him. 
“To be honest, Nick tried hard and his grades were not top, but still better 
than mine” John whispered to himself. 
Looking again at his notes he wrote in capital letters: 
• GOOD GRADES: MANY ALTERNATIVES, VOLUNTEER MILITARY = 
AN OPTION 
• BAD GRADES: FEW ALTERNATIVES, VOLUNTEER = ONLY REAL 
OPTION 
And he continued his melancholy thoughts by examining the second 
reason that forced him to consider being a volunteer. 
 
B)   Poor family economic condition 
 
John thought to himself: “It will be a great burden for my family to sustain 
me financially for 4 years while attending university, 1-2 years until I find a good 
job, and not to mention the 1 year I would go anyway in the military as a 
conscript! TOTAL: 6-7 years. That’s a lot for them”. He continued writing: 
• My parents’ jobs in the private sector are risky; the same would be 
the case for my potential future private job. 
• Future in general seems uncertain in the labor market. 
• Unemployment rate is high; so, even if I get a degree, it is difficult to 
find a good job. 
• It is not only that my parents do not have much money: their pension 
is at risk. So if I need their help after some 10 years (let’s say to 
marry), they would not be able to assist me. 
• On the positive side, at least they at present have medical coverage, 
not for any “difficult” disease, but for the usual stuff. 
• Another positive argument would be to go for the public sector, after 
getting a university diploma. But this sounds difficult, too. 
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When John saw again his notes, he laughed at the comment he made 
about marriage. He was 17 by that time, adding 10 years would make him 27. 
“That is not too late to be married”, he thought. 
“Still it is about one more lifetime for me”. But again, he remembered other 
men from his neighborhood who were married well above 30. 
“If I try to go to university and then the draft, I guess my first standard 
salary-payment will come,” he browsed his notebook pages “…aha…in…7 
years!” Silence. 
“Then we’re talking about 10 more years to afford a household, loans, and 
even kids!” 
This was a characteristic of John that made him special compared with the 
rest of kids his age. He was very mature in thinking of his every future step; or 
maybe he just had to be mature. 
It was already late at night, and John was making his future plans. He felt 
sleepy, but on the other hand he did not want to leave his thoughts incomplete. 
He grabbed his pencil: 
 
C)  No future economic prospects 
 
John argued to himself : “I know that if my parents were at the same 
salary level, but had a prospect for better days in the future they would force me 
to study and go to a university. I believe that because...”, and he wrote: 
 
• They care for my well-being 
• They cannot hope for a general improvement in employees’ 
income; they should have specific reasons to believe that they 
will afford to sustain me while at university 
• If they could, my parents would wish the family to be elevated 
financially and educationally through my potential university-
enabled job 
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“I can put myself in their position: they are not sure about themselves; they 
cannot force me into an unsure option of attending university. Imagine then, if 
they run into bad luck, maybe lose their job, or perhaps some medical matter or 
something else serious that could require me to drop my studies. What then? I 
would have to look for any possible job, and, worst of all, lose the opportunity to 
volunteer, as I will probably be older than the maximum age that is allowed for 
applying,” he thought. 
Then, John thought of his last reason that pushed him toward the choice 
of volunteering for the Military: 
 
D)  Not high family education 
 
“I can clearly understand that, if my parents were university educated, they 
would advise me to follow their model.” 
 
• Usually parents wish their kids to do better than them 
• They would appreciate the education as a means of culture and not 
only as a “weapon” for gaining money in a job 
• Maybe they could also help me to get better marks in school or even 
arrange private tutors in classes that I needed help 
• On the other hand, I recognize that if I do not succeed in university 
introductive exams, they would probably force me to be a volunteer. 
Still, it would not be their first choice nor mine! 
 
“What is my boy doing up so late at night?” whispered his mother while 
pushing John’s door open. 
“Nothing mom. Just keeping some notes for tomorrow’s classes;” he said, 
closing his small note book and nervously arranging his stuff on the desk. 
A goodnight kiss from his mother dispersed his thoughts and helped him 
fall asleep peacefully. 
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D.  THE PARTY 
The last year of high school is close to an end and the students are 
preparing for their favorite part of the year: the graduation party. This will take 
place in a big restaurant of the neighborhood, with a DJ and plenty of drinks. All 
students are eager for that party and are happy to help arrange the last details. 
John (on the phone): Alex, is your girlfriend, Mary, coming to the party? 
Alex: How could she miss such a night? She has already talked to your 
girlfriend, Vivian, and they are trying to find out what they will wear. How about 
you?  Will you wear a tie? 
John: No, you know that I am sporty guy. Are all four of us going 
together? What do you think? 
Alex: Yes, why not? I will ask for my father’s car and if he gives it to me, 
we could go for a ride after the party! 
John: Cool! 
As is the case with all pleasant things, time passes quickly. The 
graduation party was over and the two friends and their girlfriends found 
themselves sitting at the beach next to Alex’s father’s parked car.  
Mary: The May moon is said to be the brightest. 
Alex: It depends on the clearness of the atmosphere. 
Vivian: I drank so much that everything seems blurry to me now. 
John: Try not to show it when you get back to your house, as your 
parents will blame me for that. 
Vivian: Don’t worry. They’ll be sleeping, and I won’t see them until 
tomorrow morning. 
Mary: What are we all doing tomorrow? 
Alex: If you are asking me, I will be sleeping all day. 
Mary: I do not mean that, you fool. I mean what we are doing in our 
futures? 
John: The answer is easy for you, Mary, and for Alex, too: you will stay 
with your parents and finish University. After that, you will try to find a job and 
continue to stay with your parents; and then you will hopefully stop staying with 
them and get married! Vivian is also a good student, and her parents will help her 
to study music that she so much loves. Later, she will abandon me when she 
realizes I am not a university guy and I will probably be away, serving in the 
military. 
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Vivian: Do not talk nonsense. You know that I will not love you for your 
university degree, and I will patiently wait for you to finish your one year service 
in the army. 
Alex: Mary, will you wait for me to come back? 
Mary: If I do not find anything better to do!... OK, OK I’m teasing you! Of 
course I will wait. It’s only a year, and if your father arranges for you to serve 
near Athens, we will be seeing each other at least every week. Actually, now that 
they are talking about conscripting women, I would like to go. I would like to have 
military experience in my life, and I would love to know later on that I served my 
country for a period! 
Alex: Can you take my place? I will lose valuable time from finding a job. 
But now that I am thinking of you being conscripted, it would be a disaster. Our 
whole life will be set back more than a year. You would serve a year, and after 
that you would be looking for a job, God knows for how long. You might easily 
find a job during your last year of university, when you might get several options 
from your teachers and from other institutions.  
Mary: Ok, you are right. But if the service time was less for women and 
there were training in an area that I could use in a future job, I would seriously 
consider it. 
Vivian: I would not say the same. The military is not a good place for 
women. Only totalitarian nations conscript women as draftees. The history of 
civilized nations shows that women have raised children and kept their families 
while men fought. Not that women could not make it in the military, but it is the 
nature of woman to give birth and take care of her children. It’s just the natural 
way of things.  
Mary: You sound so conservative! 
Vivian: I do not say that women should not work. I merely suggest that 
women not be interrupted in their lives. Do you know that we will have fewer 
young people in our population by 2050 and double the proportion of old guys 
over sixty? 
John: Vivian, you have an artistic nature and cannot accept a military life. 
But let’s leave that and lie down to watch the full moon! 
The next day found John thinking about his service. Apart from probably 
being in a difficult financial situation during his potential future university studies, 
he was also required to serve a year as a conscript. He felt his life was like a car 




guys of his company had their gas tank half filled or even completely filled by 
their parents, so as to move for at least five to six years until they could find a job 
and pay for their own gas. 
John had a problem of finding gas for the next few years. His “personal 
consultant” was there. He grabbed his notebook and scribbled: 
Be a volunteer in ARMED FORCES 
+ (Positive) 
 Steady salary 
 Higher salary than the average 
job I would have in the private 
sector 
 No burden for my family 
 Full medical coverage 
 Good pension-if I live to get it! 
 Medical coverage for my 
parents 
- (Negative) 
 Difficult job 
 Probably stationed away from 
my relatives and friends 
 Vivian will leave me, for sure 
 Always follow orders from 
military high-ranking officers-
live in a strict environment 
 Go to operations abroad or   
wherever the politicians decide 
to send you.(Really, will they 
always be right?) 
 DO I HAVE TO KILL? 
 
At the last entry, John was stuck and was thinking of military movies that 
he had seen in the past. 
Closing his notebook, he thought the decision was much simpler: the 
Volunteer Army was the employer of last resort, or the “gas station” of last-resort! 
Nevertheless, he decided to give a try on the general high-school exams which 
lead to public universities, and after that he would make up his mind. 
E.  THE CHOICE 
It was of no big surprise to John when he spotted the general exam results 
posted outside the high school door:  
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Alex Papadatos: Succeeded in Computer Science Department – Athens 
University. 
Vivian Roussos: Succeeded in Arts School - University of Athens 
John Papadopoulos: Failed 
John could not tell what he exactly felt. On the one side, he felt 
disappointed; at the same time he felt oddly relieved. He felt free now, since he 
would not have to make a difficult choice. Since he did not succeed in entering in 
a university, volunteering for the Armed Forces seemed a one-way road. 
Alex ran toward the school door, but before starting to read the results, 
John hugged him and congratulated him for his success. Alex started cheering 
with his hands up. After a minute, he learned about John’s failure. 
Alex: It does not matter John. You will make it next year when you will be 
better prepared. You will come to my university, and we will be together again 
soon enough. 
John: I wish I could dream that. I do not think that I will give it a second 
try. 
Immediately after, John was on the phone with Vivian. 
John: (talking on the phone):  Vivian, good news! 
Vivian: Tell me that the results came out!. 
John: You will be studying Arts in Athens, your first choice! 
Congratulations, my love! 
Vivian answered back after a small pause, a loud cry, and a five minute 
hug with her parents! 
Vivian: Thank you, I love you! Tell me the good news for you, too! 
John: Unfortunately, I can’t. I will have to make my choice shortly.”   
The conversation went on for a long time, but John’s mind was stuck on 
how to find “gas” for moving his “vehicle” into the future. 
As always, John’s family stayed for a while after dinner to discuss any 
news or issues they might have. Kostas, John’s father, began: 
Kostas: John, we know that you did your best for these exams. Forget 
them now and you can do better next year. We will try to get you a private 
teacher to prepare you. 
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As John was hearing his father’s words, he realized at the same time that 
his father was as puzzled as he, and that he knew that John’s future would be 
insecure if he chose to go on trying for university studies. Not only that, John 
would put all his family at risk if one of his parents were fired and they had to 
obtain a loan for John’s studies. Recently, he had heard on the TV news that the 
unemployment rate was steady, a little below 10 percent, and youth’s opinion, all 
around Europe, was that the unemployment rate in the future would worsen. 
John did not know if his parents did it on purpose or not, but he saw daily 
newspapers lying on the living room table with bold headlines: 
“2000 positions in the Navy for volunteers. This September is the 
deadline for applications”.   
Without reading the rest of the article, John made up his mind: “I will be a 
Volunteer,” he thought to himself. 
The following week, a month before the deadline, John and his father 
entered the recruiting office of the Navy. 
The posting on the wall was clear: “Applicants should be between 17 
and 26 years old, over 1,60 m height and with a high-school diploma. They 
will all go through medical and physical exams along with an interview.” 
Evidently, John had these minimum requirements, and his father 
completed an application form for him. 
Kostas (father): Good luck my boy. I have a feeling that you will be 
accepted. They will hire more that 2,000 volunteers. 
John: Yes, but do not forget that every time up to now, there were 2 to 5 
times more applicants than positions. 
Kostas: Still, I have a good feeling. 
John knew that his choice was made by considering the whole family and 
not himself only. If conditions were different, he would like to give himself another 
chance for succeeding in university introductory exams. Of course, the fact that 
society appreciated the Hellenic Armed Forces was a determining factor for 
John. Several times, he had read surveys in papers where that appreciation 
touched the 90 percent level. Maybe the fact that he would have a decent and  
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appreciated job by society was the final nudge toward his decision to enter 
volunteer force. At least society and politicians kept a close watch on the Armed 
Forces so he would feel more secure. 
Finally, he also liked the uniform. His neighbor, Nicholas, was his idol for 
that. He always looked sharp in his navy uniform. 
F.  INSIDE THE MILITARY 
(Alex and John sitting in a neighborhood cafeteria):  
Alex: I do not believe that a year after graduating from high school, our 
lives have changed so much. I am studying Computer Science in Athens 
University; you are enlisted in the Armed Forces, my girlfriend Mary got a part-
time job using her partially-completed university studies; and, unfortunately, you 
broke up with Vivian. 
John (after drinking his coffee): It is like playing a movie in fast forward! 
From the time that my mother picked up the phone last September, and I heard 
her cry out: You have been accepted in the Navy”, I cannot manage my time. It 
took me only a week to get ready and be present in the recruiting center. After 
that, three months of intense training and only two months ago my first position 
on a fast patrol boat as a mechanic! 
Alex: How did you learn about mechanical stuff? 
John: I did not! Just some basic training! The big training is on the job! 
Alex: At least you should be happy to serve and get paid for that. In four 
years if you do not like it you could leave. Think of my case; I will serve for one 
year as a conscript, they will position me anywhere they like, without getting paid, 
and on top of that, postponing for at least one year my job quest. 
John: I have thought of that; that is why I enlisted. Especially for me to 
wait five to six years without an income would be out of the question. 
After returning to his house, John could not avoid thinking about all the 
things that had happened to his new life. His feelings were mingled; he felt happy 
for the evident smiles of his parents, anybody could see that they were feeling 
more relaxed. He also felt unhappy for his girlfriend, Vivian, who left him as she 




when John was on training or operational trips. Additionally, he felt sure for 
himself, but still disappointed that he was away from his friend, Alex, and the rest 
of the company.  
After that he questioned himself: “What Alex said was weird. Really, why 
are we getting paid, while draftees are not? Finally, we do approximately the 
same job!” Even in his new life, John kept his notebook-habit, for resolving 
difficult quests. 
 
WHAT A VOLUNTEER HAS TO 
OFFER TO THE MILITARY 
 Service of at least 4 years in a 
military unit 
 Experienced worker, able to 
use high-tech equipment, after 
a while 
 Add efficiency in military drills 
as after a period of repeating 
procedures and drill the time 
needed to perform a task 
drops to the minimum 
 The chain of command is 
stronger, because volunteers 
understand and are embedded 
better in the military hierarchy 
as they are professionals 
 They participate in operations 
abroad, where danger is 
sometimes present. 
WHAT A CONSCRIPT HAS TO 
OFFER TO THE MILITARY 
 Service of 1 year - usually 
broken down to one semester 
at each one of two military 
positions 
 Little expenses for the state 
 In total, conscripts cover the 
mobilization factor of the A.F. 
in the short term (the forces 
needed at present), and the 
long-term (the forces needed 
in case of a war or major 
conflict) 
 They represent the society in 
the army, bringing with them a 
civilian “air” and ideas 
 As a result, they bring the 
focus of the society on the A.F. 
and help towards the logical 
use of army and the 
improvement of military life-
conditions. 
 
When John realized that it was past 1 am, he preferred to go to sleep, as 
he had to get up in just 5 hours to go to his ship. 
The military life for him was very harsh, especially in the beginning; but, as 
the months went by, he made good friends with the rest of the volunteers. There 
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were no conscripted sailors on his ship, as was the case for most of the ships, 
which were manned only with volunteers, officers, and petty officers. The 
relations on the ship were quite warm, and as he was learning his job as a 
mechanic, he felt even better. All the rest of the volunteers were boys and girls 
from cities with high unemployment rates, and their family financial situations 
were even worse than his. None of them had a university diploma, but they were 
well-suited for the job, as it was not science, and by doing the same things all the 
time, one finally learns to do it right.  
There were not a few times that Nicholas, as an Ensign now, visited 
John’s ship at port and asked him if he was doing okay. John knew that his 
mother asked Nicholas’ mother for that favor. 
John had also good relations with the conscripted soldiers who served on 
the military base where his ship was docked. Sailors were from all around 
Greece. There were some poor guys and some rich guys; there were some 
illiterate men and some others with a graduate degree; there were some farmers 
and some others from big cities. 
His friendship with some of them helped him to happily pass his free time 
during his duty days. You could learn everything about Greece if you stick to the 
sailors’ company, as John used to say. Fights were also a humorous incident for 
that strongly mingled conscript company. There were not few times when Peter, 
a guy from a poor family, would argue that the system is unjust and although he 
wanted to study and become someone, although his family’s financial situation 
would not allow that. Another guy, George, who came from a rich family, was 
telling him that he did not study enough and did not have good enough grades to 
make his dream come true. 
In any case, all these conversations and arguments were very amusing. 
Sometimes officers would participate in these small conscript “parliaments” and 
have fun with them, but also listen to their problems. 
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Once, John’s friendship with one sailor who in his civilian life had a 
Master’s degree in Mechanical Engineering enormously helped his ship. After 
calling his friend to repair a major fault in one engine that nobody knew how to 
fix, the friend repaired it, and in a few hours the engine was operating again. 
Even the Captain of the ship called the sailor, along with John, to thank them.  
There was another incident, when John once again greatly appreciated 
the help given by the conscripts. I should remember to tell it to Alex. Next time he 
will argue that only volunteers should serve. And he continued his monologue: 
Since we defend the country from our enemies, why should I take on the burden 
of those who do not want to enlist? Why should I sacrifice myself for Alex’s 
family, when Alex himself does not care for their safety and prefers to seek his 
personal goals? He had little to do with Alex, but John was trying to counter him, 
as most of the time Alex was telling John that after the four years’ postponement 
of his conscript service, he would try to avoid conscripting in any way he could. 
His argument was mainly that he would lose critical time from his employment 
“hunting” period; and, furthermore, volunteers are paid to do military service. 
Another of Alex’s arguments was that police do not require conscripts: they do 
their job with volunteers, so why cannot the military do the same? 
John remembered all these arguments and got furious. He decided to fight 
back with the help of his secret weapon: his notebook, of course. 
He put down three main factors that should be accomplished through the 





























































































III. Social Equity 
 
Finally, he thought of something he heard on the radio recently: The 
number of children of Greece is declining, and the ratio of those entering 
universities is increasing. So, the available pool for picking volunteers will be 
less, as no volunteer up to now has a university diploma. Apart from that, he 
thought of the potential scenario of positive expectations on the economic future, 
in Greece or in Europe. Who would volunteer then? “Surely not me”, he thought.  
G.  THE CONSCRIPT SOLDIER 
Finally, Alex could not avoid it, and, after completing his university studies, 
he was called to serve in the Navy as a sailor for a period of one year. 
His father tried to find “loopholes” in the conscription laws to avoid service 
by his son, but he failed. The Hellenic constitution was clear, anyway: ”All Greek-
origin youngsters, capable of bearing arms should participate in the Hellenic 
Armed Forces.” 
Neither Alex, nor his father, would like Alex to be characterized as 
incapable or a conscientious objector, as this “title” would follow him in the rest of 
































Now Alex was counting on John for making him more familiar with the 
military life. 
Alex: (talking on the cell phone) You know, John, this is the first time 
that I have left my home for more than a week. The initial conscript training will 
last more than a month. Still, my parents will be able to visit me next week. 
John: Do you miss home? 
Alex: At first, greatly. Now my feelings are mixed. I see another side of 
life. I got to know the rest of the conscripts, and we are talking a lot. We make up 
a good group. Some of them come from places in Greece that I did not know 
existed. This is fun! 
John: How do officers treat you? 
Alex: They are quite good. We do not have any problems, except for a 
low-ranking one, a lieutenant, who is a very hot-tempered guy. He always yells at 
us. At first I was afraid; now, I know it is just his way and I am trying to avoid him. 
The interesting thing here is that there are some volunteers, like you, who have 
only two years in the force, and they order us around, like officers! 
John: Imagine me being there, I would yell orders at you. 
Alex: I would jump on you and fight as we did in the school! Anyway, I am 
kind of relaxed as time goes by. To tell you the truth, I was a little afraid of 
military life before getting to know it. Now that I am living in that environment, I do 
not think that I should have been so worried. 
John: Your mother is still worried, though, isn’t she?  
Alex: You bet she is! I am trying to convince her that I am all right. 
John: Now, have you changed your mind, about the necessity for 
conscription, or do you still believe that only volunteers should serve? 
Alex: Not yet. I still believe that the volunteer army would be more 
effective. Take me as an example: I am undergoing a month’s “freshmen” 
training. Later on I will be in a unit for five months, and after that for six months in 
another remote unit, including one month of regular leave. What am I supposed 
to learn during that period? And even if I learn something, I will not have time to 
offer it back to my unit. On the other hand, volunteers like you, have more time to 
offer and practice their knowledge on military issues. You became a ship-
mechanic, without knowing anything at first, and now as you tell me, you feel that 
you can handle any situation. Not to mention also that officers are mostly based 
on volunteers to do their job. Only the high-ranking ones make speeches for the 
need for conscript soldiers! 
John: You might be right about the effectiveness, but what about the 
legitimate issues of serving your country? What about the equity, especially in 
case of war? Do not tell me that you believe that war is out of the question for  
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Greece. Every now and then we have a broader type conflict, and apart from 
that, our history is full of battles. Imagine the mobilization needed in the case of a 
war. Will a volunteer army be adequate to defend our country? 
Alex: “OK, a volunteer military would not be enough in that case; but, 
then, I would not object to being conscripted and participating.” 
John: You are saying that now, but remember what you said before being 
conscripted. You were trying to avoid it even in a peace-time situation. Would 
you have the courage to serve when a war is imminent? At least now, as you 
said, you have an idea how to move and survive in the military life; later on, it 
would be easier for you to rejoin army, in case of a war. 
Alex: I do not know for the future, but now I have to go to my shift, as a 
good gate-guard. We will talk tomorrow. Bye. 
John: Bye, freshman! 
In a way, the two friends were helping each other live military reality. The 
ideas and perceptions exchanged between them helped them rationalize some 
military irrationalities.  
While John had a steady position on the same ship for the fourth year, 
Alex was close to the end of his conscript service. 
Alex (discussing on the cell phone) I have just one month more, my 
friend. Then I will take 30-days leave, and that’s the end of my military uniform. 
At last! 
John: Have you thought of becoming a volunteer later on? 
Alex: Don’t joke with me, my friend! I do not see the time to go on with my 
life. What about you? Have you thought of becoming again a civilian? 
John: I do not feel different than a civilian. I see this as my job and every 
year that goes by I feel surer for that. Now I am the most experienced mechanic 
on the ship, as I have been longer than anyone else. I feel also more secure 
financially. The salary is not so high, and I could possibly find a job in the private 
sector that would pay more, but the stability of the military job is precious for me. 
My parents cannot sustain me if I were unemployed for long. And it’s not only 
that. Do you remember the difficult operation that my mother had to undergo? 
The Navy paid for the whole thing, and it cost 15000€. For you to understand it 
better, this is close to the annual income of my dad! 
Alex: I know, John. This job is a safe port for you. Ah! And not to forget 
that your job had another positive side-effect! 
John: What? 
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Alex: Do you remember Rita? She was in the first year of high school 
when we graduated. 
John: Yes, what about her? 
Alex: She called me at the Facebook yesterday to chat, and she told me 
that she saw you last week in your uniform and really liked you! She asked me if I 
have your e-mail address. 
John: …and have you given it to her? 
Alex:  Of course not. I do not like to distract you from your lonely military 
life! 
John: I will kill you! 
Alex: OK, I am joking. She will e-mail you. 
John: I buy the beers next time! 
Alex: Next time, beers are on me, as hopefully I will be a wealthy civilian 
again. 
John: Come on Alex, you were always so negative about conscription and 
military; now that you are leaving it, did not you find anything good or interesting? 
Alex: I do not really know if there is a positive side. I would say it was a 
very dynamic experience that formulated my personality in a way. Meeting the 
diverse people that make up the Navy might not have been possible in any other 
setting, and I might never have this opportunity again. I ran into illiterate 
shepherds and university professors, from the very poor to the extremely rich. I 
liked learning how they see life. You can see some of them in my Facebook 
profile. We became friends and exchanged contact info to meet later on. A guy 
called Tony has a small cottage in Macedonia, Thessalonica, and he invited me 
to go there when we are both out of the Navy. You can join us if you want. 
John: Yes, why not? At last you found something positive in your service. 
Alex: I suggest you do not ask my girlfriend Mary about that. She is 
furious with my six-month absence. I saw her only twice during that period. 
John: Yes, but imagine later on; you might have to see her everyday if 
you get married. That might be worse! 
Alex (laughing): You might be right! I am off now; I will go to my 1520th 
hour of duty as a gate-guard! 
John: At least, the positive side in being a volunteer is that you get to do 
more interesting things. Bye, good luck! 
Alex: Bye. 
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H.  THE INTERCONNECTION 
John would not believe that during his vacations he would get up at six o’ 
clock in the morning to watch the sun rising. 
Tony: John, what are you doing up that early? 
John: If I did not experience by myself this sunrise, here at your cottage in 
Thessalonica, I would not believe that the sunrise is not always the same. You 
know, this is my first big leave of 20 days since the time I enlisted in the Navy. I 
completed eight years on the same ship, and now I got a new cool position as a 
mechanic on a base near Athens. That means… 
Tony: I know what it means, my friend. I used to be a conscript in the 
Navy with your friend, Alex, don’t you remember? It means that you will have no 
trips and except for the duty days, you will be sleeping at your house every night 
with your sweetie! Now that I mentioned, is Rita still sleeping? I hope she likes it 
here. It is the first time you brought her with you. I was getting bored seeing you 
alone, and Alex with his girlfriend Mary. 
John: I know, Rita couldn’t get leave easily. You know how private sector 
jobs are, and imagine she works full shifts for 900€ per month. But there is a 
reason we are here together. It is all part of the plan. 
Tony: What plan? 
Alex: Will you let anyone over here to sleep? What are you doing awake 
that early? Tony, are you doing your shift as in the old days? 
Tony: Yes, I am doing the 2 to 8 night shift, as you always got the best 
shift, by fixing the Commander’s computers! 
John: Ah! That’s why he was calling me to talk until late at night: he 
“offered” his shift to you, Tony! 
Alex: Ok, I admit it. I had better shifts than Tony; but wait a minute; you 
were discussing something else before, something about a plan. 
Tony: Yes. John, tell us about your secret plan. 
John: You will get to know shortly! But please do not spoil the moment, let 
us all watch the sun rising over that green valley. I imagine it like a golden-wing 
horse riding over the edge of the darkness, and light all the living creatures, 
awakening their minds and their hearts. 
Tony: I will bring coffee; John might write some poems for us today! 
The golden flying horses of sun gallop through the area of Tony’s ranch 
and continue on to more western areas. 
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Mary: It is the fifth time that you are hosting us here, Tony. But this time 
you surpassed even yourself in cooking. This pork with honey and plums was 
superb! 
Rita: I do not know about your past successes in cooking, but being my 
first time here, you really astonished me! 
Tony: I have my good days, but getting compliments from women is very 
encouraging! 
Mary: Do not say that. My job did not allow me the time to learn how to 
cook. 
Rita: Sorry to disappoint you, Tony, but me either. I am not an expert. The 
only reason I am still fed is that my mother cooks for me as we stay together. 
Tony: But, Rita, you do have a job, don’t you? 
John: And you think that private-type jobs are like the Navy. We are 
working the same hours and we both have only high-school diplomas; she gets 
300€ less than I do. If you do not get married, it is difficult to move out of your 
family’s house. 
After leaving the dining table, they moved to the spacious wooden 
decorated lounge. They all sat in big sofas around the lighted fireplace, holding 
their glasses of homemade wine. 
The conversation went on and on. Their diversity made the company 
eager to discuss all issues on which their opinions differed. The girls tried to stop 
their boyfriends when the military-centered discussions seemed unending. 
When John found a break in the discussion, he put his arm around Rita’s 
shoulders, raised his hand, and asked the company for a moment of attention. 
John: First of all, I would like to thank Tony for inviting us here once 
again, and for his always warm company. 
Alex: Yes, speech, speech! 
John: Cut it, Alex, I have more to say. I regard all of you as close friends 
and I would like to share a very personal moment with you tonight. As you know, 
Rita and I have been together for quite some time. 
Alex: Thanks to me and the Facebook. Don’t forget that! 
John: Yes Alex, I owe you that lucky moment of my life. So, Rita is 
pregnant! 
Rita (standing up): John, we said to discuss it first between us… 
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John: There is no need, Rita, I have made up my mind. 
His movements were nervous and evidenced his intentions. The company 
watched him kneel in front of Rita and take out a small box from his inside jacket 
pocket. 
John: Rita, will you be my wife? 
Nobody really heard any answer. Rita was laughing and crying at the 
same time, hanging onto John like a treasure, while the rest of the company was 
clapping and yelling with happiness. 
After some hours of celebrating, the men were left alone in the lounge. 
Tony: Sorry guys, this is the last champagne I have. 
Alex: Don’t you think that five is enough? John is going to be married and 
we will end up alcoholics! 
John: This was the best day of my life. You are real brothers to me. I want 
you to know that. 
Tony: Ok, brothers. Now, before John’s golden horses wake us up, go to 
sleep with your beautiful girls; they will be waiting for you. It’s been more than an 
hour that we have been drinking alone here. 
Alex: Goodnight, my friends. Do not wake me for the morning shift. 
John: Goodnight, I am going to my future wife! 
Tony: Goodnight, future father! 
I. THE INCIDENT 
Happiness glows on Rita’s face, while holding her two-year old son in her 
arms and showing pictures of her wedding to a girlfriend, sitting together in the 
sofa at John’s and Rita’s new home. 
Suzy (Rita’s friend): I am jealous of you, Rita. John seems to be a very 
good guy and you have a wonderful son. I am close to my 30s now, and I just got 
a job after finishing the university. 
Rita: They are not all so bright, Suzy. Thank God we all have our health, 
but this house was paid through a loan and the biggest part of my salary goes to 
the monthly payments. We live on John’s salary. 
Suzy: What should I say for myself? I did not even attempt to live alone by 
renting. I am still living with my parents. 
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Rita: Life is not easy, is it? Now, I will make the table and you will have 
dinner with us. John normally should have been here by now, but he must have 
been delayed with some extra work. Since he started working on the naval base, 
we are much better as most of the days he is free from duty and comes back to 
the house without having to be away on long trips. 
The phone rings, and Rita rushes to answer. 
As her friend Suzy observed Rita talking on the phone, a bad feeling came 
over her. Suzy did not realize how she found herself talking on the phone as Rita 
was standing speechless with her eyes staring straight ahead and no sign of 
emotion. On the other end of the line, a person who called himself the officer of 
the duty had to repeat to Rita’s friend Suzy that John was seriously injured while 
driving a truck with supplies on the Naval Base. 
As the two families and Rita’s girlfriend Suzy were waiting in the lobby of 
the Naval Hospital of Athens, a doctor in a white robe came out without no 
emotion on his face. 
Doctor: Are Mr. John Papadopoulos’ relatives here? Only John’s father 
had the courage to stand up.  All the rest were staring at the doctor, as if they 
were not there, but they were seeing a cinema-film instead.  
Kostas (John’s father): How is he? Will he get over it, doctor? 
Doctor: Mr. Papadopoulos, I am really sorry… 
The moments, the days, the weeks that followed, were a fierce sea for the 
two families and John’s friends. 
Alex (Talking on the phone with Tony): Tony, my whole perception of 
life changed after that incident. A piece of me is missing. 
Tony: Even though I got to know John after you did, I feel that we were 
together for a whole life. Did you learn how the accident happened? 
Alex: He was driving that damn truck. 
Tony: Do not tell me that it was the so-called “killer-truck? 
Alex: Yes, that was it. 
Tony: You remember once that I had an accident when driving that very 
truck on our base? The brakes did not operate at all, and then the engine surged. 
Fortunately, I rear-ended the truck ahead at a very low speed and I was not 
injured. These trucks are awful -- they should recall them. 
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Alex: Yes, I know. I remember your accident. What is incomprehensible is 
that the Navy does not give compensation to John’s family because the 
committee that investigated the accident concluded that it was John’s fault. 
Tony: No way! John’s father must appeal that to find the truth and even 
sue the Navy or the truck company for that. 
Alex: I told him the exact same thing, but he does not know the legal 
procedures and apart from that, he does not have the money to pay the lawyers 
for getting started with the trials. Besides, he is considering the probability of 
losing. Then, he would put his family and Rita in a worse condition, as they would 
be required to take a loan to pay the lawyers. 
Tony: Unfortunately, he is right, Alex. I suggest we try to help him, as an 
honor to our friend. After all we could have been in his position. These old trucks 
are killers.    
The two friends settled on a plan. They would use Alex’s father, who knew 
the legal system quite well, and a friend of Tony’s, who happened to be a local 
parliament representative. The first man would submit a type of suit, for which 
one does not have to pay any money, meanwhile the second man would submit 
a formal question in the parliament about that specific accident and other similar 
incidents involving that type of truck. The representative was convinced by his 
local voter, Tony, for two reasons. First, he also served in the Navy and could not 
imagine himself or his son, later on, being subject to that danger. Second, all his 
voters were ex-conscripts, and all military issues were of great concern to them. 
Alex’s father did not have to be convinced, as he was devastated by the loss of 
his son’s best friend.   
It took only three months for a second committee to change the conclusion 
of the first one: 
“The specific type of truck, due to its age and to design faults, is not 
considered safe for the Navy and should stop being used. Regarding the 
accident of the 27th of September of 2008, which caused the death of the 
Volunteer John Papadopoulos, it is our solid opinion that the driver had no 
responsibility for that.” 
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This official judgment gave a 100,000€ compensation to John’s family, 
and more than that, gave a feeling of closure to John’s family and friends. 
Alex and Tony were very pleased, as they offered a final honor for their 
lost friend, John. However, in fact, this was not exactly the final honor. 
J.  THE EPILOGUE 
Rita (sitting in the lounge couch, at Tony’s farm in Thessalonica, 
Macedonia):  I really needed this small trip. Three years now, after the incident, 
and I cannot pull myself together. At last, thanks to your help, I paid back the 
loan with those 100,000€ and I do not have to pay monthly loan payments. Still, 
life is difficult because now expenses are rising for John Jr. as he will start school 
this year. 
Tony (after lighting the fireplace): Rita, why do not come here to stay? 
You can work with me in the cottage and at the same time take the child to a very 
good private school that is only ten minutes from here. 
Rita: You do not mean that, do you? 
Tony: In fact no. I have something else in my mind that I do not have a 
way of expressing. 
Rita: If it is honest, I can take it. Go on! 
Tony: Rita, I loved your husband John as my best friend. I admired your 
relationship, too. Through this misfortune, I started to value you even more, and 
now I want to ask you something that you were asked in this same place five 
years ago. 
Rita opened her eyes widely with surprise, her heart beating like crazy.  
She was not able to think what was logical or right.  She just found her hand over 
Tony’s, and their eyes meeting with surprise and hope. 
Finally, the warmth of the fireplace died out, but the golden-wing horses 
were flying over them to warm up their new home. 
 
Dedicated to a cousin of mine who, during his conscript service, lost 
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APPENDIX A. A SYNOPSIS OF THE HELLENIC ARMED FORCES 
HISTORY457 
The constitution and maintenance of a well-trained army was always the 
goal for the Greeks. The deciding reason for that is the everlasting crucial 
geopolitical position of the Greek territory. In ancient Greece, (Athens, Sparta, 
Thebes, Macedonia of Philip and Alexander) the choice to create an army of free 
citizens with a common national conscience and ideas always existed. In the 
Byzantine years a paid system of soldiers was initially used. That system quickly 
presented big weaknesses;, so the government frequently took some measures 
to the direction of obligatory enlistment, with the parallel support to the institution 
of the “Akrites.” These were the people who lived in the frontier regions, and who 
would be the first to face any enemy invasion. As time went by, the utilization of 
paid military personnel for the needs of the Byzantine army was considered by 
many as one of the causes that weakened the Byzantine defensive system. 
Finally, that led to the fall of the Byzantine Empire. 
During the time of the National Revolution of 1821, the core of the military 
corps was constituted by armed teams that had been developed in the mountains 
of the country and fought the Ottoman Empire. While the Revolution was 
developing, Greeks realized that they had need of a regular army. As a result, in 
the year 1825, a partial obligatory enlistment was established; it used a lottery 
draw among a group of people (one soldier between the ages of 18 and 30 for 
every 150 residents).458 
 
                                            
457 Data derived from: National Military Conscription Agency, 16, 
http://www.stratologia.gr/enhmerwtika.htm (accessed November 10, 2008). 
458 In fact, that was one of the proposals by Professor C. Moskos, regarding a potential 
solution for the U.S. return to the Draft System. The same proposal was also supported by many 
other authors. 
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By the beginning of 1880, the system of catholic enlistment was 
established in Greece, with an obligation for all men to serve for three years. This 
system survives up to the present day, along with a voluntary branch of the 
Armed Forces. 
In 1958, Law 3850 was published, which created the first legal frame for 
conscription and also the provision for the three services of the armed forces 
(Army , Navy and Air force). Later on, Law 720/1970 and Law 1763/1988 defined 
all issues relevant to conscription. These two latter laws are still in effect with the 
amendments of Law 2510/97. Today, this legal base constitutes the regulative 
basis of conscription and Volunteer Corps in the Hellenic Armed Forces.  
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APPENDIX B. BRIEF HISTORY OF WOMEN SERVING IN THE 
HELLENIC ARMED FORCES459 
• In February 22, 1944, the “Company of Volunteer Women Force” is 
created in Cairo with 16 active members and 229 backup. 
• The first women in the Armed Forces appeared officially in 1946 
with their enlistment in the School of Nurses; after four years of 
training, they are named Lieutenants Junior Grade and they staff 
the Military Hospitals. 
• Law 705/77, “The enlistment of women,” is published in the 
Government’s Paper on September 19, 1977, which obliges all 
Greek women from the ages of 20 to 32 to enlist for duty in the 
Armed Forces in times of war or mobilization. The duration of the 
military service is 14 to 24 months. 
• In 1979, the first women are trained in the “Women Training 
Center” in Athens. 
• Ιn 1980, one group of University Educated Women is constituted 
from the volunteers with the purpose of creating members with the 
rank of Lieutenant Junior Grade. 
• In 1990, Law 1911 permits the entrance of women into the Military 
Academies. 
• In 1991, the first women who acquired degrees in the Military 
Medical Schools graduated. 
• According to Law 1407 of 1983, in a case of pregnancy, a year 
leave is granted to all military women personnel , regardless rank. 
• The changes of duty environment for women now mainly follow 
mainly the changes of duty environment of men.  
• How important it is for women to enlist in the Armed Forces is 
shown from the following examples: In 1994, for 81 women’s 
positions in the Hellenic Air Force, there were 8,667 candidates; in 
1990, for 250 women’s positions in the Hellenic Navy, there were 
2,000 candidates. 
 
                                            
459 Data derived from Ilias Kapetanakis, “Conscripting Women: An Evil or a Necessity? 
(2006), http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=el&u=http://library.techlink.gr/ptisi/article-
main.asp (accessed October 26, 2008). 
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APPENDIX C. THE GREEK EDUCATION SYSTEM460 
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Education in Greece is compulsory for all children 6-15 years old; namely, 
it includes Primary (Dimotiko) and Lower Secondary (Gymnasio) Education. The 
school life of the students, however, can start from the age of 2.5 years (pre-
school education) in institutions (private and public) called "Vrefonipiakoi Paidikoi 
Stathmi" (creches). In some Vrefonipiakoi Stathmoi there are also Nipiaka 
Tmimata (nursery classes) which operate along with the Nipiagogeia 
(kindergartens). 
Attendance at Primary Education (Dimotiko) lasts for six years, and 
children are admitted at the age of 6. Along with the regular kindergartens 
(Nipiagogeia) and the Dimotika, All-day primary schools are in operation, with an 
extended timetable and an enriched Curriculum. 
Post-compulsory Secondary Education, according to the reform of 1997, 
consists of two school types: Eniaia Lykeia (Unified Upper Secondary Schools) 
and the Technical Vocational Educational Schools (TEE). The duration of studies 
in Eniaia Lykeia (EL) is three years and two years (a' level) or three years (b' 
level) in the Technical Vocational Educational Schools (TEE). Mutual student 
transfer from one type of school to the other is possible. 
Along with the mainstream schools of Primary and Secondary Education, 
Special Nipagogeia (kindergartens), Dimotika, Gymnasia, Lykeia and upper 
secondary classes are in operation, which admit students with special 
educational needs. Musical, Ecclesiastical and Physical Education Gymnasia 
and Lykeia are also in operation.  
                                            
460 Greek Education System, http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_page1531.htm (accessed August 
10, 2008). 
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Post-compulsory Secondary Education also includes the Vocational 
Training Institutes (IEK), which provide formal but unclassified level of education. 
These Institutes are not classified as an educational level, because they accept 
both Gymnasio (lower secondary school) and Lykeio (upper secondary school) 
graduates according to the relevant specializations they provide. 
Public higher education is divided into Universities and Technological 
Education Institutes (TEI). Students are admitted to these Institutes according to 
their performance at national level examinations taking place at the second and 
third grade of Lykeio. Additionally, students are admitted to the Hellenic Open 
University upon the completion of the 22 years of age by drawing lots.  
The following graph presents concisely the structure of the Greek 
education system, as it consists of institutions of the formal, classified or 
unclassified education. 
Formal education is characterized by the fixed length of study, the 
possibility of repetition and the award of a formal school-leaving certificate which 
is the official authorization. 
As a consequence of the classification of the education institutions, a title 
(school-leaving certificate, degree etc.) is compulsory for students at each 
education level in order to continue to the next.  
It should be outlined that the graph offers a general overview of the 
education system with its main aspects being supervised by the Ministry of 
Education and which form the major part of it. However, a broader analysis 
shows that the total of the education services provided for in Greece form a much 
more complex, multilevel and differentiated infrastructure. Moreover, many other 
educational services, classified or unclassified, are provided for in the formal 
education system, either in co-operation with it or completely independently.  
A detailed description of the Greek Education System is offered in 
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APPENDIX D. THE INTERVIEW OF COL. COSTAS MOUTOS U.S. 
ARMY RET.  
“I’m a Greek/American, having served in Greece with NATO and during 
the early years of the all volunteer Armed Forces for the U.S., I was a member of 
the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. From this point of my military experience I 
would like to offer comments on a possible Greek Army all volunteer concepts. 
The nation of Greece must consider two areas in formulating a policy: 
A. Strategic needs. For defense the Greek Army needs to be as large 
as today’s force to address the challenge of defending a nation with vast borders 
as Greece has with its great number of islands. Forces have to be permanently 
stationed there or quickly deployed within hours. The force has to be well trained 
and equipped and have the close relationship it now has with the Greek nation. A 
volunteer force becomes “THEY” of little concern to the Greek general public. 
They become employees of the Government and are viewed as such by the 
people. As such, the effort to equip and train such force loses its support by the 
people. A volunteer force will probably be smaller than the present force. 
Greece’s small population almost guarantees such. In the event of hostilities a 
smaller force will need replacements (effedries) quickly or it will be defeated. In 
times of war people are less inclined to volunteer and it takes time to recruit 
volunteers, train them and deploy them. Example: if a building project needs 
carpenters all stops until carpenters are hired. This often takes time which is a 
luxury UN available in combat. The answer to small volunteer force is a well 
trained, equipped and available reserve of equal size or greater than the 
volunteer force. This will have a ready reserve of well trained individuals who 
would be available for call up and immediate deployment to feel vacancies in the 
active Army, Units of platoon (dimiries) company (lohos) and battalions (tagmata) 
sized units well trained, fully manned and quickly deployed to meet the defense 
requirements. To fight well, they must be equipped and trained as well. Minimum 
training will have to include a Sat/Sunday training session a month and at least 
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15 days a year of training in a maneuver area with the active army. Also advisors 
at company (lohos) level from the active army will be needed. Such reserve force 
must be recruited simultaneously with the active army and trained in installations 
by the active army to insure quality. This combination of a volunteer force 
supported by a reserve force might able to satisfy the defense needs of Greece. 
A small defense force of volunteers only without sizable ready reserves will 
probably fall short of the Greek strategic needs. 
B. Costs. A volunteer force will be expensive in fact very expensive to 
the tune of four to five times as much. The soldier now becomes an employee. 
You have to pay market price for each soldier and when the economy is good the 
price goes up. To pay minimal wages without the very expensive benefits such 
as medical care and retirement, the only volunteers you will get is a lower mental 
level and competence. You have to establish a recruiting structure with 
mental/physical categories for the volunteers. Perhaps a 1 to 5 designation. One 
being the top and five for the lowest (hazous and vlakes). Bonus will have to be 
paid for the high and hazardous requirements. Extensive preplanning to insure 
timely inputs to maintain levels needed. Obligations will have to be established 
for volunteers to serve in the reserves when leaving active duty to insure reserve 
manning and quality levels for the reserves (efedries). The same organization will 
have to recruit personnel for the reserve components. An example for the 
reserves will be soldiers will spend six months in training with the active army 
and six years service with the Army reserve (paid while serving). The volunteer 
force for the Navy and the Air Force might have to be paid more now. The 
incentive of serving in the Navy or the Air Force instead of being drafted in to the 
Army will be gone. Officers in the reserves will have to be trained at the same 
level as those in the active army. Armories (training locations) will be needed in 
all communities for reserves to train one weekend a month. Storage areas and 
security of weapons for the reserves is a major concern. The cost is an area of 
major concern. If inadequate resources to maintain the reserves are provided a 
small active army force is in great jeopardy in time of war,” 
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 APPENDIX E. PRESENTATION OF THE MILITARY 
REPRESENTATION MODEL (MRM)461 
A. BACKGROUND 
Proponents of population representation in the American armed forces call 
upon three basic principles to argue their position. Briefly, military members 
should: (1) be “citizen-soldiers” who can “re-present” (or “present again”) the 
variety of community interests and recreate the social fabric of American life; (2) 
ensure a capable, cohesive, and effective fighting force (in symbol as well as in 
deed); and (3) be selected and treated fairly and in a way that distributes the 
benefits and burdens of service throughout society. These three areas—political 
legitimacy, military effectiveness, and social equity, respectively—frame a core of 
concern around an age-old question: Who shall serve when not all serve? 
A reasonable balance of opposing objectives is the key to reconciling 
differences between, say, benefits and burdens, internal organizational needs 
and external national goals, equal opportunity for individuals and equal 
representation of groups, compulsions and freedoms, and other areas of discord. 
A trade-off or compromise is similarly needed to mitigate fundamental conflicts 
between the goals of legitimacy, effectiveness, and equity. Yet, the search for a 
reasonable balance to guide military manpower policy, even though it offers a 
means for reconciling sometimes conflicting objectives, is ultimately an exercise 
in subjective reasoning. After all, how does one strike a balance between realistic 
military needs or requirements and the perceived social good? Can one, or 
should one, even attempt to balance and trade between separate categories of 
demands on the nation and the body politic? Indeed, what is “reasonable?” 
The American experience is one of civil-military convergence, where the 
outcomes and objectives of military representation are described in social and 
                                            
461 Mark J. Eitelberg, https://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/mn4114_eb (accessed May 21, 
2008). 
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political as well as military terms. Assuming that it is possible to establish 
evaluative criteria and balance competing objectives, we can attempt to build a 
conceptual framework and functional definition of military representation. 
Perfect representation is often described as “microcosmic” representation, 
a miniature reflection or copy of the larger population. Perfect representation in 
the armed forces is depicted in the Military Representation Model as a smaller 
replica of the national population, located somewhere within that body. Since the 
idealized state of perfect representation cannot be achieved under normal 
conditions—and may not even be desirable—it is necessary to establish some 
boundary of “approximate representation” in the model. Once the notion of 
approximate representation is accepted, however, the presumed certainty of 
outcomes associated with perfect representation is lost. The problem is that 
approximate representation can mean one inch or a thousand miles, one 
percentage point or many more, depending upon one’s point of reference. 
Consequently, approximate representation must be evaluated in relation to the 
set of “higher” goals that have made it an important policy concern. These higher 
goals are depicted in the model as political legitimacy, military effectiveness, and 
social equity. As long as the population of military members stays within the 
established boundaries of being “close enough for comfort” (shown as the 
shaded area in the model), the armed forces are seen by most as approximately 
representative. 
But, government policy, social values, the economy, international relations 
and conflict, benefits associated with military service, public attitudes and 
opinions of the military, the distribution of influence across population subgroups, 
as well as the many other factors, can change over time and affect the way in 
which the goals of legitimacy, effectiveness, and equity are defined or balanced. 
War, for example, can have a profound effect on how equity is perceived, as the 
burdens of military service normally outweigh the benefits—and what was once 
seen as an acceptable proportion of racial or ethnic minorities is considered  
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unacceptable; or, in terms of effectiveness, a once-acceptable proportion of 
persons with lower technical or mechanical abilities can become unacceptable 
for what is deemed a higher state of military readiness. 
 
Figure E.1. Convergence / Divergence Model of Military Representation 
(MRM)462  
B. SUMMARY 
If one is interested in evaluating a state of military “representativeness,” 
population ratios are meaningless unless they are placed in context. The Military 
Representation Model provides such context by using the political, military, and 
social issues that have been employed over the years to support having certain 
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levels of population participation in the American armed forces. For example, 
although the argument for “full-citizen participation” is as old as the American 
military itself, the numbers and proportion of women in the military have 
remained far below comparable levels in the larger society. Even today, when 
women account for roughly 15 percent of both the active-duty enlisted force and 
officer corps, and they are allowed to serve in more than four out of five military 
occupations, we do not find a great public outcry for the increased representation 
of women at levels closer to 50 percent. Why not? Why is a level of 16 percent 
considered acceptable, if the state of perfection is proportionately three-times as 
great? In contrast, African Americans (18- to 44-years old) account for about 13 
percent of the national population and nearly 20 percent of the active-duty 
enlisted force (23 percent in the Army). A majority of American citizens, in a 
number of surveys, have indicated that they are quite comfortable with the racial 
or ethnic balance in the enlisted force. Yet, it seems that, whenever the threat or 
reality of armed conflict is seen, many voices can be heard criticizing the over-
representation of African Americans or other racial/ethnic minorities in the 
military’s enlisted ranks. Why is one level of representation acceptable at some 
point and not another? Further, why is it acceptable to exclude certain groups—
older or younger people, high school dropouts, persons with relatively low 
aptitude test scores, very tall or very short people, homosexuals who are 
otherwise qualified, women in ground combat, and so on—and not others? Don’t 
persons in these excluded groups qualify as citizens who should be represented 
when considering the argument for “full-citizen participation?” The answers to 
these and other questions can be found in the Military Representation Model. 
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